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For this discovery we are indebted to a gentleman of Georgetown, Ky., named Stevenson. He ascertained that the pit was nothing but a chasm of great depth, extending across the cave and therefore got a ladder of sufficient length to reach over. On this ladder this daring man, the guide, and some two or three others, crossed this deep and frightful chasm, and, on reaching the opposite part, found themselves in a cave of considerable size, which, after exploring to the distance of two miles, brought them, to their utter astonishment and delight, to the celebrated river of the cave. It is in this region of the cave, unknown until the last two years, where you meet with the great domes, the cataract, the river, the lake and the gigantic stalagmite columns. In order to gratify the numerous visiters with a view of this deeply interesting section of the cave, the proprietor has had a large and strong bridge with suitable railways, erected over the bottomless pit, rocks have been removed so as to render walking pleasant in the different avenues, stair-steps have been placed where required, boats are in readiness for those who feel inclined to take aquatic excursions on the river, and Bengal lights can be had by such as wish to witness the sublime spectacle which is exhibited by an illumination of the various domes.
"The river is three miles from the mouth of the cave.Where you first strike, it is not very wide, but of great depth; as you descend, it becomes wider; and it has a gentle current. I have never descended the river more than half a mile, but it is from the point where you first see it to the lake five miles; and Mr. Gorin, a highly respectable lawyer, and a former Representative of Warren county, informs me that there is a sufficiency of water in this river to float the largest class of steamboats. It is in this river where those fish without eyes have been found. It was the opinion of Professor Davidson, of Transylvania University, (who wrote a pamphlet respecting the cave,) that those fish had eyes and were blinded by light; in other words, that the apparent want of eyes arose from the sudden contraction of that organ, occasioned by the stimulus of light. This is not the case; a Professor of the Louisville Institute anatomized the head of this fish, and says there is no indication of there being such an organ. The lake of the cave has never been explored; some few have attempted it, but they have become alarmed and abandoned the enterprise. Stevenson, of Georgetown, has ventured farther on it than any other person. He passed, while on it, I am told, the mouths of four rivers or caves filled with water. It is of great depth, and is supposed of great width. This, however, I conceive doubtful, as I cannot conceive of the existence of an arch of sufficient expansion to admit of a lake of great dimensions. In descending the river to the lake, the mouths of a great many caves were seen, all of which are to be explored."
In my next article, I will continue my extracts, in which my correspondent gives an account of the discovery of the great cataract last November. The present article is lengthy; I therefore pause, and will continue it in the next or some future number if you have space. M.
[From the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, August 10th.] Destruction of the Steamboat Erie by Fire, and the loss of One Hundred and Seventy Lives! Little did we think yesterday in penning a brief paragraph in commendation of the Erie, that to-day we should be called upon to record the destruction of that boat together with a loss of life unequalled on our own or almost any other waters. The Erie left the dock at 10 minutes past 4, P. M., loaded with merchandise destined for Chicago, and, as nearly as now can be ascertained, about two hundred persons, including passengers and crew on board. The boat had been thoroughly overhauled, and although the wind was blowing fresh, everything promised a pleasant and prosperous voyage. Nothing occurred to mar this prospect till about 8 when the boat was off Silver Creek, about 8 miles from shore, and 33 miles from this city, when a slight explosion was heard, and immediately, instantaneously almost, the whole vessel was enveloped in flames. Capt. Titus, who was on the upper
deck, at the time, rushed to the Ladies' Cabin to obtain the Life Preservers, of which there were from 90 to 100 on board, but so rapid had been the progress of the flames, he found it impossible to enter the cabin. He returned to the upper deck, on his way giving orders to the Engineer to stop the engine, the wind and the headway of the boat increasing the fierceness of the flames and driving them aft. The Engineer replied that in consequence of the flames he could not reach the engine. The steerman was instantly directed to put the helm hard a starboard. The vessel swung slowly round, heading to the shore, and the boats-there were three on board-were then ordered to be lowered. Two of the boats were lowered, but in consequence of the heavy sea on, and the headway of the vessel, they both swamped as soon as they touched water. We will not attempt to describe the awful and appalling condition of the passengers. Some were frantic with fear and horror, others plunged headlong madly into the water, others again seized upon anything buoyant upon which they could lay hands. The small boat forward had been lowered. It was alongside the wheel, with three or four persons in it, when the captain jumped in and the boat immediately dropped astern filled with water.
