Buildings in the District of Columbia: Authority to erect, 1179. Rented buildings Contracts, 1180. Buildings rented instead of those pre viously rented, 1181. Lease in time of war, 1182. Storage accommodations, 1183. Requisition in time of war, 1184. State, War and Navy Department Building, 1185. Temporary buildings In Potomac Park, 1186. Between Virginia Avenue and B Street, In Henry Park and Seaton Park, 1188. Telephone switchboard building, 1191. Schools for children of employees, 1194. 1019. Purchase of land to be authorized by law. No land shall be purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase. R. S. 3736. See note to R. S. 3733, post, 1153. Notes of Decisions. Construction and effect of section in general. The general effect of the section is to render the exercise by an executive department of a power to purchase land on account of the United States illegal, unless the intention of Congress that such power should be exercised has been so clearly expressed as to amount to an express authority. (1865) 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 201. An act authorizing the Secretary of War to purchase for the United States land necessary for wharves for transportation of the Army and its supplies is a law authorizing the purchase of land within the statute. (1899) 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 665. A conveyance of lands to the United States is void and inoperative unless the purchase is authorized by Congress. U. S. v. Tichenor (C. C. 1882), 12 Fed. 415. This section is directed not against the acquisition of real property otherwise than for a valuable consideration but against the expenditure of public money. Hence the word "purchase" should not be deemed herein to apply to the acquisition of real property by any means other than by descent but given a narrower meaning, in which it appears clearly it was intended to be used. (1910) 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 413, 415; id. 463. Implication of authority to purchase land. Under the section an act authorizing a public improvement and appropriating money therefor is sufficient authority for the purchase of land necessary or proper to such improvement. Burns v. U. S. (1908), 160 Fed. 631, 87 C. C. A. 533. The compromise of a suit, receiving real and other property in discharge of the debt in trust, and selling the same, does not come under any authority to purchase lands. U. S. v. Lane (C. C. 1844), Fed. Cas. No. 15,559. Act Mar. 3, 1875, making an appropriation for a movable dam, impliedly authorizes the purchase, with the approval of the Secretary of War, of such land as is necessary for the construction of the dam. (1877) 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 212. Exchange of lands.-The Secretary of the Treasury may, if authorized by the President, accept a site for a Federal building in Honolula acquired in exchange for public land in Hawaii and assume the custody and control thereof, no objection thereto arising under the section. (1903) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 600. The expense of procuring an abstract of title to land to be used as a site for a fortification is a proper charge against the appropriation made for the purchase of the site, if the abstract is needed by the United States attorney to assist him in examining the title, provided the land is to be purchased and not condemned. 3 Comp. Dec. 216. The act of Congress does not prohibit the acquisition by the United States of the legal title to land, without express legislative authority, when it is taken by way of security for debt. Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98. Construction of section to defeat Government title.-This section should not be construed to apply to executed contracts so as to defeat the title of the United States to land it has paid for. Burns v. U. S. (1908), 160 Fed. 631, 87 C. C. A. 533. debt. Neilson v. Lagow (1851), 12 How. 98, 106, 107, 13 L. Ed. 909. Purchase of mine. The leasing of a mine in Pennsylvania by the United States on a cash payment of $1,500, for experimentations in mine rescue work, constitutes a purchase of land within the meaning of the section (1910), 28 Opp. Atty. Gen. 463. Sites for monuments.-An appropriation for the erection of monuments or menorial tablets for the purpose of marking the position of each of the commands of the Regular Army engaged at Gettysburg is not applicable to the purchase of lands for the sites of such monuments or tablets. (1887) 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 79. Taking title or security.-A deed to trustees to pay a debt due the United States, being an authority to sell so much of the land as might be necessary to pay the debt, is not such a purchase as is forbidden by this section, but the statute does not prohibit the acquisition directly by the United States of the legal title to land, when it is taken by way of security for a 1020. Assent of States to purchases of land by the United States.--The President of the United States is authorized to procure the assent of the legislature of any State within which any purchase of land has been made for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings without such consent having been obtained. R. S. 1838. Notes of Decisions. Jurisdiction of Federal courts.-See ante, 431, and notes. Payment for land.-Payment of the purchase money for the land may be made, though the legislature of the State has not consented to the purchase. See 1029, post, considered in connection with this section, and construed. (1877) 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 212. 1021. Price of land limited by appropriation.-And hereafter no money shall be paid nor contracts made for payment for any site for a public building in excess of the amount specifically appropriated therefor; as amended by sec. 33, act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 699). See also notes to R. S. 3733, post, 1153. R. S. 3734, Requisites of estimates for appropriations for public works, see 208, ante. Notes of Decisions. Right to object on ground of insufficiency of appropriation.