decided in Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449. On the contrary, it is there cited with approval, and carefully distinguished from the case then under consideration. Our statute, unlike those of some of the states which give the action for the benefit of the next of kin generally, closely follows Lord Campbell's act, and allows suits only for the benefit "of the wife, husband, parent, and child" of the person killed. And in Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449, the court, following the English decisions construing their statute, decided that "legal liability alone is not the test of the injury in respect of which damages may be recovered under the statute; but that the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by the relative remaining alive may be taken into account by the jury, and damages given in respect of that expectation if it be disappointed, and the probable pecuniary loss thereby sustained." In that case, a father was killed who had two adult unmarried daughters who lived with him as part of his family, were dependent upon him for support, by reason of their inability to support themselves, and the father had supported, and was supporting them at the time of his death. In view of these facts, the court considered it a case falling within the rule of interpretation above stated, and allowed the jury to award damages to these adult as well as to the minor children.

Following in the same line is the case of Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 63 Md. 135. The person killed was a mother who had made her permanent home with a married daughter, to whom she rendered services by attending to housework and looking after the children while the daughter was away at work, and thus gave her considerable assistance, which she had rendered, and was rendering when she was killed. The court allowed the jury to consider the pecuniary value of these services to the daughter, and to award her damages for the loss of them. In each of the English decisions cited in both these cases, the adult son who was killed had given and was giving assistance of a definite pecuniary amount to his parents, and this fact was relied on by the court as the evidence which showed that the father had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of his son's life: Dalton v. South-Eastern R'y Co., 93 Eng. Com. L. 296; Franklin v. South-Eastern R'y Co., 3 Hurl. & N. 211. Of like character and to the same effect is Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v.

Adams, 55 Pa. St. 499; and many other similar cases might be cited. In these cases, the son, after attaining age, had manifested his willingness to assist his parents by actually doing so, and when that fact is proved we can understand how the latter may reasonably expect further assistance if the son lives. But whether a minor son will do so after he comes of age is, as it seems to us, a matter of vague conjecture, which can furnish no reasonable foundation for a verdict.

In the present case, the father testified that he had emancipated his son two years before he was killed; that he was working for himself, and had voluntarily given each year to witness, since his emancipation, seventy-five or eighty dollars of his wages; that he was a farm-hand and earned from one hundred and ten to one hundred and twenty dollars a year, and was living with witness, except when at labor. But the only effect of this emancipation, as it is called, was to protect, so long as it continued, the employer, in paying his wages to the minor himself. The father could revoke the privilege at any time he chose, and collect and receive his entire wages.

Again, in answer to the direct question, "Did you have any reasonable expectation that he would do this [that is, give you seventy-five or eighty dollars a year] after he became of age?" the father testified that "the deceased had said that after he got of age he would help to fix up the property, and that he never said anything about getting married"; and the court, against the objection of the defendant, allowed this testimony to go to the jury. But a vague declaration or promise like this, made by a minor, has no probative force whatever, and in our opinion, this evidence is altogether too slight and insufficient to enable the jury to find from it a ground for the reasonable expectation which the law requires. Nor do we find any evidence in this record which can have the effect of taking this case out of the rule laid down by our predecessors in State v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 24 Md. 84; 87 Am. Dec. 600. That case was, in our judgment, well decided.

We have considered the case very carefully, and it follows from what we have said that while there is no error justifying a reversal in the other rulings of the court, there is error in the modification made by the court to the defendant's eleventh prayer, in rejecting its twelfth prayer, in granting the plaintiff's first and fourth prayers, and in the ruling relating to the admissibility of evidence contained in the second exception,

and for these errors the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded.

PARENT AND CHILD. - As to the measure of damages recoverable by a father for the death of his child, see Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509; 14 Am. St. Rep. 69, and note; Cooper v. Lake Shore etc. R'y Co., 66 Mich. 261; 11 Am. St. Rep. 482.

WHITRIDGE V. WILLIAMS.

CONSTRUCTION of Will.

[71 MARYLAND, 105.]