A lady floated by with a life preserver on. She cried for help. There was no safety in the boat. The captain threw her the only oar in the boat. She caught the oar and was saved. It was Mrs. Lynde of Milwaukie, and she was the only lady saved. In this condition, the boat a mass of fierce fire, and the passengers and crew endeavoring to save themselves by swimming or supporting themselves by whatever they could reach-they were found by the Clinton at about 10 P. M. The Clinton left here in the morning, but in consequence of the wind had put into Dunkirk. She lay there till nearly sunset, at which time she ran out, and had proceeded as far as Barcelona, when just at twilight, the fire of the Erie was discovered some 20 miles astern. The Clinton immediately put about and reached the burning wreck about 10. It was a fearful sight.—All the upper works of the Erie had been burned away. The engine was standing, but the hull was a mass of dull, red flame. The passengers and crew were floating around, screaming in their agony and shrieking for help. The boats of the Clinton were instantly lowered and manned, and every person that could be seen or heard was picked up, and every possible relief afforded. The Lady, a little steamboat lying at Dunkirk, went out of that harbor as soon as possible, after the discovery of the fire, and arrived soon after the Clinton. It was not thought by the survivors that she saved any. By 1 A. M. all was still except the dead crackling of the fire. Not a solitary individual could be seen or heard on the wild waste of waters. A line was then made fast to the remains of the Erie's rudder, and an effort made to tow the hapless hull ashore. About this time the Chautauque came up and lent her assistance. The hull of the Erie was towed within about four miles of the shore, when it sunk in eleven fathoms water. By this time it was daylight. The lines were cast off. The Clinton headed for this port which she reached about 6 o'clock. Of those who are saved, several are badly burned, but none are dangerously injured so far as we have heard.
Origin of the Fire.-Among the passengers on board were six painters in the employ of Mr. W. G. Miller of this city, who were going to Erie to paint the steamboat Madison. They had with them demijohns filled with spirits of turpentine and varnish, which, unknown to Capt. Titus, were placed on the boiler deck directly over the boilers.One of the firemen, who was saved, says he had occasion to go on deck, and seeing the demijohns, removed them. They were re-placed, but by whom is not known. Immediately previous to the bursting forth of the flames, as several on board have assured us, a slight explosion was heard. The demijohns had probably burst with the heat, and their inflammable contents, taking fire instantly, communicated to every part of the boat, which having been freshly varnished caught as if it had been gunpowder.
Not a paper nor an article of any kind was saved. Of course it is impossible to give a complete list of those on board. Of cabin passengers Capt. Titus thinks there were
between 30 and 40, of whom 10 or 12 were ladies. In the steerage were about 140 passengers, nearly all of whom were Swiss and German immigrants. They were mostly in families with the usual proportion of men, women and children. The heart bleeds at the thought.
It is a singular coincidence that the Erie was burned at almost identically the same spot where the Washington was burned in June, 1838. Capt. Brown, who commanded the Washington at that time happened to be on board the Clinton, and was very active in saving the survivors of the Erie.
We annex a list of the lost and saved so far as we have been able to ascertain :
Hiram De Graff, passenger.
Theodore Sears, painter.
J. H. St. John, passenger to Chicago.
do badly burned.
William Wadsworth, one of the band, Erie.
Alfred O. Wilkeson, East Euclid, Ohio.
William Hughes, 2d mate.
Luther B. Searls, fireman.
Thomas J. Tann, Pittsford, N. Y.
John Winchel, Buffalo.
Edgar Clemens, 1st engineer.
Son of George Bebee, Cleveland.
Harrison Forrester, Harbor Creek, Pa.
COMMERCIAL AND STATISTICAL
EDITED BY SAMUEL HAZARD.
PHILADELPHIA, WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 1, 1841.
In a late Number, page 97, was inserted a correspondence between Governor McNutt and Messrs. Hope & Co., in relation to the payment of interest on the bonds of Mississippi -a subscriber has placed in our hands the "Southron" which contains the legal opinion of Charles Scott, Esq., given at the request of the Union Bank, that the State is "morally, politically and legally bound to discharge her bonds"-it is as follows:
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, July 27, 1841.
James Elliot, Esq., President of the Mississippi Union Bank.
SIR-Your communication of the 16th inst., in which my opinion is requested, as to the liability of the State of Mississippi upon her bonds, executed to, and sold by the Union Bank, has been duly considered.
