17. A clause written in the margin of a policy, granting a privilege "to keep not exceeding 5 barrels of oil on said premises," does not dispense with the printed regulations as to precautions in handling or using it. Gunther v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. 857 18. Where a policy of fire insurance permits the use of kerosene or like oil "for lights, if the same is drawn and the lamps are filled and trimmed by daylight only," the words "for lights" are restricted in meaning to lighting the insured premises only, and the words "by day light" are intended to prevent the use of artificial light from which the oil might catch fire. ld. 2. Interest on a dividend declared by a receiver should be allowed from the time it was declared and ought to have been paid. Arm strong v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 747 3. Interest on bonds should be allowed only from the date when they were delivered to the owners and holders of them. Washburn v. Green, 516 4. Where coupons, as well as the bonds, are silent as to the rate of interest after maturity, and are made payable in New York, the rate of interest established by law in that State is to be allowed on the coupons after their maturity. Scotland County v. Hill, 7. Under the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, parties may contract in writing for the payment of interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum. Shepherd v. Pepper, 706 INTERNAL REVENUE. 1. One who, in his business of buying and selling stocks for others, regularly employs capital by use of which interest is earned upon moneys advanced by him for his customers, is, under the statute, a banker, whose capital, employed in his business, is liable to a tax of of 1 per cent per month, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3408. Richmond v. Blake, 481 7. Malt and hops on the premises at the time of the commission of the offense and of the seizure are forfeited for illicit distilling, although sold to a third person after the offense was committed. Id. the forfeiture, but found upon the premises 8. Horses, wagons, and harnesses sold after at the time of the seizure, were forfeited under the Act of Congress of 1875 relating to illicit distilling. Id. 10. The setting up of a still on mortgaged 261 land, with the mortgagor's knowledge and 5. Where a judgment was rendered in Mis- consent, in violation of the internal revenue souri, the law of that State governs as to in-laws, operated, from the time it was set up, as terest on the judgment after its rendition. Id. a statutory conveyance to the United States of 6. A guarantor of title to land in Louisiana is not liable, on an eviction of his grantee, for interest on the valuation of unimproved land from which his grantee derived no rents or revenues. New Orleans v. Christmas, 99 the mortgagor's title and interest in the land, which was as valid and effectual as a recorded deed; and the right so vested in the United States could not be defeated or impaired by any subsequent act of the mortgagor. Id. 561 11. Boiler, engine, pump, vat, and tanks | statements of the bill, assumed to be true. annexed to the land, being real estate and Ohio C. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co. covered by a mortgage, and not used with the distillery, are, as against an innocent prior mortgagee, exempt from condemnation for illicit distilling; only the mortgagor's interest is liable thereto. United States v. Stowell, 555 INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 1. That part of the statute of Iowa concerning the sale of liquors which declares that no person shall own or keep, or be in any way concerned, engaged, or employed in owning or keeping, any intoxicating liquors with intent to sell the same within that State, and all the prohibitory clauses of the statute, are within the constitutional powers of the State Legislature. Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County Dist. 801 2. It is no objection to a statute that it authorizes a proceeding in the nature of a suit in equity to suppress the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, which are by law prohibited, and to abate the nuisance which the statute declares such acts to be. Id. Ct. JUDGMENT. 7. If the allegations of the bill are distinct and positive, they may be taken as true on a decree pro confesso, without proof; but if they are indefinite, or the demand of the plaintiff is in its nature uncertain, the requisite certainty must be afforded by proof. Id. 8. In suits for the foreclosure of mortgages, a decree pro confesso can be rendered for a balance due over and above the proceeds of the sale, only when the case made by the bill shows that the amount is due. Id. II. EFFECT AND CONCLUSIVENESS, 9. An adjudication in a state court which binds the plaintiff, whether it was right or wrong, concludes him until it has been reversed or set aside. It cannot be disregarded any more in the courts of the United States than in those of the State. Scotland County v. Hill, 261 10. An adjudication that a particular case is of equitable cognizance cannot be disturbed by an original suit. Such adjudication is not void, even if erroneous. Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 178 11. The district court of the United States I. RENDITION; ENTRY; FORM; AMEND- possesses superior jurisdiction; and its judg MENT. II. EFFECT AND CONCLUSIVENESS. I. RENDITION; ENTRY; FORM; AMENDMENT. Stetson, 792 ments cannot be assailed collaterally, except upon grounds that impeach the jurisdiction. It is presumed to have jurisdiction to give the judgments it renders, until the contrary appears. Re Cuddy, 154 12. The courts of ordinary in Georgia are Courts of original, exclusive, and general jurisments are no more open to collateral attack diction over decedents' estates; and their judg than the judgments, decrees, or orders of any other court. Veach v. Rice, 163 13. Whether a suit to remove a lien on prop2. Under the statutes of Texas, in a suit erty of an insolvent corporation could be against partners, where one of them was a non- brought before plaintiff had exhausted his legal resident, and notice was addressed to him un- remedies by judgment and execution was one der Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 1230, and the other of the questions necessary to be determined in partner was served personally, the judgment is the suit; and any error in deciding it would not a personal judgment against the nonresi- not authorize even the same court, in an origident partner, but a judgment against the part-nal, independent suit, to treat the decree as ner individually who was personally served, void. and against the firm as a distinct legal entity. Sugg v. Thornton, 447 3. By the practice in chancery in Illinois, a decree against an infant is absolute in the first instance. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 1047 Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 178 14. Contingent limitations and executory devises to persons not in being may be bound by decree against a person claiming a vested estate of inheritance; but a person in being 4. A party is not bound by a prior decree claiming under an executory devise not subject which is so uncertain in describing property as to any preceding vested estate of inheritance to be inoperative and void. Shepherd v. Pep- by which it may be defeated must be made a 706 party to a suit affecting his rights. Miller v. Teras & P. R. Co. 487 per, 5. Under the statutes of Texas, a party recovering a judgment may remit any part of it; and where the remitter does not appear to have been made in open court, the court may, at the same term and before any writ of error is sued out, correct the record in that particular according to the fact. Pacific Exp. Co. v. Malin, 450 6. A decree pro confesso is not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the bill, or merely such as the complainant chooses to take it; but it should be made by the court, according to what is proper to be decreed upon the 15. Where a former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, to which a railroad company that issued bonds, and the surviving trustee under the mortgage made to secure the bonds, were made parties, the bondholders, being represented by the trustee, are bound by the decree canceling and annulling the bonds and mortgage, unless the decree was fraudulently obtained. Beals v. Illinois, M. & T. R. Co. 608 16. Where an infant, by his prochein amy, prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois from the original decree rendered in a suit brought by him, and appeared by guardian ad litem to an appeal in the cross-suit, he is as much bound by the action of that court in respect to mere errors of law not involving jurisdiction as if he had been an adult when the appeal was taken. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 1047 17. A decree against a corporation, making an assessment on its stock in the discharge of a duty resting on the corporation, binds its members in the absence of fraud, although it has assigned its property and rights in trust for the payment of its debts and has ceased to exist. Hawkins v. Glenn, 184 18. A stockholder is bound by a decree of a court of equity against the corporation in enforcement of a corporate duty, although not a party as an individual, but only through representation by the company. Id. 19. When the suit in which a judgment was recovered was not commenced until after a bank went into liquidation, the judgment against the corporation is not binding on the stockholders in the sense that it cannot be reexamined, where the facts of the case were not known to the stockholders of the bank when the judgment was rendered. Schrader v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank, 564 III. LIEN; ENFORCEMENT; RELIEF AGAINST. closure suit was a director in the mortgagor company,-are not sufficient, in the absence of actual fraud, to render the foreclosure void. ld. 25. Where the proper place to have made a defense was in a foreclosure suit, and ample opportunity was had there for such defense, the court, in a suit afterwards brought to declare the foreclosure sale void, is not bound to give effect to such defense. ld. 26. If original and cross-bills were not a genuine case, but were contrived and the proceedings were conducted for the purpose of depriving an infant of his estate, without bringing attention to the real merits of his claim to the property in dispute, the decree in such case would not constitute an obstacle in the way of giving relief to the infant. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 1047 27. That the attention of the court was not specially called in a former suit relating to an infant's property to the points now made against the theory of a trust, advanced in behalf of the opposite party, does not show fraud or collusion. The absence from the opinion of that court of any reference to it does not prove that the guardian ad litem and next friend failed to make the point, or that he purposely avoided allusion to it. JUDICIAL NOTICE. LEASE. See CORPORATIONS, 11. ld. See EVIDENCE, I. 20. Judgments become liens only from the time they are rendered, or notice thereof is filed in the register's office of the county where the property is situated. They are subordi- LEGISLATURE. See POLICE. nate to any prior mortgage upon the property. LEVY AND SEIZURE. Fogg v. Blair, 721 21. No execution can be issued in one State upon a judgment of another, without a new suit. Cole v. Cunningham, 538 Insolvency proceedings in Louisiana place all of the debtor's property in gremio legis, and prevent any valid levy on any part of it thereafter, although it is not included in the schedule, and