Where a testator bequeaths to a trustee a sum of money to be held in trust, and the income to be paid to a married woman, "for the sole use of herself and her children during the term of her natural life, this trust to continue until her youngest child then alive attain to the age of twenty-one years, should she herself die previous to that time, when said trust fund is to go to her child or children then alive, in equal proportions,"-1. The words "for the sole use of herself and her children” did not give the children any estate in the property bequeathed. They showed that their support and maintenance were objects for which the testator desired to provide, but the mode which he adopted for securing this result was the gift to her of the income during her life. 2. The beneficiary having died before her youngest child attained the age of twenty-one years, the trust was to continue until it reached that age, and then the fund was to be divided equally among the children living at that time. 3. The income accruing after the death of the beneficiary was not to accumulate until the time of division, but the children were entitled to equal shares of such income until the time of division should arrive. 4. The beneficiary was entitled to the income during her life, and the trustee had no authority to use any portion of it to repair the depreciation of the principal. 5. The portion of such income which was converted by the trustee into principal belongs to the personal estate of the beneficiary, and must be delivered to her administrator. 6. But no loss ought to fall upon the trustee from his having so invested the income, since the beneficiary received the benefit of the investment during her life, and the delivery of the investment to her administrator will protect her personal estate from harm, and ought therefore to be credited to the trustee as income paid by him.

BILL in equity to obtain a construction of a clause of a will. Thomas Whitridge, now deceased, left the following legacy in his will: "I give and bequeath to John A. Whitridge fifty thousand dollars in cash, to be held in trust, the income of which to be paid to Mrs. Mary C. Williams, wife of Dr. Philip C. Williams, for the sole use of herself and her children during the term of her natural life; this trust to continue until her youngest child then alive attain to the age of twenty-one

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XVIL-33

years, should she herself die previous to that time, when said trust fund is to go to her child or children then alive, in equal proportions, but should she die without a child or children," then to certain persons named. In the residuary clause other property was left in the same way, to be included in the trust above mentioned. Mrs. Williams died, leaving four children, one of whom is over twenty-one years of age, and the other three are under that age. John A. Whitridge, trustee, averred in his bill that he had received the fifty thousand dollars above mentioned, and certain stocks and bonds; that during the lifetime of Mrs. Williams he paid over to her the net income, except the sum of $2,037.37, the balance in his hands at the time of her death, and except, also, about three thousand dollars, which he found it necessary, in order to keep the principal unimpared, to transfer to the principal account, from time to time, to make good the loss of premiums on certain securities, which had depreciated as they approached maturity. He also averred that he had received other sums of money belonging to the trust, all of which, except $11,367.73, he had invested. The principal object of the bill was to obtain the opinion of the court as to the meaning of the above-mentioned clause in the will, and its direction as to the disposition of the income already collected, and that which should accrue during the future continuance of the trust. The children and the administrator of Mrs. Williams were made defendants. The circuit court decreed that the trustee should be charged with the income collected by him in the lifetime of Mrs. Williams, and be allowed credit for payments to her, and the expenses of executing the trust, and commissions, and that the balance then remaining should be paid to the administrator of Mrs. Williams, and that the income accrued since her death should be equally divided among her children. All the parties ap

pealed.

Skipwith Wilmer, for the trustee.

Randolph Barton, for J. W. Williams, and for the guardian of the infants.

James M. Ambler, for the administrator.

BRYAN, J. It is necessary to say but little about the construction of the will. The income was to be paid to Mrs. Williams during the period of her natural life. The words "for the sole use of herself and her children" did not give the

children any estate in the property bequeathed. They showed that their support and maintenance were objects for which this testator desired to provide, but the mode which he adopted for securing this result was the gift to her of the income during her life. If she should die before her youngest child should reach the age of twenty-one years, the trust was to continue until it reached that age, and then the fund was to be divided equally among the children living at that time. The purpose of the testator to secure a support for the children during their minority is clearly evident; his purpose would be fully accomplished when the youngest child reached full age; and at that time he directed the principal to be divided. If the income were to be required to accumulate, instead of being divided among the children, a leading object of the testator would be defeated. We think that until the time of division shall arrive the children are entitled to equal shares of the income.

Mrs. Williams was entitled to the income during her life; and the trustee had no authority to use any portion of it to repair the depreciation of the principal. That portion which was so converted into principal belongs to the personal estate of Mrs. Williams, and must be delivered to her administrator. No loss, however, ought to fall upon the trustee from having so invested the income, as Mrs. Williams received the benefit of the investment during her life. The delivery to her administrator of the investment will protect her personal estate from harm, and it ought therefore now to be credited to the trustee as income paid by him. The costs in this court must be paid out of the trust fund.

Decree affirmed.

ONE APPOINTED TRUSTER FOR A WIFE AND CHILDREN continues to be trustee for the children, where he has not renounced: Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. 178; 12 Am. St. Rep. 249.