Deeply impressed with the importance which the question has assumed in the eye of the civilized world, I have bestowed upon it all the thought and reflection which my mind is capable of affording. Constituting an engrossing theme of State politics, it has necessarily given rise to that diversity of views, which is ever exhibited in times of party excitement. Unbiassed by motives of either a personal or political character, the investigation which I have given to the subject results in the clear and deliberate conviction that, the State is liable, upon the soundest principles of moral and legal obligation.
True it is, that there is no process known to the law by which a State may be peaceably enforced to discharge or liquidate her debts-however honestly or legally contracted. Those who trust a State, alone depend upon her faith and honor. The State of Mississippi, except as to such powers as are surrendered to the Federal Government, is a free and independent sovereignty; and although she has established a constitutional forum, where all controversies arising between the State and individuals are to be heard and determined, still, in no event, can she be reached by means of an execution. But the question involving the legality or illegality of the bonds, is one which the people or citizens of the State are legally incompetent to determine; for, in obedience to the requisitions of the 10th section of the 7th article of our Constitution, the Legislature have conferred upon the Court of Chancery original jurisdiction of all questions which may arise between the State and individuals, whether citizens or aliens. That law provides that, "any person or persons, deeming him, her, or themselves, to have a just claim against the State, may file a bill in Equity, in the Superior Court of Chancery, against the State of Mississippi," &c. Then, it is perfectly clear that, where any controversy exists as to the legality of any claim against the State, the only lawful and constitutional forum where the question can be tried and settled, is that appointed and constituted by the law. The decree of the Chancellor, or of the High Court, in case of appeal, on such a case, would be binding and obligatory upon the parties, and there can be no truth in the argument, that such decree, if rendered against the State, would not be binding, "in relation to the rights VOL. V.-17
of the parties to the constitutional compact." Who, let us inquire, are the authors and framers of the Constitution? Who delegated the judicial power? The people themselves. They authorized and empowered the Legislature "to direct in what manner and in what courts suits might be brought against the State." They then immediately delegated to the Legislature the right to establish the Court of Chancery, with this judicial power, and consequently, the decree of that court, upon the hearing of this question, would not only be obligatory and conclusive, upon every department of the State Government, but would be binding upon the whole people. The Executive has no authority whatever to pronounce upon the legality of the State bonds, and when he undertakes to do so, it is a high assumption of power, on his part, and in derogation of the fundamental law of the land. It is the exercise of a judicial power, and therefore, in utter violation of the 1st Section of the 2d article of the Constitution, which declares that, "the powers of the Government of the State of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative, to one; those which are Judicial, to another; and those which are Executive, to another." No one can hesitate to believe that the question involving the State's liability is entirely a legal one, and therefore, its decision calls for the exercise of judicial power and discretion. The power to construe a law or contract is vested by the Constitution in the judiciary—for it is the appropriate function of the judiciary to construe laws. "If then, a case under the Constitution and laws does arise," says a great jurist, “if it is capable of judicial investigation and decision, we see that the very tribunal is appointed to make the decision; and the only question open for controversy is, whether such decision, when made, is conclusive or binding upon the people." The reason why they should be bound, has been already submitted. But my design is to prove that this is a question capable of judicial examination and decison, and as such, His Excellency, A. G. M'Nutt, in undertaking to declare and publish to the world that, "the State will never pay the five millions of bonds, issued in June 1838, or any portion of the interest due, or to become due thereon," has violated his executive duty, and transcended the limits of his rightful prerogative. The people themselves, as has been shown, cannot determine the question in hand, because they have delegated that power to the judicial department of the State. They may, it is true, disregard the law, and declare through their Repre sentatives in the Legislature, that they will not provide the ways and means of paying either the bonds, or the interest accruing thereon; but they cannot refuse payment upon the ground that the bonds are illegal, unless such be the decree of the Chancellor. But where are the people-where is the Legislature or Government on earth, who would repudiate a debt which had been solemnly decided to be just and legal, by a properly constituted power? The bond-holders will not for a moment entertain the opinion or judgment of his excellency; for they have a clear and constitutional right to be heard in the Superior Court of Chancery: and if the bonds should be decided to be legal instruments, there need to be no apprehension but that the State will discharge them to the uttermost farthing.
