Boro v. Hidell. Yerger are modified by the latter cases, which state the rule in broad, general terms; but, assuming that they are not so modified, still the facts of the present case bring it within the general rule, and not within the exceptions stated in the two cases last referred to. In Duke v. Harper the duty of the agent was confined simply to the collection of rent. It was held that notice to him by the tenant that he disclaimed the title of his landlord would not be binding upon the landlord, unless actually communicated to him, because the agent had no authority to enter upon the premises, or to sue for them, upon the disclaimer. In Yarborough v. Newell it appears that Yarborough had mortgaged certain property to Newell, and that Niblett subsequently went as his agent and tendered a certain sum of money in redemption, and that Newell stated to Niblett that, while Yarborough had at one time a right to redeem, the time had expired. It did not appear that the agent informed his principal of this fact. The court held that as Niblett was Yarborough's agent only to tender the money, and, as he had no authority to sue upon failure to receive this money, the notice was not binding upon the principal. It is doubtful whether this case does not state the rule too narrowly. However, assuming that it is a correct statement, still it appears in the present case that James Boro had full authority from his sister to act for her to obtain restitution of the land in controversy. We are of the opinion that under this authority, as disclosed in the depositions of both James Boro v. Hidell. Boro and the complainant, he would have had the right to sue at any time after the matter was placed in his hands. The right of action was therefore barred at all events at the expiration of seven years from the year 1890. This suit was not brought until 1908, nearly eighteen years after the suit could have been brought. 3. It is also insisted by the defendant that, every other point aside, the bill must be dismissed, because the limitation of seven years began to run in favor of Mrs. Dora R. Hidell, although she was a fraudulent grantee, from the date of the deed made to her (which was, in effect, a voluntary conveyance made by the husband to his wife, although the deed was made directly by complainant), and that the concealment of the cause of action by W. H. Hidell, the husband, would not stay the running of the statute of limitations as against the said fraudulent conveyee, the wife. That the statute of limitations protects a fraudulent vendee is clear under the authorities (Porter's Lessee v. Cocke, supra; York v. Bright, 4 Humph., 312; Ramsey v. Quillen, 5 Lea, 184; Mull y v. Paul, 2 Tenn. Ch., 155); and that the concealment of the cause of action by the vendor or principal will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations in favor of such fraudulent vendee is fully sustained by Howell v. Thompson, 95 Tenn., 396, 404, 32 S. W., 309, et seq.; Bates v. Preble, 151 U. S., 149, 162, 14 Sup. Ct., 277, 38 L. Ed., 106. The question of laches is discussed by both sides in the briefs; but, as the points already determined are Boro v. Hidell. fully decisive of the case, we need not go into this question. It results that there is no error in the decree of the chancellor in dismissing the bill, and it must be sustained, with costs. Godwin v. Taenzer. JOHN R. GODWIN v. E. E. TAENZER et al. (Jackson. April Term, 1909.) 1. STOLEN PROPERTY. Theft of timber does not affect owner's title. The owner of timber does not lose his title thereto when the same is feloniously taken or stolen. (Post, pp. 103, 104.) Case cited and approved: Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y., 379. 2. SAME. Same. Thief's sale of stolen timber does not affect owner's title. The thief's sale and transfer of stolen timber does not deprive the original and true owner of his title or right to possession, whether the purchaser be innocent or a guilty participant in the crime. (Post, pp. 103, 104.) 3. SAME. Same. Same. Owner may recover the indentified timber, or its value in its changed form, from an innocent purchaser from the thief. The landowner, whose timber was felled, stolen, and sold by the thief to persons who bought it in good faith and innocently converted it to their own use by the assertion of ownership at the time of the purchase or otherwise, is entitled to recover the possession thereof from such purchasers, if it can be identified, either in its original or changed form or condition, but if such purchasers have appropriated it so that it can be no longer identified or followed in an action for its specific recovery, then the owner is entitled to a recovery against such purchasers for its full value at the moment of its conversion by them, by their such purchase, without any deduction for the value of the labor and time, or of the money expended by the thief or wrongdoer in working the change. Cases cited and approved: Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S., 432; Silsbury v. McCoon, 13 N. Y., 379; Nesbitt v. Railroad, 21 Godwin v. Taenzer. Minn., 491; Coal Co. v. Shoe Co., 69 Ark., 302; Everson v. Sel ler, 105 Ind., 266; Parker v. Railroad, 81 Ga., 387. Cases cited, distinguished, and approved: Dougherty v. Chestnutt, 86 Tenn., 12; Holt v. Hayes, 110 Tenn., 42. FROM SHELBY. Appeal from the Chancery Court of Shelby County. -F. H. HEISKELL, Chancellor. G. J. MCSPADDEN, for complainant. CARUTHERS EWING and R. E. KING, for defendants. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BEARD delivered the opinion of the Court. The question of law raised on the record in this case is: What is the measure of recovery to which the complainant, from whose land timber has been feloniously taken, is entitled as against the defendants, who innocently purchased the same from the felon and as innocently converted it to their own use? The contention of the defendants is that, having bought and appropriated the timber in good faith and without any knowledge of the true ownership, they should be charged the value of the timber at the place where the trees |