by them in the character of executors only, the real estate was not affected by it. (Fordham v. Wallis, 10 Hare, 217; 17 Jur. 228; 22 Law J., Ch. 548.) 9 Geo, 4, c. 14. one of se Indebitatus assumpsit against J. and W,; plea, the Statute of Fraudulent Limitations; replication, that the debt accrued within six years. payment by The debt was originally contracted with J., W. and S., and S., more veral partthan six years afterwards, and within six years of the action being ners. brought, made a payment in respect of it to the plaintiff. S. became bankrupt shortly after; and the jury found that he made the payment in fraud of J. and W., and in expectation of immediate bankruptcy. It was held, that, nevertheless, the payment barred the operation of the statute. (Goddard v. Ingram, 3 Q. B. 839.) made by infants. No action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person upon Confirmation any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during of promises infancy, or upon any ratification after full age of any promise or simple contract made during infancy, unless such promise or ratification shall be made by some writing signed by the party to be charged therewith. (9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 5.) A written acknowledgment of a debt is an answer to a plea of the Statute of Limitations, though made by an infant, if the debt was for necessaries supplied to him. (Willins v. Smith, 4 Ell. & Bl. 180.) In an action of debt for goods sold and delivered; plea, infancy; replication that the defendant ratified the contract in writing, signed by him after coming of age. Issue thereon. The plaintiff produced the following paper, signed by the defendant: "I am sorry to give you so much trouble in calling but I am not prepared for you, but will, without neglect, remit you in a short time." The paper had no address or date, and specified no sum; but it was proved orally that the defendant delivered it to the plaintiff's agent on being pressed for the debt, the amount of which was also proved by oral evidence. This was held sufficient to satisfy the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 5. No evidence was given to show whether the defendant was of age or not when he delivered the paper: it was held, that the plaintiff must recover; the defendant, if he relied on his infancy at the time, being bound to prove it. (Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Ad. & Ell. 934; 3 P. & Dav. 529. As to the second point, see Borthwick v. Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648; Bates v. Wells, 1 Stark. Ev. 463, 2nd ed.) Any written instrument signed by the party, which, in the case of adults would have amounted to the adoption of the act of a party acting as agent, will, in the case of an infant who has attained his majority, amount to a ratification of a promise or simple contract debt. (Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. R. 122; Law J. 1847, Exch. 270. See ante, p. 246.) visions of By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, so much of the act 2 & 3 Repeal of Will. 4, c. 39, s. 10, as relates to the duration of writs and to alias and certain propluries writs, and to the proceedings necessary for making the first 3 Will. 4, writ in any action available to prevent the operation of any statute, c. 39. whereby the time for the commencement of any action may be limited, is repealed. (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 10.) mons to save No original writ of summons shall be in force for more than six Renewal of months from the day of the date thereof, including the day of such writ of sumdate, but if any defendant therein named may not have been served the Statute of therewith, the original or concurrent writ of summons may be re- Limitations, newed at any time before its expiration, for six months from the date and for other of such renewal, and so from time to time during the currency of the purposes. renewed writ, by being marked with a seal bearing the date of the day, month and year of such renewal, such seal to be provided and kept for that purpose at the offices of the masters of the said superior courts, and to be impressed upon the writ by the proper officer of the court out of which such writ issued, upon delivery to him by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 14. plaintiff or his attorney of a præcipe, in such form as has heretofore been required to be delivered upon the obtaining of an alias writ; and a writ of summons so renewed shall remain in force and be available to prevent the operation of any statute whereby the time for the commencement of the action may be limited, and for all other purposes, from the date of the issuing of the original writ of summons. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 11. (16 & 17 Vict. c. 113, s. 28, as to Ireland.) As to process to save the Statute of Limitations, see 2 Arch. Pr. Q. B. pp. 1224, 1225, and Black v. Green, 15 C. B. 262. ABOLITION OF FINES AND RECOVERIES. 3 & 4 WILLIAM IV. c. 74. An Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries (a), I. Interpretation clause, s. 1. II. Fines and recoveries abolished, ss. 2, 3. III. The tenure of ancient demesne, ss. 4−6. IV. The amendment of fines and recoveries, and the rendering them valid in certain cases, ss. 7-12. V. The custody of the records of fines and recoveries, s. 13. VI. Estates tail not barrable by warranty, s. 14. VII. Alienation of estates tail, ss. 15—21. VIII. Definition of the protector, ss. 22—33. IX. Powers of the protector, 34—37. X. Confirmation of voidable estates created by tenant in tail, s. 38. XII. Modes by which estates tail and estates expectant thereon are XIII. Estates tail in copyholds, 50—54. XIV. Bankrupts' estates tail, ss. 55–69. XV. Money to be laid out in lands to be entailed, ss. 70–72. XVI. The inrolment of deeds, &c., ss. 73-76. XVII. Alienation by married women, ss. 77-91. XVIII. Ireland. XIX. Orders of the Court of Common Pleas made in pursuance of the above act. INTERPRETATION CLAUSE. I. Be it enacted, that in the construction of this act Meaning of the word "lands" shall extend to manors, advowsons, certain words rectories, messuages, lands, tenements, tithes, rents and sions. hereditaments of any tenure (except copy of court roll), "Lands." This act does not extend to Ireland, but on the 15th August, 1834, the statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92, was passed, entitled "An Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and for the Substitution of more simple Modes of Assurance in Ireland." This act corresponds in most particulars with the English statute. The general period fixed for the Irish act to come into operation was the 31st October, 1834, instead of 31st December, 1833. and expres "Estate." 