The next proposition which I shall attempt to establish is, that the State bonds were created in accordance with the requisitions of the Constitution, and as such, were legally
was passed by a majority of each house, the journals of the Legislature prove: that it was entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, the journals also establish: that it was referred to the People and the next Legislature, the 47th section of the Charter itself shows, which enacts that "the fifth section, whereby the faith of this State is pledged, &c., be referred to the next Legislature, in pursuance of the 9th section of the 7th article of the Constitution:" that it was passed by a majority of the next Legislature, the journals of that body testify: and, that it was approved by the Executive on the 5th of February, 1838, none will controvert.
But it is contended that the act was not published in three newspapers of this State for three months previous to the next general election, and therefore, it is no law, and the bonds were issued under a void authority. The journals of the Legislature, of course, do not show whether the necessary publication was made or not. That such publication was made, is asserted by some and denied by others. How the fact really is, I have no means of ascertaining nor does it matter. In the latter clause of the 47th section of the Charter of the Bank, provision is made for its publication, under the direction of the Governor. A more proper person could not have been selected to superintend its publication. The Constitution merely declared that the act should be published, and did not designate who should attend to its publication. It certainly did not contemplate that the Legislature, as a body, should do anything more than order the act to be published; for, if published at any time, or by any person, in obedience to such order, for three months before the then next election of members to the Legislature, it would assuredly have been considered a legal publication. Then, it seems to me that, all the Legislature could do, was done, in ordering the publication of the act, and making it obligatory upon the Executive to see that it was done. Who were the persons to be satisfied of the fact of publication? The members of the Legislature, who were sworn to support the Constitution. Were they satisfied? The presumption is that they were-for they passed the act, and we must not charge them with a violation of their oaths. Who else was to be satisfied? The Executive-for he approved the act, which, if unconstitutional, it was his power and duty to veto. But he did not veto it, but in fact gave it his sanction and approval: therefore, we must infer, for charity's sake, at least, that he too was satisfied that all the forms and requisitions of the Constitution had been fully complied with, or he never would have signed and approved the act. But, the fact of publication must be presumed, and, in law, cannot be inquired into. The Charter or act of incorporation, is a public act, is in the nature of a law, and, as such, must be construed. Its constitutionality must be judged of according to what it purports to be upon its face, which the courts of the country cannot look beyond. It is a well settled rule in the construction of a law that everything is to be presumed in favor of its constitutionality. A multitude of authorities might be referred to in support of this position.
sold and negotiated. The bonds, upon their face, evince no evidence of their illegality. They are in due form, signed by the Executive, countersigned by the Treasurer, and are attested by the Great Seal of the State. Clothed with all the solemnities of law and sovereignty itself, they, prima facie, are legal obligations. But it is urged that they were executed for the purpose of raising a loan of money upon the faith and credit of the State, and as the law or act incorporating the Mississippi Union Bank, by virtue of which they were executed, was not passed and approved in accordance with the requisitions of the Constitution, the bonds are unconstitutional and void, because their validity depends upon the validity of the law or charter authorizing their issuance. Then the question resolves itself into this-is the act incorporating the Mississippi Union Bank a constitutional act? All remember the general suspension of the banks in 1837, and the serious train of embarrassments which followed upon the heels of that event. The monetary affairs of the whole Union felt the shock. Despair brooded over the whole land. The very wheels of Government were clogged-individual enterprise drooped, and the face of business wore a melancholy aspect. It is needless to remark that, our own State and people experienced the fatal consequences of the suspension. What was to be done? Credit seemed destroyed, and the people were threatened with ruin and bankruptcy. In the midst of alarm and panic, the Governor convened the Legislature. That body met, and the proposed measure of relief was, the establishment of the Union Bank. None doubted the right of the Legislature to charter a bank. The act of any one Legislature, when approved by the Executive, is sufficient to incorporate an ordinary bank; but the 5th section of the Union Bank Charter contains the following provision: "Be it enacted, that in order to facilitate the said Union Bank for the said loan of fifteen million five hundred thousand dollars, the faith of this State be, and is hereby pledged, both for the security of the capital and interest, and that seven thousand five hundred bonds, of two thousand dollars each, to wit: eighteen hundred and seventy-five, payable in twelve years: eighteen hundred and seventy-five, in fifteen years, eighteen hundred dred and seventy-five, in eighteen years, and eighteen hundred and seventy-five, in twenty years, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, shall be signed by the Governor," &c. Now, it is contended by those who are opposed to paying the bonds that, this section proposed to raise a loan of money upon the credit of the State, and pledge the State faith for the payment or redemption of that loan-and therefore is unconstitutional, unless it was passed and approved in accordance with the forms and requisitions of the 9th section of the 7th article of the Constitution, which is as follows:-"No law shall ever be passed to raise a loan of money upon the credit of the State, or to pledge the faith of the State for the payment or redemption of any loan or debt, unless such law be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives, and be agreed to by a majority of the members of each house, and entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and be referred to the next succeeding Legislature, and published for three months previous to the next regular election in three newspapers of this State; and unless a majority of each branch of the Leg-swer as a mere individual. Her case is to be heard and deislature so elected, after such publication, shall agree to pass such law," &c. The Constitution then requires, 1st, that the act proposing to raise a loan of money upon the credit of the State, or to pledge the faith of the State for the payment or redemption of any loan or debt, shall be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives: 2d, that it shall be agreed to by a majority of each house: 3d, entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon: 4th, be referred to the next succeeding Legislature: 5th, be published in three newspapers of the State for the space of three months previous to the next general election, 6th, passed by a majority of the Legislature elected next after such publication: and 7th, approved by the Governor. Were not all these requisitions fully complied with, at least, in contemplation of law, and in the purview and meaning of the Constitution? That the act originated in one of the two branches of the Legislature, cannot form a matter of doubt: that it