-An exception to a petition by the United States for viewers to assess the compensation for a site for pua lic buildings that there was not authcient of the amount appropriated by Congress to pay for exceptant's lot will not be sustained. In re U. S. (Pa. 1874), 24 Pittsb. Leg. J. 105. 1022. Condemnation of land.--That in every case in which the Secretary of the Treasury or any other officer of the Government has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized to procure real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses he shall be, and hereby is, authorized to acquire the same for the United States by condemnation, under judicial process, whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so, and the United States circuit or district courts of the district wherein such real estate is located, shall have jurisdiction of proceedings for such condemnation, and it shall be the duty of the Attorney-General of the United States, upon every application of the Secretary of the Treasury, under this act, or such other officer, to cause proceedings to be commenced for condemnation, within thirty days from the receipt of the application at the Department of Justice. Sec. 1, act of Aug. 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 357). The practice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceeding in causes arising under the provisions of this act shall conform, as near as may be, to the prac tice, pleadings, forms and proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of the court to the contrary notwithstanding. Sec. 2 act of Aug. 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 357). Notes of Decisions. Power of eminent domain by United States. The United States, in proceedings to condemn land for governmental purposes, exercises its own right of eminent domain, subject to the limitation of the Federal Constitution that private prop erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, and does not proceed under the right of the State; and the right to compensation and its measure may be different from that in a State condemnation proceeding with respect to property which had previously been appropriated to public or municipal uses under the laws of the State. Town of Nahant v. U. S. (1905)), 136 Fed. 273, 70 C. C. A. 641, 69 L. R. A. 723, modifying decree In re Condemnation of Land at Nahant (D. C. 1904), 128 Fed. 185, and decree modified (1907), 133 1 ed. 520, 82 C. C. ♪ 470. The United States has never, by any legislation, undertaken to confer upon the States authority to judge f its needs of lands for national purposes or to assess the compensation it should pay, and any such judgment and assessment must, therefore, be wholly provisio al and subject to its acceptance and ratification. People v. Humphrey (1871), 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94. The United States may, in the exercise of its right of eminent domain, by observing the constitutional requirement of making due compensation therefor, seize and condemn the property of individuals for the purpose of erecting lighthouses thereon. Id. The proceeding under Laws Mich. 1867, p. 158, authorizing the condemnation of private lands for the purpose of turning it over to the United States for the maintenance of a lighthouse, can not be sustained on the ground of the interest of the State by reason of its coastwise commerce in the establishment of lighthouses on such waters. Id. Any attempted distinction between "requisition" and " condemnation" is largely technical; "requisition" is more often used with reference to the taking of personal property, and "condemnation " to the taking of real property; but in either case the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation to be made. Filbin Corporation v. U. S. (D. C. 1920), 266 Fed. 911. The exemption of the United States from a suit by an individual does not affect the rule that property may only be taken in the manner prescribed by law. Id. The omission from the statute of a provision for a jury trial does not deprive the owner of any right. Id. Property subject to appropriation.The rule that land in public use can not be taken for another and inconsistent public use under general legislative power of condemnation, but that the right must appear, to seize the particular property, by express provision directed toward the special property, in some pertinent legislation or be the inevitable implication arising from such legislation, does not apply to a proceeding by the United States to condemn a portion of a public alley for a post office site; the comparative importance of the contending public uses under such circumstances being a matter for judicial determination. U. S. v. City of Tiffin (C. C. 1911), 190 Fed. 279. Query, whether property already lawfully taken and held for the uses of the State as a public way can be taken for the uses of the United States without express authority from Congress therefor, or under a statute authorizing in general terms the condemnation of land for such use. U. S. v. Certain Land in Town of New Castle, Rockingham County (C. C. 1908), 165 Fed. 783. See (1893) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 628. Validity of statute. The manner in which the power of eminent doms' shall be exercised is a matter of legislative discretion. Chappell v. U. S. (1897), 81 Fed. 764, 26 C. C. A. 600. And this section is a constitutional exercise of the powers of Congress. Chappell v. U. S. (1896), 16 Sup. Ct. 397, 400, 160 U. S. 499, 40 L. Ed. 510. And is not in conflict with Const. Amend. 5. In re Rugheimer (D. C. 1888, 36 Fed. 369. Construction and applicability of statute. The purpose of this section is to |