XXXIX. 1826. the great road leading through their centre, by which CHAP. it was thought the assailants would advance. But Campbell wisely declined that mode of combat, and made his attack instead by both flanks, which were comparatively undefended; he himself, at the head of the 13th and 89th, with a detachment of the Governor-general's bodyguard, directing the right attack; while General Cotton commanded the left, composed of the 38th and 41st, with some Madras artillery. After a short conflict, the enemy, though immensely superior in numbers, gave way on both flanks, and rushed to a field-work in the centre, which was 1 Thornton, v. 78-81; speedily stormed, with great slaughter, by the 38th. As a Martin, last effort, the Burmese general pushed forward a column 125; A on the great road in the centre, in hopes of piercing it, Official Acand separating the British wings; but it was met by the 9, 1826; 89th, and forced to retreat. The enemy now fled on all 1826; Snodsides, leaving their whole artillery, stores, and ammunition, 250. which fell into the hands of the victors.1 1 Sir A. Campbell's count, Feb. Ann. Reg. grass, 239, of peace. After this decisive victory, nothing remained to the 72. Burmese but submission to any terms which the victor Conclusion chose to dictate. The British general, accordingly, was met when in full march for the capital, and only forty miles distant from it, by Mr Price and Mr Sandford, two Americans in the service of the Burmese government, and who were described " as the only persons they could trust," who announced the acceptance by the court of Ava of the terms insisted for by the British general. They agreed to cede the whole conquered provinces of Arracan, comprising Arracan Proper, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandowy; and the Arracan Mountains were to form the boundary on that side between the two empires. They ceded besides the province of Ye, Tavoy, Morgui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies connected with them, rendering the Salouen river the frontier in that quarter. In addition to this, the Burmese agreed to pay a crore of rupees (£1,000,000) towards the expenses of the war; one quarter immediately, XXXIX. 1826. CHAP. upon receipt of which the British army was to retire to Rangoon, another quarter in an hundred days, on getting which the army was to quit the dominions of the King of Ava, with the exception of the ceded provinces ; the third in a year, and the last in two years from the conclusion of the treaty. Thus, by the vigour and perseverance of the British generals, and the heroic valour of their troops, was this perilous war brought to a successful and glorious termination, the prestige of British invincibility, which had been violently shaken by the disasters at its commencement, completely re-established, and a well-defined and defensible frontier formed by a range of lofty mountains established on what had previously been the weakest frontier of our dominions. It was high time it should be so, for the crisis through which our empire passed during this war was of the most dangerous kind. Had the disasters which befell it at the commencement of Ann. Reg. hostilities continued much longer, and not been redeemed by heroic acts of valour in circumstances almost desperate on the part of the troops employed, all India would have 425, 426. been in a blaze, and insurrections would have broken out from one end of the peninsula to the other.1 1 See the Treaty, 1826, App. No. 7; Thornton, v. 82-84; Martin, 73. on the Burmese and Pindarree wars. In the whole annals of the British empire a more reReflections markable contrast is not to be found than is presented by the Pindarree and Mahratta wars undertaken by Marquess Hastings, and the Burmese by Lord Amherst. In the first, forces amounting to above 200,000 men were to be faced, and a confederacy embracing the whole of central India, the most warlike part of the peninsula, confronted. Yet such was the vigour of execution and sagacity of previous foresight and preparation, that this great alliance was broken in pieces before its forces could be assembled together, and success, as in a game of chess, was, from the very beginning, certain, from the first move having been so rapidly made that it proved successful. In the next war the inherent vice of the Anglo-Saxon character appeared in strange contrast: Athelstane" the Unready" XXXIX. 1826. was well-nigh unhorsed by the first blows. The enemy CHAP. to be encountered was not a tenth part as formidable; the Court of Ava could never bring above 20,000 men into the field; but, nevertheless, serious disasters were incurred. Inadequacy of the force at first employed, want of previous preparation and acquaintance with the country, an undue contempt for the enemy, and ignorance of his mode of fighting, were the causes of all these misfortunes. It was attempted to conquer the kingdom of Ava, one of the most warlike and determined in Asia, and possessing immense natural advantages from the thick woods with which the country is overspread, and the pestilential marshes with which it is beset, with 11,000 men landed at the mouth of the Irrawaddy, at the commencement of the most unhealthy period of the year! Disaster, rather from sickness than the sword, fearful and long-continued, necessarily followed such an attempt. But if the commencement of the war exhibited the weak, its