The people, through their Representatives, as I have shown, have declared that, the State may be sued in the Court of Chancery. Then, when sued, she comes into court, to an
cided upon the same rules and principles of law applicable to the case of an individual or private person. Suppose, then, that a suit is commenced against a mere private person, and the plaintiff relies upon an act of the Legislature to maintain his case, which act the defendant alleges to be unconstitutional. How will the court determine the question? It will alone look to the context, terms and subject matter of the law-the face of the act, in deciding upon its constitutionality. It will not permit the defendant to go beyond the face of the act. Then, if the State in subjecting herself to be sued in the ordinary courts of the country, has placed herself, when sued, in the attitude of a private person, so far as that suit is concerned, of course, she is bound by the same rules of law and evidence which would relate to the suit of a private individual. Now, the charter of the bank or act of incorporation, having been passed by a second Legislature, and having received the approval and constitu
tional sanction of the Executive, must in law be presumed, in all respects, constitutional. The argument is susceptible of many familiar illustrations. The Constitution requires that, every bill shall be read and passed three several times, in each branch of the Legislature, be signed by the Speakers, &c. and receive the approval of the Governor, before it shall become a law. Now, the mere fact that the bill was read and passed three several times in each House, is no necessary part of the act, and never appears upon its face; and the judiciary must presume and take it for granted that all the requisitions of the Constitution have been complied with, otherwise the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate would never have signed, and the Governor approved it. Every law or act read from the statute book, if my position be incorrect, would have to be proved. Another section of the Constitution declares that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."Now, the fact that such bill originated in the House, constitutes no part of the bill, and yet that fact must be presumed, to give it effect. And why? Simply because those who passed, signed and approved it were the sworn officers or agents of the people, and we must not presume that they violated their duty. Other striking illustrations, drawn from the Constitution, might be adduced, in support of my position. But I contend farther that, the State is estopped from denying the fact of publication. I have shown that, the members of the Legislature and the Executive were the only persons who were to be satisfied that the act was duly published. They are the only properly constituted judges, appointed and chosen by the people themselves, of the fact of publication. They, by passing the act, and the Governor by approving it, have declared to the world that, there was no constitutional barrier or impediment to the passage and approval of the act, that the requisitions of the fundamental law had, in all things, been strictly complied with, and therefore, the act is constitutional.-I repeat that, the Constitution makes them the sole judges of the fact of publication, and this is not mere assertion. In 1 Peters' Reports, in the case of Ross vs. Barland, et al., page 666, the court decides this principle. Commissioners were appointed under the act relative to claims of lands of the United States, south of the State of Tennessee, and were authorized to hear evidence as to the time of the actual evacuation of the territory by the Spanish troops, and to decide upon the facts. The law gave them the power to hear and decide all matters respecting such claims, and to decide thereon, according to justice and equity. The court decided that they were bound to presume that every fact necessary to warrant the certificate, in the terms of it, was proved before the commissioners, and that consequently, it was shown to them, that the final evacuation of the Spanish troops took place on the 30th of March, 1798. Now, apply this principle to the case in hand. The Constitution authorized the Legislature to pass the act in question, under certain forms and requisitions. All those forms and requisitions actually appear to have been complied with, but the fact of publication. The members of the Legislature, who alone had the right to pass the act, and the Executive, to approve it, upon the knowledge or evidence of the publication, are necessarily the only judges of the fact, or of the kind and character of the evidence requisite to establish it. Then, if they were the constitutional judges of the fact, or the measure and degree of evidence requisite to prove that fact, then we are bound to presume every fact necessary to warrant the passage and approval of the act.Then, is not the State estopped and for ever barred from inquiring into the fact of publication? What is the true statement of the State's defence? Let us suppose that suit has been instituted upon her bonds. These bonds bear upon their face the highest assurance of their legality. The Governor has signed them-they are countersigned by the Treasurer-and attested by the Great Seal of the State. The State pleads that there is no law authorizing their execution. The law is produced, and appears to have been passed by two Legislatures and approved by the Executive. But it is urged that the act was never published, and the State's counsel propose to show that fact. What will the court say? That the act upon its face is constitutional-and the State
cannot be permitted to establish a fact aliunde, to show the unconstitutionality of the act, and more especially, as the Constitution itself, the solemn compact of the people, has, by way of necessary implication, made the members of the Legislature, and the Executive, the only judges of the existence of the fact.
