CHAPTER XL. INDIA FROM THE FALL OF BHURTPORE IN 1826, TO THE XL. THE Burmese war and the capture of Bhurtpore were CHAP. to our Indian empire what the Peninsular contest and battle of Waterloo were to our European. Both these 1826. wars were very protracted, attended with a great expense, Consequen- and for long of doubtful issue. Both terminated in the ces of these establishment of the British power, the one in Europe, causing an the other in Asia, on a solid foundation, and in throwing duction of around it the halo of invincibility, even more efficacious 1. triumphs in undue re national forces. than physical strength in securing the safety and procuring the blessings of peace for nations. Unfortunately, they both led to another result, the natural consequence with short-sighted mortals of the former, and as powerful a cause in inducing danger as that is in averting it. This was a belief that external danger had for ever passed away; that the victories gained had rendered future peril impossible; and that the nation, alike in the East and West, might now with safety repose on its laurels, and reap in peace, under a very reduced expenditure, the fruits of the toils and the dangers of war. How far this delusion proceeded in Great Britain, what a lamentable prostration of national strength it occasioned, and what enormous perils it induced, has been fully explained in the former chapter, and will still more appear in the sequel of this work. But the mania of retrenchment was not less XL. 1826. powerful with the Indian government than with the nation CHAP. and its rulers at home; and as the former was more in presence of danger, and was not encircled with the ocean, which has so often rescued the parent State from the perils induced by its folly, the catastrophe came sooner, and was of a more alarming character, in the East than in the West. The thirteen years of peace which followed the taking of Bhurtpore, were nothing but a long preparation for the Affghanistan disaster in India, as the thirtynine years' peace which followed the battle of Waterloo in Europe, was for the perils which were averted from the nation only by the heroic valour of her sons in the Crimea. rassed 2. the Indian finances. In justice to the Indian government, it must be added that they had much need of retrenchment, for the cost of Embarthe preceding wars had been enormous, and brought the state of finances of the empire into a very alarming state. war with Ava in particular, combined as it was in its later stages with that of Bhurtpore, had been attended with a very heavy expense. In the two years of 1824 and 1825, no less than £19,000,000 had been raised by loans; and at the close of the Amherst administration the financial prospects of the country were of a most alarming complexion. A deficit of £1,500,000 existed in the yearly exchequer, and it had then been found, what subsequent experience has too fatally verified, that any attempt to raise the revenue, whether direct or indirect, by augmenting the rate of taxation, not only would be vain, but, by ruining the cultivators, would prove eminently prejudicial. In the Madras presidency in particular, where the "Perpetual Settlement" did not exist, and the ryotwar system admitted of attempts, by exacting in- 1 Wilson's creased rents for the land, to augment the public revenue, tion of Mill, the ruin induced upon the cultivators had been such as ix. 234; to cause the public revenue to decline in the most alarm- 428; Thorning manner. Something, therefore, absolutely required 223. to be done, to bring the income and expenditure of the Continua Martin, ton, v. 222, XL. CHAP. empire nearer to an equality; and it appeared to the government, that as it had been found to be impossible to augment the former, nothing remained but as much as possible to diminish the latter. 1826. 3. No one thought of code of No Unfortunately for India, there was a third method of remedying the financial difficulties of the country, which relaxing the it did not enter into the contemplation either of the commercial Government at home or that in India to adopt, probably India. because it threatened some interests at home, or required an increased expenditure in the first instance abroad; and that was, to increase the capacity of India to bear an increased expenditure, by augmenting the resources of its industry. To do this, however, required the opening of the English market to the produce of Indian industry on the liberal terms of entire reciprocity, and a considerable expenditure on canals and irrigation in India-the first of which thwarted the jealous commercial spirit of Great Britain, while the last ran directly counter to the economical spirit which at that time was so prevalent both with the India Directors and the British Government. relaxation of our prohibitory protection code, even in favour of our own subjects in Hindostan, was then thought of; and to such a length did this system go in blighting the native industry