This mode of reimbursement or reprisal will be upon the trade and navigation of the United States; and in proportion as ours of this State may be larger and more extensive, than the trade and navigation of other States, we shall be the greatest sufferers. This ruin of our trade will involve in it not only the ruin of the mercantile part of the State, and of the numerous body of mechanics dependent upon it, but will most essentially affect every other class of citizens, and operate most extensively to the injury of the Commonwealth.

These are some of the consequences, certain and infallible, that will flow from the denial of that power to Congress. Shall we, then, we of this State, who are so much interested in this matter, deny them that power-so essential to our political happiness?

But if we attend to our trade, as it is at present, we shall find, that the miserable state of it is owing to a like want of power in Congress. Other nations prohibit our vessels from entering their ports, or lay heavy duties on our exports carried thither; and we have no retaliating or regulating power over their vessels and exports to prevent it. Hence a decrease of our commerce and navigation, and of the duties and revenue arising from them. Hence an insufficient demand for the produce of our lands, and the consequent discouragement of agriculture. Hence the inability to pay debts, and particularly taxes, which by that decrease are enhanced. And hence, as the necessary result of all these, the emigration of our inhabitants. If it be asked, How are these evils, and others that might be mentioned, to be remedied? the answer is short: By giving Congress power, and adequate power. Whether such power be given by the proposed Constitution, it is left with the Conventions from the several States, and with us, who compose one of them, to determine.

In determining on this question, every gentleman will doubtless consider the importance of cultivating a spirit of union among ourselves, and with the several States. This spirit procured our emancipation from British tyranny; and the same spirit, by uniting us in the necessary means, must secure to us our dear-bought, blood-purchased liberty and independence, and deliver us from evils which, unless remedied, must end in

national ruin. The means for effecting these purposes are within our reach; and the adoption of the proposed Constitution will give us the possession of them. Like all other human productions, it may be imperfect; but most of the imperfections imputed to it are ideal and unfounded; and the rest are of such a nature that they cannot be certainly known, but by the operation of the Constitution: and if in its operation it should in any respect be essentially bad, it will be amended in one of the modes prescribed by it. I say, will be amended, because the Constitution is constructed on such principles, that its bad effects, if any such should arise from it, will injure the members of Congress equally with their constituents; and therefore both of them must be equally induced to seek for and effectuate the requisite amendments.

There have been many objections offered against the Constitution; and of these the one most strongly urged has been the great power vested in Congress. On this subject, I beg leave to make a few general observations, which ought to be attended to, as being applicable to every branch of that power.

It may therefore be observed, that the investiture of such power, so far from being an objection, is a most cogent reason for accepting the Constitution. The power of Congress, both in the legislative and executive line, is the power of the people, collected, through a certain medium, to a focal point; at all times ready to be exerted for the general benefit, according as circumstances or exigencies may require. If you diminish or annihilate it, you diminish or annihilate the means of your own safety and prosperity; which means, if they were to be measured like mathematical quantities, would be in exact proportion, as the power is greater or less. But this is not the case; for power that does not reach, or is inadequate to the object, is worse than none. An exertion of such power would increase the evil it was intended to remove, and at the same time create a further evil, which might be a very great onethe expense of a fruitless exertion.

If we consider the objects of the power, they are numerous and important; and as human foresight cannot extend to many of them, and all of them are in the womb of futurity, the quantum of the power cannot be estimated. Less than the

whole, as relative to Federal purposes, may, through its insufficiency, occasion a dissolution of the Union, and a subjugation or division of it among foreign powers. Their attention is drawn to the United States; their emissaries are watching our conduct, particularly upon the present most important occasion; and if we should be so unhappy as to reject the Federal Constitution proposed to us, and continue much longer our present weak, unenergetic Federal government, their policy will probably induce them to plan a division or partition of the States among themselves; and unite their forces to effect it.

But, however that may be, this is certain, that the respectability of the United States among foreign nations, our commerce with them on the principles of reciprocity, and our forming beneficial treaties with them on those principles, their estimation of our friendship and fear of losing it, our capacity to resent injuries, and our security against interior as well as foreign attacks, must be derived from such a power. In short, the commercial and political happiness, the liberty and property, the peace, safety and general welfare, both internal and external, of each and all the States, depend on that power; which, as it must be applied to a vast variety of objects, and to cases and exigencies beyond the ken of human prescience, must be very great; and which cannot be limited without endangering the public safety.

It will be and has been said, this great power may be abused; and, instead of protecting, may be employed by Congress in oppressing their constituents. A possibility of abuse, as it may be affirmed of all delegated power whatever, is by itself no sufficient reason for withholding the delegation. If it were a sufficient one, no power could be delegated; nor could government of any sort subsist. The possibility, however, should make us careful, that in delegations of importance, like the one contained in the proposed Constitution, there should be such checks provided, as would not frustrate the end and intention of delegating the power, but would, as far as it could be safely done, prevent the abuse of it: and such checks are provided in the Constitution. Some of them were mentioned the last evening by one of my worthy colleagues; but I shall here exhibit all of them in one view.

The two capital departments of government, the legislative and executive, in which the delegated powers reside, consisting of the President, Vice-President, Senate and Representatives, are directly, and by their respective legislatures and delegates, chosen by the people.

The President, and also the Vice-President, when acting as President, before they enter on the execution of the office, shall each" solemnly swear, or affirm, that he will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect and defend, the Constitution of the United States."

"The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution."

"The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors."

"No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house, during his continuance in office."

"No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, or by any particular State; and no person, holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state."

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union, a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion and domestic violence."

To these great checks may be added several other very essential ones, as, the negative which cach house hath upon the acts of the other; the disapproving power of the President, which subjects those acts to a revision by the two houses, and to a final

negative, unless two-thirds of each house shall agree to pass the returned acts, notwithstanding the President's objections; the printing the journals of each house, containing their joint and respective proceedings; and the publishing, from time to time, a regular statement and account of the receipts and expendi tures of all public money, none of which shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. All these checks and precautions, provided in the Constitution, must, in a great measure, prevent an abuse of power, at least in all flagrant instances, even if Congress should consist wholly of men who were guided by no other principle than their own interest. Under the influence of such checks, this would compel them to a conduct, which, in the general, would answer the intention of the Constitution. But the presumption is, (and if the people duly attend to the objects of their choice, it would be realized,) that the President of the United States, and the 'members of Congress, would, for the most part, be men, not only of ability, but of a good moral character, in which case an abuse of power is not to be apprehended, nor any error in the government, but such as every human institution is subject to.

There is a further guard against the abuse of power, which, though not expressed, is strongly implied in the Federal Constitution, and indeed in the Constitution of every government, founded on the principles of equal liberty; and that is, that those who make the laws, and particularly laws for the levying of taxes, do, in common with their fellow-citizens, fall within the power and operation of those laws.

As then the individuals of Congress will all share in the burdens they impose, and be personally affected by the good or bad laws they make for the Union, they will be under the strongest motives of interest to lay the lightest burdens possible, and to make the best laws, or such laws as shall not unnecessarily affect either the property or the personal rights of their fellow-citizens.

With regard to rights, the whole Constitution is a declaration of rights, which primarily and principally respect the general government intended to be formed by it. The rights of particular States and private citizens not being the object or subject