XXXIV. 1839. CHAP up all his greatness round himself, as he folds up and lays by his tent. Such, and no more, is Ibrahim Pasha. If to this you add the age of Mehemet Ali, and the health of Ibrahim, broken by war, it becomes evident that the realisation of an Arab dynasty is impossible. Even if it should for a moment succeed, the want of all unity among the people subjected to its power, the internal divisions. and revolts always ready to break out, would put insurmountable obstacles in the way of a new empire. Yes! your Arab empire would have all the vices of the Ottoman empire, without its legitimacy; it would not subsist a day beyond the terror which has founded it. 50. "The system of statu quo would turn entirely to the Concluded. advantage of England, mistress of the Mediterranean, of the mouth of the Nile, and of the Red Sea, those great stations on the road to India. It is not for a moment to be thought of. But, without abandoning the English alliance, our policy in the East may be European, by supporting a partition of influence and territory among Russia, France, Austria, and England, who have an interest in and right to it. We should open a congress immediately, and negotiate on these principles; but if time presses, as it probably will, we should positively refuse to attack the fleet of the Sultan, and immediately take possession of some military station in the Levant, such as England possesses in Malta, and Russia in the Black Sea. By so doing we would acquire a commanding voice in the negotiations; in a word, gain what Casimir Périer did by seizing Ancona. The statu quo can never be maintained in the East, but, far from being alarmed, we should be rejoiced in the interest of humanity at the progress of civilisation; for rest assured, the first cannon-shot fired on July 2, the Euphrates will not be a signal of distress; it will be Ann. Hist. the signal which will call its different populations to liberty, to life, to organisation, to industry, and open to France a sphere of action worthy of itself."1 1 Moniteur, 1839; and xxii. 187, 189. It required all the talent and influence of the Ministry XXXIV. 1839. 51. main on the to withstand those eloquent arguments, which acquired CHAP. additional force from the intimate acquaintance of M. Lamartine with the East, and the halo which his genius had shed over its romantic scenes. M. Villemain, however, Argument made the attempt, and with much ability. "The conclu- of M. Villesion," said he, "to which the eloquent speaker who has last other side. addressed you has arrived, does not correspond either with the brilliancy of his exordium or his splendid ideas for the regeneration of the East. To what does it all amount? To this, that we should imitate Casimir Périer, and seek another Ancona in the East, from whence we might have a commanding voice in the approaching partition of the Turkish empire. Such a project cannot for a moment be entertained. It would render necessary the entire remodelling of the territorial divisions of Europe, and would itself be a measure of such obvious and flagrant injustice, as, like the partition of Poland, could not fail to recoil on the heads of all the states concerned in the spoliation. A general war would in all probability arise in the division of the mighty spoil, and even if the ambition and pretensions of rival states were adjusted at the moment, such a measure would leave the seeds of eternal discord and jealousies in all the states that had engaged in it. 52. "We all see the difficulties, perhaps insurmountable by human wisdom, with which the question of the East Continued. is enveloped; and the question really is not whether any particular plan that may be proposed is open to objection, but whether every other is not liable to still greater. Viewed in every light, it will be found that the proposition advanced by the Government is the safest one on the subject; and that proposition amounts to this, 'Great events are about to ensue in the East: an empire may be about to perish; it may survive, it may endure for a long time; let us be prepared for all the chances.' The eloquent speaker, who has such advantages in this debate, from having seen so much, and retained so much in his memory, and possessing such power of bringing it forth at XXXIV. 1839. CHAP the proper moment-is he aware how much of vitality there is, even amidst apparent decay, in every people? Has he been at Varna-has he been at Schumla? Has he seen how long the military genius of Europe, directing the military strength and enduring courage of the Russians, has been arrested before the weak walls of Varna and Schumla, defended by the intrepid Mussulmans? There is still the remains of a great power. The day when it should be attempted to tear up the Turks from the soil which they occupy the day when you invade the tombs of their fathers and the mosques of their Prophet-may be the day when a great insurrection will burst forth on both sides of the Bosphorus, and possibly you may resuscitate the people in the midst of the ruins in which you would bury them. 53. "It is not proposed to set Europe at defiance: no one Concluded. wishes to engage in such a desperate project for the nationality of a people. God forbid, however, that in the anticipations which are common to us all, I do not foresee a period when great