It were easy to prefer accusations, in this case, of insincerity and the want of open and honest dealing; and this is sometimes done. To such accusations, indeed, there are some who would be justly subjected. But I am not persuaded that all doubters of this class are to be taxed with hypocrisy and double dealing. There are minds of a very serious cast, and prone to reasoning and inquiry, that have in some way come into such a state, that doubt on the subject of endless punishment cannot, without the greatest difficulty, be removed from them.

They commence their doubts, it is probable, with some a priori reasoning on this subject. God is good. His tender mercy is over all the work of his hands. He has no pleasure in the death of the sinner. He has power to prevent it. He knew before he created man, and made him a free agent, that he would sin. In certain prospect of his endless misery, therefore, his benevolence would have prevented the bringing of him into existence. No father can bear to see his own children miserable without end, not even when they have been ungrateful and rebellious; and God, our heavenly Father, loves us better than any earthly parent does or can love his children.

'Besides; our sins are temporary and finite; for they are committed by temporary and finite beings, and in a world filled with enticements both from without and from within. It is perfectly easy for Omnipotence to limit, yea to prevent, any mischief which sin can do; so that the endless punishment of the wicked is unnecessary, in order to maintain the divine government and keep it upon a solid basis. Above all, a punishment without end, for the sins of a few days or hours, is a proportion of misery incompatible with justice as well as mercy. And how can this be any longer necessary, when Christ has made atonement for sin, and brought in everlasting redemption from its penalty?'

The social sympathies, too, of some men, are often deeply concerned with the formation of their religious opinions. They have lost a near and dear friend and relative by death; one who never made any profession of religion, or gave good reason to suppose that his mind was particularly occupied with it. What shall they think of his case? Can they believe that one so dear to them has become eternally wretched-an outcast for ever from God? Can they en

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dure the thought that they are never to see or associate with him any more? Can heaven itself be a place of happiness for them, while they are conscious that a husband or a wife, a son or a daughter, a brother or a sister, is plunged into a lake of fire from which there is no escape? It is impossible, they aver, to overcome such sympathies as these. It would be unnatural and even monstrous to suppress them. They are therefore, as they view the case, constrained to doubt whether the miseries of a future world can be endless.'

If there are any whose breasts are strangers to such difficulties as these, they are to be congratulated on having made attainments almost beyond the reach of humanity in the present world; or else, to be pitied for ignorance, or the want of a sympathy which seems to be among the first elements of our social nature. With the great mass of thinking Christians I am sure such thoughts as these must, unhappily for them, be acquaintances too familiar. That they agitate our breasts as storms do the mighty deep-will be testified by every man of a tender heart, and who has a deep concern in the present and future welfare of those whom he loves.

It would seem to be from such considerations, and the like to these, that a belief in a future repentance and recovery of sinners has become so wide-spread in Germany, pervading even the ranks of those who are regarded as serious and evangelical men in respect to most or all of what is called orthodox doctrine, saving the point before us. Such was the case, also, with some of the ancient fathers; and such is doubtless the case with not a few of our day, who are far removed from noisy and obtrusive sectarianism, and who even do not venture positively to assert and maintain the modified doctrine of universal salvation, namely, the final restoration of all to divine favour, after punishment and repentance.

Can we find it in our hearts severely to reproach doubters of this retired and modest class; who will not even venture to assert what they hope is true, and on the whole do believe to be true, for fear that it may not after all prove to be so, and then the assertion of the doctrine might lead others to ruin? No, we should not so demean ourselves in respect to serious and also anxious and distressed minds, filled with doubts which they have yet found no adequate grounds to

satisfy. Their state of mind may be wrong. I must believe that it is. But theirs is an error of quite a different character from that of an obtrusive and contumacious renunciation of all belief in any future retribution.

It is foreign to my design, and beyond my present limits, to go into a discussion of the particular grounds already mentioned, which are alleged in support of the opinion that future punishment is temporary. In the most summary manner to glance at a few considerations on which the mind ought most seriously to reflect, is all that I can be permitted to do.

If the doctrine of future existence, i. e. the certainty of this doctrine, be dependent on revelation for its supportand this I must on the whole believe-then it follows, that all we can know of future happiness or misery with certainty, must be from the declarations of Scripture, or from legitimate consequences drawn by fair reasoning from those declarations.