prosecution and conclusion revealed the strong side of the Anglo-Saxon character. When the danger was revealed, and the serious nature of the contest stood apparent, neither vacillation nor timidity appeared in the British councils, any more than weakness or irresolution in the British arms. Reinforcements were poured in ; adequate efforts were made; the exertions of Government were admirably seconded by the skill and valour of the officers, soldiers, and sailors employed; and the result was, that victory was again chained to the British standards, and a contest, which at first foreboded nothing but ruin to its arms, terminated by establishing the British empire on a v. 85, 101. more solid foundation than it had ever yet rested upon.1 The Burmese war, as all contests are which prove at first unfortunate, and are attended with heavy expense, The Barwas, during its continuance, extremely unpopular in England; and even after its successful termination, the same sary and apprehensions continued-dread of the effects of an undue able. extension of our empire coming in place of the dread of 1 Thornton, 74. mese war was neces una void 1826. CHAP. the immediate defeat of our arms. But upon a calm XXXIX. retrospect of the circumstances under which the war arose, and the subsequent history of our Indian empire, it must be evident that the war was unavoidable, and that the only faults justly imputable to the Government were want of preparation on their own side, and ignorance of the enemy with whom they had to contend. It may be very true that the islands about which the war began were barren sandbanks, not worth a week's expenditure of the contest-that is wholly immaterial, in an empire resting on opinion, in considering whether the war could or could not have been avoided. A lash over the back will probably not seriously injure a gentleman, so far as his physical frame is concerned but how will his character stand if he submits, without resenting it, to such an insult? The little island about which the dispute arose might be valueless; but character is inestimable; and in the affairs of nations, not less than of individuals, he who submits to aggression, or declines to vindicate honour in small matters, will soon find himself involved at a disadvantage in disputes vital to his existence. 75. the King of July 26, 1826. The good effect of the successes in the Burmese war Treaty with soon appeared in the diplomatic relations of the British Siam. Government with the Eastern potentates. On 26th July 1826, a treaty of commerce and amity was concluded on very advantageous terms with the King of Siam, whose dominions, hitherto impervious, were opened to British commerce. This event, in itself not immaterial, was rendered doubly important from the satisfaction it gave the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain, and the v. 100-104; stop it put to the senseless clamour raised by ignorant and misled persons against any contests tending to the extension of our empire in the East.1 1 Thornton, Martin, 426. An event of a very painful character occurred in the commencement of the Burmese war, which proved the precarious foundation on which our Indian empire rested, and the necessity of "conquest to existence," as strongly XXXIX. 76. Barrack felt there as by the French Revolutionists or Napoleon CHAP. in Europe. In September 1824, a dispute arose be- 1824. tween the 47th native infantry stationed at Barrackpore and the Government, about the party which was bound Mutiny at to be at the expense of providing bullocks to carry the pore. Sept. 15, extra baggage of the sepoys who had been ordered to 1824. prepare to march into the Burmese territories. These bullocks had hitherto been always provided at the expense of the sepoys themselves, being in general got in great abundance, and at a small cost, in the country in which they had hitherto been accustomed to carry on war. On this occasion, however, as they were going into a distant and unknown region, the price of these bullocks rose to an extravagant height, and the sepoys maintained, not without reason, that for this extra expense at least they should be reimbursed by the Government. This was imprudently, and, in the circumstances, unjustly refused by the commissariat, which held itself bound by former usage in this particular; and Col. Cartwright, who commanded the regiment, supplied funds from his private fortune to buy the bullocks; and Government, being informed of the circumstance, at length agreed to issue a sum of money to aid in the purchase. These tardy concessions, however, arrived too late to extinguish the spirit of discontent which from this cause, and the general unpopularity of the Burmese war from its being carried on beyond the sea, had seized a large part of the native troops. The men were ordered to parade on the 30th October in Oct. 30. marching order, but they refused to obey, and declared 1 Thornton, they would not go to Rangoon or elsewhere by sea, or v 104-108; march at all by land unless they had double batta or Rep. April marching allowance. Two regiments besides the 47th 2151, 2152. were ascertained to share these sentiments.1 Matters had now reached such a point that the speedy suppression of the revolt was indispensable, at whatever cost of life; for the concessions demanded by justice, if now made, would have been ascribed all over India to VOL. VI. 2 L v. Commons' 1832, Q. |