changes are to be brought about. Without interdicting to France the protectorate of Egypt and the East at some future time, it is wiser at present to be regulated chiefly by the experience of the past. The strongest guarantee for the future stability of the Turkish empire does not suppose any intention to restore to it that which time, force, or policy may have torn away; it is only meant to declare that such as it is it shall remain, and that no one has a right to tear fresh fragments from it. Are we to embrace the system of giving to him who has the power to take, and, if force is about to overspread the East, are we to open the gates to it? Infinite are the 1 Moniteur, dangers of such a policy; for the power which advances 1839; Ann. towards the East may turn in another direction. Con190, 191. stantinople is far from central Europe, but Warsaw touches it." 1 July 3, Hist. xxii. This very interesting debate reveals both the extreme difficulty of the Eastern Question, and the state of uncer 1839. 54. Soult's mea East. tainty in which the French Government was in regard to CHAP. the policy which should be pursued concerning it. All the XXXIV. other powers of Europe, including England, were inclined to support the Porte against his rebellious vassal, while Marshal France conceived that its interests lay in maintaining sures in the the ascendancy which the Pasha of Egypt had acquired. These difficulties were increased by the intelligence received of the sailing of the Turkish fleet from Constantinople, and the resumption of hostilities at land by Ibrahim Pasha. Marshal Soult, to be prepared for any event, sent orders to the French fleet in the Levant to steer for the coasts of Syria, and sent M. Caille, his aide-de-camp, to Cairo, to assure Mehemet Ali of the eventual support of France, and to endeavour in the mean time to avert hostilities. He arrived, however, too late he reached Cairo five days after the battle of Nezib. In the critical circumstances the French Government demanded and obtained from the Chambers a credit of 10,000,000 francs (£400,000), to put the naval armaments on a respectable footing. The necessity of this precautionary measure was so obvious that no serious opposition was or could be made to it, but the debate revealed a very important tendency in the Chamber, which now appeared openly for the first time. This was the desire to intermeddle with the mysteries of diplomacy, and subject the Crown to the direct control of a popular assembly-an innovation fraught with the utmost danger to the ultimate interests of nations. The debate was closed by the following remarks on the part of Government by M. Jouffroy, the reporter of the commission : 55. "The first consideration on this subject which strikes every one, is the danger of the exclusive occupation of M. JoufEgypt or Constantinople by any European a people; the sition of the second, that these two positions are so closely connected Government together, that to secure Constantinople you must defend it in Egypt, and to secure Egypt you must defend it in Constantinople. These two systems, though plausible, are system. CHAP. equally false; the Ottoman or Arab policy will equally XXXIV. lead to disaster. The only way to avoid it, is to assemble 1839. an European congress, the basis of whose deliberations is to be, that no power is to be permitted to aggrandise itself in the East. The initiative of such a policy belongs to France. It is not timid; it is disinterested. Should the 83-85; Ann. Ottoman empire go to pieces, it can only be a transforma195-197. tion. Death does not authorise the seizure by a stranger of the property of the defunct.1 1 Cap. x. Hist. xxii. 56. "This great question and great debate impose on the Concluded. Cabinet an immense responsibility. In receiving the credit of 10,000,000 francs which the Chamber has voted, the Ministry have contracted a solemn engagement, and that is to enable France, in the affairs of the East, to occupy a position worthy of herself, and which may not cause her to decline from the position which she occupies in Europe. That is a difficult task; the Cabinet feels all its extent and weight. It has only been recently formed; it has not had time to commence those acts which consolidate an administration. But fortune has thrown into its hands an affair so great, that if it directs the Government as beAnn. Hist. comes France, it will be, we venture to say, the most glorious Cabinet which has governed France since 1830." The vote of credit passed by a majority of 287 to 26.2 The difficulties of the Eastern question, sufficiently Affairs of great in themselves, were much enhanced at this period the storm of by an outbreak which occurred in Africa, that could be xxii. 197, 198. 57. Africa after Constan tine. compared only to the sudden raising of a pillar of sand by the whirlwind of the desert. It almost seemed to justify the assertion of M. Villemain, that if it were attempted to dispossess the Turks from Constantinople, it might produce a storm which would restore the Ottoman power. To understand how this came about, it must be premised that, after the storming of Constantine, the dispossessed bey retired into the interior, and the French dominion was pushed farther into the Atlas, particularly to Stora, the ancient Roman station of Rusicada, which was occupied |