3&4 Will. 4, and whether corporeal or incorporeal, and any undivided c. 74, s. 1. share thereof, but when accompanied by some expression including or denoting the tenure by copy of court roll, shall extend to manors, messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments of that tenure, and any undivided share thereof; and the word "estate" shall extend to an estate in equity as well as at law, and shall also extend to any interest, charge, lien or incumbrance in, upon or affecting lands, either at law or in equity, and shall also extend to any interest, charge, lien or incumbrance in, upon or affecting money subject to be invested in the purchase of "Base fee." lands; and the expression "base fee" shall mean exclusively that estate in fee simple into which an estate tail is converted where the issue in tail are barred, but persons claiming estates by way of remainder or otherwise are not barred (b); and the expression "estate tail," in addition to its usual meaning, shall mean a base fee into which an estate tail shall have been converted; and the "Actual te-,, expression "actual tenant in tail" shall mean exclusively the tenant of an estate tail which shall not have been barred, and such tenant shall be deemed an actual tenant in tail, although the estate tail may have been divested or "Tenant in turned to a right (c); and the expression" tenant in tail" shall mean not only an actual tenant in tail, but also a person who, where an estate tail shall have been barred and converted into a base fee, would have been tenant of such estate tail if the same had not been barred; and the "Tenant in expression "tenant in tail entitled to a base fee" shall "Estate tail." nant in tail." tail." tail entitled to a base fee." "Money." mean a person entitled to a base fee, or to the ultimate beneficial interest in a base fee, and who, if the base fee had not been created, would have been actual tenant in tail; and the expression "money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands" shall include money, whether raised or to be raised, and whether the amount thereof be or be not ascertained, and shall extend to stocks and funds, and real and other securities, the produce of which is directed to be invested in the purchase of lands, and the lands to be purchased with such money or produce The definition of the word " estate," taken in connection with the 77th section, post, enable a married woman by deed acknowledged to dispose of any interest in land either at law or in equity, or any charge, lien or incumbrance in or upon or affecting land either at law or in equity. (Briggs v. Chamberlain, 11 Hare, 74.) In the glossary clause of the Irish act, the word "estate" is made to extend to " any interest, charge, right, title, lien or incumbrance in, upon or affecting lands, either at law or in equity, whether present or vested, or future or contingent." The additional words, right and title, were probably introduced in consequence of some doubts which some, as it is conceived, erroneously entertained whether the word estate would comprehend the right or title of dower of a married woman. (See note to section 78, post.) gender. shall extend to lands held by copy of court roll, and also 3&4 Will. 4, to lands of any tenure, in Ireland or elsewhere out of c.74, s. 1. England, where such lands or any of them are within the scope or meaning of the trust or power directing or authorizing the purchase; and the word "person" shall ex- "Person." tend to a body politic, corporate or collegiate, as well as an individual; and every word importing the singular Number and number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the plural number shall extend and be applied to one person or thing as well as several persons or things; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male; and every assurance already made or here- Settlement. after to be made, whether by deed, will, private act of parliament or otherwise, by which lands are or shall be entailed, or agreed or directed to be entailed, shall be deemed a settlement; and every appointment made in exercise of any power contained in any settlement, or of any other power arising out of the power contained in any settlement, shall be considered as part of such settlement, and the estate created by such appointment shall be considered as having been created by such settlement (d); and where any such settlement is or shall be made by will, the time of the death of the testator shall be considered the time when such settlement was made: provided always, that those words and expressions occurring in this clause, to which more than one meaning is to be attached, shall not have the different meanings given to them by this clause in those cases in which there is any thing in the subject or context repugnant to such construction. (a) The principal objects of this statute are, 1st. To abolish fines and recoveries, and to make warranties by tenant in tail no longer effectual for barring entails. a 2nd. To enable a tenant in tail to make an effectual alienation by any deed to be inrolled, by which a tenant in fee can convey. 3rd. To make the beneficial owner of an estate for years determinable on life, or of any greater estate prior to an estate tail under a settlement, the protector of the settlement for the purpose of consenting to a disposition by a tenant in tail in remainder. 4th. To repeal the statute 11 Hen. 7, c. 20, restraining the alienation by married women tenants in tail of lands, of the gift of their husbands, except as to settlements made before the passing of the act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74. 5th. To provide new methods by which estates tail and interests expectant thereon may be barred, as well as to freeholds as copyholds. 6th. To repeal the Bankrupt Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 65, as far as relates to estates tail, and to give to the commissioners of bankrupt other powers of disposing of the estates tail of bankrupts. 7th. To repeal the statutes 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 56, and 7 Geo. 4, The principa objects of this act. |