CHAP. XXXIX. 1806. 26. Military now come to be generally understood that the strength of our army in India mainly depends upon the proportion of Europeans who are employed in it; and between the Queen's troops and those in the service of the Company they now amount to nearly 50,000—about a fifth of the native troops. Great as the military establishment of India is, it is by no means disproportioned to its necessities or resources. A establish- force of 280,000 men, of whom 49,000 are English soldiers, India not cannot be considered as excessive for a country of such ment of vast extent, inhabited by 160,000,000 people, many of them of a warlike character, and all accustomed to internal feuds and warfare. In fact, it is nothing to the proportion of armed men to the whole population in the military monarchies of Europe; for it is only 1 soldier to every 500 inhabitants; whereas in Françe the proportion is 1 to 70, in Austria 1 to 72, in Russia 1 to 60, in Prussia 1 to 56. In most of the old civilised countries of Europe, the proportion of the soldiers to the inhabitants is nearly ten times that which obtains in India. The garrison in and around Paris, in a period of the most profound peace, exceeds the whole European troops in India. When it is recollected that India was won by the sword, and must be retained by it, its military establishment, so far from being regarded as excessive, must be considered as very moderate, or rather surprisingly small, and certainly not a third of what it was when the whole country was in the hands of jarring and independent native powers.1 It is recorded by Arrian, that, after his conquest of Persia, Alexander the Great formed corps of united Asiatic and European troops, which were invariably blended in the proportion of two of the former to one of the latter. After the battles of Delhi and Laswaree, Lord Lake wrote to the Directors of the East India Company that success could not be relied on in Indian warfare if the XXXIX. 1806. proportion of British to native troops was less than 1 to 6.* CHAP. Lord Clive said that "the empire of India would rest with the power which could bring into the field the greatest number of European troops." The opinions of these great Asiatic conquerors deserve all attention, and should never be absent from the thoughts of those to whom, directly or indirectly, the direction. of our Indian empire is intrusted. Whether it is from difference of constitutional energy, or the debilitating effect of a warm climate, or the successive oppression of hordes of Tartar conquerors, from which, owing to their greater distance from Central Asia, the states of Europe have been exempt, it is now perfectly ascertained that the native soldiers of India, whether Hindoos or Mussulmans, are far from being equal to the Europeans, and that, unless supported by an adequate number of British troops, and led by British officers, no reliance can be placed on their steadiness in the day of battle. Occasionally they fight most gallantly, and instances have even occurred where they have confronted dangers from which British recoiled. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. Generally speaking, they will not bear a comparison with English soldiers, and, unless well supported, are almost sure to melt away under the first severe fire. This is a painful admission to make, for the native troops have many most valuable qualities, and without * "I cannot avoid saying, in the most confidential manner, that in the event of a foreign foe coming into this country, without a very great addition of men in Europeans, the consequences will be fatal, as there ought always to be at least one European battalion to four native ones. This I think necessary. I have seen a great deal of these people lately, and am quite convinced that without king's troops very little is to be expected. In short, the infantry of this army, as well as the cavalry, should be remodelled."-Secret Despatches, LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, September 12, 1803 (the day after the victory of Delhi); WELLESLEY'S Despatches, iii. 312. "If they do not in England think it necessary to send British troops in the proportion of one to three sepoy regiments—which is, in fact, one to six in actual numbers, from the superior strength of the native battalions-they will stand a good chance of losing India if a French force once gets a footing there."-LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, October 10, 1803 (the day after the battle of Agra), ibid. iii. 396. VOL. VI. 2 H XXXIX. 