JUNE "IV. Resolved, That the members of the second branch 25 of the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of thirty years. at least; to hold their offices for six years, one third to go out biennially; to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service; to be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the func tions of the second branch) during the term for which they are elected, and for one year thereafter.

"V. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.

Postponed, 27. "VI. Resolved, That the national legislature JULY ought to possess the legislative rights vested in Congress by 16 the confederation; and, moreover, to legislate, in all cases, 17 for the general interests of the Union; and also in those to

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which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.

"VII. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.

"VIII. Resolved, That in the original formation of the legislature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five members, of which number

JULY But as the present situation of the States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the legislature of the United States shall be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of representatives; and in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States created within the limits of the United States, the legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the number of representatives, in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of the number of their inhabitants, according to the provisions hereafter mentioned, namely: Provided always, that representatives ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation which may be required, from time to time, by the changes in the relative circumstances of the States

"IX. Resolved, That a census be taken within six years from the first meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress, in their resolutions of April 18, 1783; and that the legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.

"X. Resolved, That all bills for raising or apportioning money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Government of the United States, shall originate in the first 16 branch of the Legislature of the United States, and shall not

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be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public treasury but in pursu ance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch.

"XI. Resolved, That, in the second branch of the legis lature of the United States, each State shall have an equal

vote.

"XII. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of seven years; to be ineligible a

JULY second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to public service, to be paid out of the public treasury.

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"XIII. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature.

"XIV. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, 21 to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by the second branch of the national legisla18 ture; to hold their offices during good behavior; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their ser vices, in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such diminution. "XV. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.

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"XVI. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony.

"XVII. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of new States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.

"XVIII. Resolved, That a republican form of govern ment shall be guaranteed to each State; and that each State shall be protected against foreign and domestic violence.

"XIX. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

"XX. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and ju diciary powers, within the several States, and of the national

Suppose, for instance, ten individuals, in a state of nature, about to enter into government, nine of whom are equally wise, equally strong, and equally wealthy; the tenth is ten times as wise, ten times as strong, or ten times as rich: if, for this reason, he is to have ten votes for each vote of either of the others, the nine might as well have no vote at all-since the whole nine might assent to a measure, yet the vote of the tenth would countervail and set aside all their votes. If this tenth approved of what they wished to adopt, it would be well; but if he disapproved, he could prevent it; and in the same manner he could carry into execution any measure he wished, contrary to the opinions of all the others, he having ten votes, and the others altogether but nine. It is evident that, on these principles, the nine would have no will nor discretion of their own, but must be totally dependent on the will and discretion of the tenth; to him they would be as absolutely slaves as any negro is to his master. Hence it was urged, the inequality of representa. tion, or giving to one man more votes than another, on account of his wealth, &c., was altogether inconsistent with the principles of liberty; and in the same proportion as it should be adopted, in favor of one or more, in that proportion are the others enslaved. It was urged that, although every individual should have an equal voice in the government, yet even the superior wealth, strength, or understanding, would give great and undue advantages to those who possessed them that wealth attracts respect and attention; superior strength would cause the weaker and more feeble to be cautious how they offended, and to put up with small injuries rather than engage in an unequal contest. In like manner, superior understanding would give its possessor many opportunities of profiting at the expense of the more ignorant.

"Having thus established these principles with respect to the rights of individuals in a state of nature, and what is due to each on entering into government-the principles established by every writer on liberty--they proceeded to show that states, when once formed, are considered, with respect to each other, as individuals in a state of nature; that, like individuals, each state is considered equally free and equally independent, the one having no right to exercise authority over the other, though more strong, more wealthy, or abound

ing with more inhabitants-that, when a number of states unite themselves under a federal government, the same principles apply to them as when a number of individual men unite themselves under a state government—that every argument which shows one man ought not to have more votes than another, because he is wiser, stronger, or wealthier, proves that one state ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous; and that by giving one state or one or two states more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such state or states having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put of individuals, when one has more votes than the others--that the reason why each individual man, in forming a state government, should have an equal vote, is because each individual, before he enters into government, is equally free and independent; so each state, when states enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote, because, before they entered into such federal government, each state was equally free and equally independent—that adequate representation of men, formed into a state government, consists in each man having an equal voice; either personally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representatives--so adequate representation of states in a federal government consists in cach state having an equal voice, either in person or by its representative, in everything which relates to the federal government—that this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal than in a state government, because the members of a state government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be inade by one part oppressive to the others without their suffering in common; but the different states composing an extensive federal empire, widely distinct one from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.

"It was said that the maxim that taxation and representation ought to go together was true so far that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented; but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom, and therefore all, whether individual