But, again the members of the Legislature, in a Government like ours, are the representatives or agents of the people, and their acts are binding and obligatory upon the people. Now, it is a truth that can be easily established, that the Legislature of the State, which met or convened subsequent to the execution and sale of the bonds, by resolutions did recognise and approve the sale of the bonds. These resolutions are of binding efficacy upon the State, so that she cannot now examine either into the validity of the execution or sale of the bonds. She is a party to the contract, or bonds and is she not estopped, after having recognised the validity of the bonds, to deny that she had a right to execute them? Is she not estopped effectually? In the case of the Commonwealth vs. the Pejepscut proprietors, reported in the 10th Mass. Rep, p. 155, it is decided that, the Commonwealth is estopped by the resolve of the Legislature, declaring the boundary between its lands and those of a private company. In an Indian deed to a large tract of land to the company, in 1684, one important boundary was declared to be the uttermost falls in Androscoggin river. There were, in fact, five sets of falls. In 1787, the Legislature declared the twenty mile falls, (in fact the middle ones,) to be the boundary intended in that deed, and ordered matters accordingly. The court decided that the Commonwealth was estopped, and held to those falls as the true boundary. So, it is clear that the doctrine of estoppel is applicable as well to States as individuals, and the case cited bears a striking analogy to the one now under consideration. Again: can the State be permitted to deny the validity of her bonds, solemnly attested and proved by her Great Seal? That seal, the seal of sovereignty itself, furnishes the highest evidence that the bonds were properly and legally executed. The keeper of the seal may abuse his trust, but the only remedy the people can have in such case is, that terrible rebuke which is administered in the exercise of the elective franchise.
But there is an equitable estoppel which applies to this question. If A proposes to sell a certain tract of land to B, which belongs to C, and C stands by in silence and permits A to offer and sell the land to B, as his, C is estopped in equity from denying A's title. Here, recollect, the fee and real title was in C to the land, and to pass that fee and title, the law regularly requires a deed or conveyance from C.But here is no deed or conveyance-but still his right and title has departed. Why? He stood by when the contract of sale was made and consummated: he did not deny the right of A to sell: he permitted B to purchase it, and the law therefore says, he is for ever estopped from setting up his title-because, it would be encouraging a species of fraud. Now, apply this principle to the bond question, and you will perceive how it will operate. After the sale of the bonds, and before the last four millions were paid over to the Union Bank, the Legislature of this State met. They were timely informed of the sale and negotiation of the bonds. Did thatLegislature repudiate them? Did they deny their legal execution and sale? Did they say to the purchasers, pay no more money for the purchase of these bonds; for we intend to resist their payment, upon the ground that the act authorizing their issuance was not regularly published? No. Then it is contended that the State will be estopped from relying upon any such defence as the want of publication; for if permitted to set up such defence, it would be legalizing the worst of frauds-a fraud committed by a sovereign State.
It will not be expected that I should notice all the objections which are urged against the payment of the bonds.It would be idle and useless to do so. It is sufficient to review the most prominent arguments which militate against the opinion I have expressed. It is said that the faith of the State was to be pledged, and the bonds executed only upon the performance of certain conditions stipulated in the char ter or contract to be performed on the part of the stockhold