Now it is palpable, at first view, that most of the doubts and difficulties suggested above, are such as arise from reasoning in the main independently of the Scriptures. That God is good, kind, merciful, compassionate, paternal-is true beyond all doubt. That he is just also, is equally true. Nor do I suppose his justice, truth, compassion, or any other attribute of such a quality, is different in its nature from the like attributes in ourselves; for we are made in his image, and we can have an idea of his moral attributes only by reasoning from an analogy with our own, and then separating from those attributes, as existing in him, all idea of imperfection. But still, there is one most important and fundamental consideration, in respect to this whole matter, which does not seem to be properly regarded by doubters of the class in question. This is, that God superintends the concerns of a UNIVERSE; and that all things, present, past, and future, are all perfectly before him. It is such a being, and such an one only, who is capable of judging what particular thing or measure is conducive to the highest good of the whole. It is only such a being who can judge, where the safe and proper bounds of mercy are to be placed, and how far the right and power of pardon shall be exercised. Even an earthly government, that should exercise indiscriminately the right of pardon, would be deemed weak, ineffi

cient, yea, contemptible, inasmuch as this would be merely bidding up a bounty for transgression of the laws. Must not God's moral government maintain the honour and dignity of his laws?

You will answer in the affirmative. Some punishment must be inflicted. But then-endless punishment! O that dreadful thought! Endless misery for finite crime!

True; it is a dreadful thought. All punishment is dreadful in a greater or less degree, else it would not be punishment. But tell me : Can any one, except the omniscient God, unfold or even understand the extent of the evils occasioned by sin? It must be true that no one can do this except Нe.

If then, in his Law, he has actually affixed such a penalty to sin, what are we to believe? That it is just, or unjust? It is a plain case of duty here, to acquiesce in his judgment and decision. The question turns, then, simply on what he has decided in his word.

As to endless punishment, do not our State Governments immure criminals for life? May not punishment continue as long as sinning? And is it just that our civil government should exercise such a power? If you concede this point, why may it not be true, that the Supreme Governor of the Universe may immure in the State Prison of the Universe (if I may be allowed so to speak), such as cannot be permitted to go at large without jeoparding the order, harmony, peace, and happiness of the Universe? Can we be the proper judges of what is necessary to preserve and promote these in all their extent and mutual relations? Or must He, of necessity, be the only competent judge?

The appeal is made, moreover, and often with thrilling effect too, to parental feelings, and the question asked, 'Would you be willing that a child of yours should become for ever miserable?' The first and spontaneous answer is— No! No! How then can God be willing that any of his children should be for ever miserable?' He is not, in one sense. He has no pleasure in it. He has sworn that he has none. But this does not decide the point, that, as a legislator and governor and judge, he may not feel obliged to inflict such a punishment. Supposing an earthly parent to be fully and on good grounds assured that a prodigal son will never reform, and that he will use all the efforts possible

to corrupt the rest of his family-is such a father justified in retaining such a child in his own house? Surely there are cases, many cases, where he could not be justified, but must cast him out, in order that the peace and happiness of the innocent should be secured. Cannot God judge better than we, when this ought to be done; and can any one but He decide on the propriety and necessity of doing it?

But God has power to make all men happy; how then can his benevolence permit any to be for ever miserable?' God has power, I answer, to make all happy, both here and hereafter, so far as omnipotence is concerned. He can make and unmake worlds by a single word. But if the possession of such a power confers obligation on benevolence to save from all misery (and this is the very gist of the argument), then why does his benevolence actually permit sin and misery in this world? It will not be called in question, that this world is full of both.

But we may go a step farther. To talk of mere power, in such a case, does not seem to be saying much to the purpose. There is a harmony, a consistency, a complete congruity, in the divine character and attributes. God has determined to create moral beings, and to place them under a moral government as free and responsible agents. He looks on this as a plan which infinite wisdom and goodness must adopt. If now he should use his simple omnipotence so as to defeat a part of the plan of moral government and retribution which he has devised, then he would array one part of his attributes against another. He cannot, consistently with his plan of governing the world, make any free rational agents happy, who are sinners, so long as they remain impenitent. He could, so far as his power is concerned, unmake them, and create new and holy beings in their stead. But his wisdom and his goodness have not led him to adopt such a plan of government. When we say that God can do this or can do that, we should always say so with the express understanding, that all his attributes in their harmonious relation, and also the nature of the government which he has adopted, permit him to do this or that consistently.

Who shall judge, now, where pardon may be safely extended-and beyond which the general good will not perinit it? I know of none but God who can judge. Why then should we suppose ourselves to be within the limits of pro