To find an objection, then, it must be shown that some meaning was annexed to these general terms, which was not proper; and, for this purpose, either that the means used by the General Assembly were an example of improper means, or that there were no proper means to which the terms could refer.

In the example given by the State, of declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts to be unconstitutional, and of communicating the declaration to the other States, no trace of improper means has appeared. And if the other States had concurred in making a like declaration, supported too by the numerous applications flowing immediately from the people, it can scarcely be doubted, that these simple means would have been as sufficient, as they are unexceptionable.

It is no less certain that other means might have been employed, which are strictly within the limits of the Constitution. The Legislatures of the States might have made a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain a rescinding of the two offensive acts; or, they might have represented to their respective Senators in Congress, their wish, that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the Constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a Convention for the same object.

These several means, though not equally eligible in themselves, nor probably, to the States, were all constitutionally open for consideration. And if the General Assembly, after declaring the two acts to be unconstitutional, the first and most obvious proceeding on the subject, did not undertake to point out to the other States, a choice among the farther measures that might become necessary and proper, the reserve will not be misconstrued by liberal minds into any culpable imputation.

These observations appear to form a satisfactory reply to every objection which is not founded on a misconception of the terms employed in the resolutions. There is one other, however, which may be of too much importance not to be added. It cannot be forgotten, that among the arguments addressed to those who apprehended danger to liberty from the establishment of the General Government over so great a country, the appeal was emphatically made to the intermediate existence of the State Governments, be tween the people and that Governmert, to the vigilance with which they would descry the first symptoms of usurpation, and to the

promptitude with which they would sound the alarm to the public. This argument was probably not without its effect; and if it was a proper one then, to recommend the establishment of the Constitution, it must be a proper one now, to assist in its interpretation.

The only part of the two concluding resolutions that remains to be noticed, is the repetition in the first, of that warm affection to the Union and its members, and of that scrupulous fidelity to the Constitution, which have been invariably felt by the people of this State. As the proceedings were introduced with these sentiments, they could not be more properly closed than in the same manner. Should there be any so far misled as to call in question the sincerity of these professions, whatever regret may be excited by the error, the General Assembly cannot descend into a discussion of it. Those, who have listened to the suggestion, can only be left to their own recollection of the part which this State has borne in the establishment of our National Independence, in the establishment of our National Constitution, and in maintaining under it the authority and laws of the Union, without a single exception of internal resistance or commotion. By recurring to these facts, they will be able to convince themselves, that the representatives of the people of Virginia, must be above the necessity of opposing any other shield to attacks on their national patriotism, than their own consciousness, and the justice of an enlightened public; who will perceive in the resolutions themselves, the strongest evidence of attachment both to the Constitution and to the Union, since it is only by maintaining the different governments and departments within their respective limits, that the blessings of either can be perpetuated.

The extensive view of the subject thus taken by the committee, has led them to report to the House, as the result of the whole, the following resolution:

Resolved, That the General Assembly, having carefully and respectfully attended to the proceedings of a number of the States, in answer to their resolutions of December 21, 1798, and having accurately and fully re-examined and re-considered the latter, find it to be their indispensable duty to adhere to the same, as founded in truth, as consonant with the Constitution, and as conducive to its preservation; and more especially to be their duty to renew, as they do hereby renew, their protest against "the Alien and Sedition Acts," as palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution.

MR. MADISON'S LETTER.

To the Editor of the North American Review.

DEAR SIR,

Montpelier, August, 1830.

I have duly received your letter, in which you refer to the nullifying doctrine," advocated as a constitutional right, by some of our distinguished fellow-citizens; and to the proceedings of the Virginia Legislature in '98, '99, as appealed to in behalf of that doctrine; and you express a wish for my ideas on those subjects.

I am aware of the delicacy of the task in some respects, and the difficulty in every respect, of doing full justice to it. But having, in more than one instance, complied with a like request from other friendly quarters, I do not decline a sketch of the views which I have been led to take of the doctrine in question, as well of some others connected with them; and of the grounds from which it appears, that the proceedings of Virginia have been misconceived by those who have appealed to them. In order to understand the true character of the Constitution of the United States, the error, not uncommon, must be avoided, of viewing it through the medium, either of a consolidated government, or of a confederated government, whilst it is neither the one nor the other; but a mixture of both. And having, in no model, the similitudes and analogies applicable to other systems of government, it must, more than any other, be its own interpreter, according to its text and the facts of the case.

From these it will be seen that the characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are: 1. The mode of its formation. 2. The division of the supreme powers of government between the States in their united capacity, and the States in their individual capa

cities.

1. It was formed, not by the governments of the component States, as the federal government for which it was substituted was formed. Nor was it formed by a majority of the people of the United States, as a single community in the manner of a consolidated government.

It was formed by the States, that is, by the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed consequently by the same authority which formed the State Constitutions.

Being thus derived from the same source as the Constitutions of the States, it has, within each State, the same authority as the Constitution of the State; and is as much a Constitution, in the strict sense of the term, within its prescribed sphere, as the Constitutions of the States are, within their respective spheres; but with this obvious and essential difference, that being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the Constitution of a State may be at its individual will.

2. And that it divides the supreme powers of government, between the government of the United States and the governments of the individual States, is stamped on the face of the instrument: the powers of war and of taxation, of commerce and of treaties, and other enumerated powers vested in the government of the United States, being of as high and sovereign a character, as any of the powers reserved to the State governments.

Nor is the government of the United States created by the Con. stitution, less a government in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the governments created by the Constitutions of the States are, within their several spheres. It is, like them, organized into legislative, executive and judiciary departments. It operates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them it has at command a physical force for executing the powers committed to it. The concurrent operation in certain cases, is one of the features marking the peculiarity of the system.

Between these different constitutional governments, the one operating in all the States, the others operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction; and that some provision ought to be made for such currences. A political system that does not provide for a peaceabl and authoritative termination of occurring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of a

government, the object and end of a real government being the substitution of law and order for uncertainty, confusion and violence.

That to have left a final decision, in such cases, to each of the States, then thirteen, and already twenty-four, could not fail to make the Constitution and laws of the United States different in different States, was obvious, and not less obvious, that this diversity of independent decisions, must altogether distract the government of the Union, and speedily put an end to the Union itself. A uniform authority of the laws, is in itself a vital principle. Some of the most important laws could not be partially executed. They must be executed in all the States, or they could be duly executed in none. An impost, of an excise for example, if not in force in some States, would be defeated in others. It is well known that this was among the lessons of experience, which had a primary influence in bringing about the existing Constitution. A loss of its general authority would moreover revive the exasperating questions between the States holding ports for foreign commerce, and the adjoining States without them; to which are now added all the inland States, necessarily carrying on their foreign commerce through other States.

To have made the decisions under the authority of the individual States, co-ordinate, in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would unavoidably produce collisions incompatible with the peace of society, and with that regular and efficient administration which is of the essence of free governments. Scenes could not be avoided, in which a ministerial officer of the United States, and the correspondent officer of an individual State, would have recontres in executing conflicting decrees; the result of which would depend on the comparative force of the local posses attending them; and that a casualty depending on the political opinions and party feelings in different States.

To have referred every clashing decision, under the two authorities, for a final decision, to the States as parties to the Constitution, would be attended with delays, with inconveniences, and with expenses, amounting to a prohibition of the expedient; not to mention its tendency to impair the salutary veneration for a system requiring such frequent interpositions, nor the delicate ques