in India, that it was stated some years after in Parliament, by one of the ablest and best informed men who ever returned from that country, Mr Cutlar Fergusson: "I will take this opportunity of expressing a hope that, while such active exertions are made. to extend the manufactures of England, we should also do something for the manufactures of India. At present, our cottons and woollens are admitted into India on payment of a duty of 24 per cent, while at the same time a duty of 10 per cent is charged upon the manufactures of India imported into Great Britain. A few years ago, in Dacca alone, 50,000 families obtained the means of subsistence by the cotton manufactures, but from the commercial policy this country has pursued with regard to XL. 1826. India, not one tenth of the number are now employed in CHAP. this branch of industry. I trust this system will soon be abandoned, and that articles produced by the natives of India will be admitted into England on payment of a small duty." Such was the effect in the East of the system so much vaunted in this country, whereby the Parl. Deb. manufacturers of Manchester and Glasgow were able to 1833; undersell the weavers of Hindostan in the manufacture of v. 336. an article which grew on the banks of the Ganges.1 1 July 22, Thornton, of Lord W. Governor Government having decided upon the diminution of 4. expenditure, not the increase of the productive powers of Character native industry, the most peremptory orders were sent Bentinck, out with the Governor-general who succeeded Lord Am- the new herst, LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK. The character of this general. nobleman, and the circumstances under which he assumed the reins of power, were singularly favourable to the full development, for good or for evil, of the economising policy. He obtained his appointment in consequence of the connection of Mr Canning with the Portland family, of which he was a younger son; and he left England at a time when economy was the order of the day with all parties, and every successive ministry was striving to outbid its predecessor in the race for popularity, by reductions in the national armaments and consequent relaxation of taxation. His personal character and ruling principles were eminently calculated to give effect to these maxims of government in the boundless empire over which his rule extended. A "Liberal,” as he himself said, "to the very core," he had in the close of the war brought the Government into no small embarrassment, when in command in the Mediterranean, by an imprudent and unauthorised proclamation to the Genoese, in which he promised them the restoration of their ancient Europe, independent form of government.2 Without the power- § 104. ful mind which discerns the truth through all the mists with which popular passion and prejudice so often envelop it, he had respectable abilities, and a great facility in 2 Hist. of c. lxxxvii. XL. 1828. CHAP. embracing and carrying out the leading principles of the day. His heart was in the right place. His intentions were always good, his views benevolent, his aspirations after an increase of human felicity; and yet he did more than any one else to endanger our Eastern dominions, and in the end brought unnumbered misfortunes upon it. Such is too often the result of inconsiderate or ill-informed benevolence. Yet are these disastrous consequences not to be ascribed entirely, or even chiefly, to Lord William Bentinck, as an individual; they were the result of the faults of the age, of the opinions of which he was the exponent and instrument rather than the director. 5. measures of economy. Nov. 29, 1828. The new Governor-general arrived at Calcutta in His first July 1828, and the very first acts of his administration gave an earnest of what was to be the tone of his administration. For above thirty years past, ever since 1796, a dispute had subsisted between the Government at home and the native army in India, called the half-batta question. The payment was not of any great amount not exceeding £20,000 a-year-but several peremptory regulations on the subject had been sent out by the Court of Directors, which had been evaded by successive governors-general, better acquainted than the rulers at home with the wants of, and the necessity of propitiating, the army. Now, however, they had found a Governorgeneral prepared to carry out their projects of economy to their full extent; and on 29th November 1828, they were promulgated by general orders from the Governorgeneral, and became law in India. The dangerous consequences of this unhappy reduction were clearly perceived at the time by those best acquainted with the country: Sir Charles Metcalfe and Mr Butterworth Bayley, the members of the Council, regarded it with undisguised apprehension; and the resignation by Lord Combermere of the situation of commander-in-chief, which he had held only four years, was mainly owing to his aversion to the same change. Even Lord W. |