1806. CHAP. their aid our Indian empire could not be maintained for an hour. But it is better to be aware of the truth than to have it burst unawares; and by being sensible what they can do, and what not, disappointment is less likely to ensue, and the disaster consequent on misapprehension more likely to be avoided. The Indian army is very expensive, for the pay and allowances of the troops, both native and European, are on the most liberal scale; and the heat of the climate is such that much which in Europe would savour of luxury is there a matter of absolute necessity. It has been so, for the same reason, from the earliest ages, and will be so to the end of time. Punkahs to keep the air cool, regimental libraries to divert the soldiers, large barracks, comfortable bedding, and cold baths, are provided in most of the stations for the European soldiers. The enlistment of the sepoy is for fifteen years; no bounty is paid, and conscription is unknown, the service being so popular that there are commonly severai candidates for each vacant situation. These accommodations, so different from the utter penury of their native dwellings, insure the popularity of the army as a profession, but they immensely increase the expense with which it is attended, and greatly encumber military operations; for the proportion of camp-followers to fighting men is seldom less than three to one-so that for an army of 30,000 soldiers provision must be made, for feeding or moving, for 120,000 mouths.1 1 Thorn ton's Brit ish India, 279; Mar tin, 530, 537. 28. sued in India by Govern The system which should be pursued in a distant miliTrue policy tary empire such as that of India is abundantly plain. to be pure. It is that which gave and so long retained in the hands gard to of the Romans the empire of the world. It must be the British founded on military strength; the prestige of victory, the moral influence of irresistible strength, must play around its bayonets. The British Government there must always be considered as reposing in presence of a hostile population, which will take advantage of the first serious reverse to avenge upon it the loss of its independence. Any consider ment. XXXIX. 1806. able reduction of military force, and, above all, large dis- CHAP. banding of old soldiers, must be considered as in the highest degree dangerous. But, on the other hand, the maintenance of such a large military establishment is very expensive; it will soon be felt as burdensome, and, if not compensated by other advantages, it may become impossible to keep it up. The only way in which it is possible to combine these different objects is to maintain a powerful standing army, such as may at any moment be adequate to any emergency, but to accompany this with liberal grants for the encouragement of industry and the improvement of the country, and the most entirely just and even indulgent system of commercial intercourse. It is at all times an easy matter in India to procure a supply of soldiers to any amount by voluntary enlistment, for the pay of a common soldier is more than double that of a common labourer; the real difficulty is to find funds to pay the large establishment which is requisite to preserve the command of the country. This is only to be done by liberal grants of public money to restore the aqueous communications of its fields, and the most enlarged and indulgent commercial policy, such as may give the inhabitants at once the means of paying the imposts, and secure their attachment to the Government which imposes them. Lord Dalhousie's administration afforded a brilliant example of the first, Sir R. Peel's tariff of 1842 was the commencement of the second. 29. establish The JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT of India is on a large scale, and undoubtedly is a very great improvement on Judicial the courts of the native princes. Justice is administered ment of in cases of small value in the native courts, from the deci- India. sions of which there is an appeal to a higher court, either native or European, at the option of the appellant. The native and European are put on the same level in these courts; but there is an appeal from them both to superior courts, of which that of the Suddu-Adawlut at Calcutta is the highest, from which, in cases above £1000, there CHAP. 1806. is an appeal to the Queen in council. The proportion of XXXIX. reversals to adherences, though considerably greater than is usual in European courts,* is not more than might be expected, considering that the law to be applied is a strange medley of Hindoo, Mahommedan, and British ish India; institutions. It speaks volumes as to the integrity of British administration, and the confidence of the natives in it.1 1 Thorn ton's Brit Martin, 534. 30. The protected States, and decline. One circumstance is very remarkable in India, and without a proper understanding of the causes to which it is owing, it would appear altogether inconceivable. This their rapid is the miserable condition and rapid decline of the protected States, which is invariable, and ere long becomes so excessive that they become incapable of supporting themselves, and, as a matter of necessity, are absorbed by the all-conquering power. The offer of the protection of the British Government presents almost irresistible temptations to an Indian potentate. The basis of it is the conclusion of an alliance offensive and defensive, which secures to the weaker State the guarantee of the stronger, and is accompanied only, in the first instance, by the requisition of supplies and pay for two or three battalions stationed as a subsidiary force in the capital of the protected State. So far nothing can appear more advantageous, and the smaller States are too happy in general to secure the ægis of a power capable alike of shielding them from * SUITS DECIDED IN NATIVE COURTS, APPEALS, AND PROPORTION OF REVERSALS, FROM 1843 TO 1849. |