remains in the debtor's possession. Geilingery. Philippi, 614 LIENS. See also CORPORATIONS, 18, 19; 22. The provision of U. S. Const. art. 4, § 1, that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judgments of every other State, does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment, over the parties and subject matter, nor as to whether the judgment is impeachable for 1. A bargain and sale of personal property, fraud. Id. accompanied by delivery, devests the vendor 23. Where a court has jurisdiction of the case of any lien for payment, unless such lien is seand of the parties and of the subject matter, for cured by chattel mortgage or by agreement between the parties. any mere error in its decision the proper remedy Segrist v. Crabtree, 125 is by appeal, or by bill of review in the same court, and not by a suit in another court. Leavenworth County v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. 1064 24. The facts that some of the trustees in a deed of trust or mortgage given by a railroad company were directors or stockholders in a railroad company which procured the foreclosure of the mortgage, and that one person was the president of both companies, and that a majority of the directors of both companies were the same persons, and that a majority of the stock of the mortgagor company was in the hands of the president of the other company, and that the attorney who appeared for the mortgagor company had previously been employed by the other company, and the attorneys who brought the foreclosure suit were afterwards attorneys of the latter company, and one of the attorneys of that company in the fore 2. The Indiana Act of 1887 gives a lien to employés of a corporation only for work and labor, and not for the value of materials furnished, or for advances of money made. Vane 310 v. Newcombe, 3. A contractor with a corporation is not an employé of the corporation, within the meaning of the Indiana Act of 1887, § 1 (Ind. Rev. Stat. § 5286), which gives a lien to employés for work and labor done and performed by them for the corporation. Id. 4. Plaintiff, by perfecting his claim for a lien under the Indiana Act of 1887, waived any right he had to assert his common-law lien on the personal property and earnings of the corporation. Id. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. 1. No state statute of limitations can affect the rights of the United States; it is not amen able to the statute of limitations or the doctrine of the statute against the grantee, when it has of laches. Redfield v. Parks, 327 already run against the assignee, or bring 2. The District of Columbia is embraced in into action a new period of limitation dating the terms of the Statute of Limitations in force from the time of the conveyance; nor can it inin that district. Metropolitan R. Co. v. Dis-terrupt the running of the statute against the trict of Columbia, claim or right, when it has once commenced to run against the assignee. 231 3. The fact that the duty to pay money for work and materials which defendant failed to perform was a statutory one does not make the action one upon the statute; such an action is one within the Statute of Limitations. Id. 4. In Texas, where the Statute of Limitations has commenced to run against a party, it is not suspended by his death, and the period of limitation cannot be extended by the connection of one disability with another. Miller v. Texas & P. R. Co. 487 5. The provision in the Virginia Statute of Limitations, that the time during which a suit shall be obstructed by a resident of the State removing and remaining out of the State shall not be computed as part of the time within which the suit should be brought, does not ap; ply where the removal from the State occurred before the contract sued upon was made, and, therefore, before any cause of action thereon accrued. Embrey v. Jemison, 172 6. By N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 390, an action which does not involve title or possession of real property in the State cannot be brought in the State against a nonresident, after the time limited by the laws of his residence for bringing a like action, except by a resident of the State or one who becomes so before the expiration of the time so limited. Penfield v. Chesapeake, O. & S. W. R. Co. 940 7. Unpaid subscriptions to stock are assets, and, the corporation being insolvent, the ex istence of creditors subjects these liabilities to the rules applicable to funds held in trust; and statutes of limitation do not commence to run in respect to them until after a call and assessment has been made. Hawkins v. Glenn, 184 8. In a case of fraud upon the part of an administrator, in which each of the defendants participated, a court of equity should be slow in denying relief upon the mere ground of laches in bringing suit. Bryan v. Kales, 829 9. In Arizona the limitation for the commencement of an action to recover real property or its possession is five years. An equitable action to set aside deeds and recover real property is not barred by such statute by a delay of four years in suing. Id. 10. In the courts of the United States, in an action of ejectment based on a title derived from the government, the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until the date of the government patent for the land. Redfield v. Parks, 327 11. Where the Statute of Limitations has be gun to run against the right of an assignee in bankruptcy to redeem from a foreclosure sale and conveyance of real property of the bankrupt, the statute continues to run against the subsequent grantee of the same property by conveyance from the assignee. Greene v. Taylor, 411 12. A conveyance by an assignee in bank ruptcy cannot prevent the operation of the bar โd. 16. One having a cause of action against a Tennessee corporation, for personal injury in that State, and being a resident of Missouri when the injury occurred, is barred by N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 390, from bringing his action in New York, unless he became a resident of that State before the expiration of the one year limited by the laws of Tennessee for the commencement of such an action, although in New York the period of limitation is three years. Penfield v. Chesapeake, O. & S. W. R. Co. 940 LIS PENDENS. See also BONDS, 21. A purchaser pendente lite cannot relitigate, in an original, independent suit, the matters determined in a suit to which his vendor was a party. Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, MANDAMUS. See also STATE, 6. 178 2. Although, when the order dismissing_an appeal was made, the supreme court of a Territory consisted of other judges than its present members, yet a mandamus can issue to the court constituted as it now is, to reinstate a case dismissed by their predecessors. ld. 3. A proceeding by mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to pay a judgment is in the nature of execution. The rights of the parties to the judgment, in respect of its subject matter, were fixed by its being rendered. Chanute v. Trader, 345 4. A court, by means of writs of mandamus operating upon the officers of legislative bodies, cannot make up the records of the proceedings 945 of those bodies, or cause alterations to be made | could, and that he hurried the men and used in such records as prepared by the officer oaths, whereby they became confused and whose duty it was to prepare them. Clough v. failed to act in concert,-does not authorize a Curtis, recovery from the employer. Id. 9. Where the work of construction and repair of a railroad must be done in the intervals between the running of regular trains, and this fact is known to an employé who is employed to do such work, he assumes the risk of doing it at the times at which it has to be done. Id. MARSHAL. Although the President has authority to regulate the length of service and compensation of a special deputy marshal or a supervisor of election, yet where the services for which compensation is demanded were performed before the President made such regulations, and were performed in pursuance of the statute, compensation must be made therefor accordingly. United States v. Davis, 390 MASTER AND SERVANT. 1. A master is liable to third persons injured by negligent acts done by his servant in the course of his employment, although the master did not authorize or know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved of or for bade it. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 440 2. Where a person, for certain commissions to be paid him, agrees to give his whole time and services to the business of a company in selling its machines, and the company reserves to itself the right of prescribing and regulating, not only what business he shall do, but the manner in which he shall do it, such person is the company's servant, for whose negligence in the course of his employment the company is responsible. ld. 3. The relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done. Id. 4. An employer is exempt from liability for injuries to a servant caused by another servant. Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 656 2. Where the existence of a vein or lode in a placer claim is not known at the time of the application for a patent, that instrument will convey all valuable mineral and other deposits within its boundaries. Dahl v. Raunheim, 324 proceedings essential for the issue of a patent 3. Where a person has complied with all the for placer mining ground, he is the equitable owner of the mining ground, and the government holds the premises in trust for him, to be delivered upon the payments specified. ld.. 4. Where, in a contract for the sale of an interest in a mine, it is provided that if the pur5. The employer is liable to the servant for chaser at any time shall dispose of or sell such negligence of a fellow servant when the for- interest, them and in that case the unpaid purmer's own negligence contributes to the injury, chase money shall become immediately due or when the other servant occupies such a re- and payable, a leasing of the property is a dislation to the injured party, or to his employ-posal of it so as to render the purchaser immement in the course of which his injury was received, as to make the negligence of such servant the negligence of the employer. ld. diately liable for the unpaid purchase money, although by the terms of the contract the same had not become otherwise due. Hill v. Sum284 6. The porter and the carpenter of a steam-ner, ship are fellow servants with the stewardess of the ship. ld. MISTAKE. See ASSUMPSIT, 5, 6. 7. One employed by a railroad company as a laborer or construction hand cannot recover of the company for injuries received by him through the negligence of his fellow servants in allowing a rail to drop which he and they were loading on a car, whereby his leg and foot were broken and crushed. Coyne v. Union P. R. Co. 651 8. That, after men had lifted a rail which produced an injury to a fellow servant, and had carried it forward to a car, and while there holding it, awaiting the word of command from the boss to lift it further and throw it on the car, the boss failed to give the word of command in such a way as to produce concert of action in the men, but, on the contrary, ordered them to get the rail on the car in any way they II. See also APPEAL AND ERROR, 43; CONTRACTS, 29; JUDGMENT, 8, 24; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 11; REAL PROPERTY; TAXES, 21. 1. IN GENERAL. 1. Mortgages of railroad property and deeds of trust of the same, which in terms cover after-acquired property, are valid, and estop the company and all persons claiming under it and in privity with it from asserting that they do not cover all the property and rights which |