СНАР. XL. 1838. 52. Great ef defeat of Russia. Thus did England and Russia first meet, with entire defeat to the latter, in the great battle-field of central Asia. "If we go on at this rate," said Baron Brunow, the ambassador of the Czar in London, to Sir John Hobfects of this house," the Cossack and the Sepoy will soon meet on the banks of the Oxus." 66 Very probably, baron," replied the latter; "but however much I should regret the collision, I should have no fears of the result." In truth, the designs of Russia had now met with a signal check, and her aggressive policy had recoiled upon her own head. The system of impelling the northern powers upon the south before her own forces were brought into action; of bribing Persia to enter into the contest by the promise of Herat and the remission of the unpaid debt, Affghanistan by the offer of aid to recover Peshawur, and the Sikhs by indemnity for the loss of Peshawur by the spoils of India, had broken down at the outset. The influence of England in central Asia, well-nigh lost by the parsimonious system of late years, had been restored by the heroism of an English officer, and the devoted gallantry of his Affghan followers. Nothing was wanting but a conciliatory and liberal policy to secure the Affghanistan chiefs, now violently roused against Russia by the onslaught against Herat, in the English alliance. Unfortunately these eminently favourable circumstances were turned to no account, or rather rendered the prolific source of evil, by the policy which they induced in the British Government. Instead of entering into an alliance with Dost Mahommed, the ruler of the people's choice, and who, by his vigour and capacity, had won for himself a throne by showing he was worthy of it, and capable of meeting the wants of the country, they determined on dethroning that chief, and placing the exiled discrowned sovereign, Shah Soojah, on the throne. The fact of his having proved incapable of ruling, or maintaining himself in power, and having been for thirty years an exile, during which he had, like XL. 1838. his fellow-exiles in Europe," learned nothing, forgotten CHAP. nothing," was deemed of less importance than having a sovereign on the throne who owed his restoration to British interference, and was identified with our Government by present interest and past obligation. 53. take com sion by the Govern The result has proved that a greater and more lamentable mistake never was committed by any government. Great misShah Soojah was not only incapable of ruling Affghan- mitted on istan, but he was in the highest degree unpopular with its this occa inhabitants. At once weak and cruel, irresolute and re- English vengeful, he was utterly disqualified to rule a nation of ment. barbarians, and possessed no merit but the unwearied perseverance with which he had striven to regain the lost inheritance of his fathers. On the other hand, Dost Mahommed was in the highest degree popular with all classes, and by his vigour and capacity he had succeeded in establishing his power on a solid foundation. True, he was a usurper, the son of the vizier; he had gained a throne by dispossessing his lawful sovereign. But Shah Soojah was no better; he had for a brief period held the throne by expelling from it his elder brother, who had himself won it by dethroning and depriving of sight Zemaun Shah, the true inheritor of the crown of the Douranee empire. The race of the viziers had succeeded to that of the imbecile shahs, as that of the Maires du Palais, from which Charles Martel and Charlemagne sprung, had in the olden time to the wornout dynasty of the rois faineants of the first race in France. The claim of legitimacy had as little to recommend Shah Soojah as his personal character or qualifications. He was not the rightful heir to the throne; Kamran the victorious, the ruler of Herat, and his family, came in before him. In every point of view, therefore, the determination to replace Shah Soojah upon the throne, and displace Dost Mahommed, was inexpedient and unjust. It was unjust to the rightful heir, for it tended to place a usurper permanently on the throne; it was unjust to XL. 1838. CHAP. the Affghans, for it was intended to deprive them of their inherent right, so frequently exercised amidst the changes of Asiatic government, of choosing their own ruler, and to force upon them a weak and hated sovereign, equally incapable of winning a throne by conquest or retaining it from inheritance. It was unjust towards Dost Mahommed, who, so far from injuring, had done everything in his power to favour British subjects and interests, and had evinced the greatest anxiety to enter into the closest alliance with the government of Calcutta. It was to the last degree inexpedient for our Indian empire, for instead of erecting a powerful barrier against the threatening dangers of Russian conquest, it was calculated to weaken that which already existed, to involve the English Government in the endless maze of Affghan politics, and instead of bringing to their support a powerful ally and a gallant people, to encumber them by the defence of a distant dependant, who could be upheld only by the force of foreign bayonets. 54. the restoration of Shah Soo jah. June 26, 1838. These considerations, which were strongly urged upon Treaty for Lord Auckland by Captain Burnes and those best acquainted with the real state of Affghanistan, were entirely disregarded, and it was resolved at all hazards to dispossess Dost Mahommed, and in his room place Shah Soojah on the throne. This was done by the sole authority of the Governor-general and his confidential advisers, then assembled at Simlah to enjoy the cool breezes of the first slopes of the Himalaya during the sultry season; the Supreme Council at Calcutta, though they afterwards adhibited their official consent to the measures, were not, in the first instance, consulted in their preparation. Having taken his resolutions, Lord Auckland was not long in *" In October 1838, the author (M. Martin, Esq.), deeply convinced of the unjust and perilous nature of the war, drew up a memorandum which the Marquess Wellesley transmitted to Sir John Cam Hobhouse, then President of the Board of Control. His lordship subsequently addressed a communication to Sir John against the Affghan war, predicting 'that our difficulties would commence when our military successes ended.' The Duke of Wellington, Mr Mountstuart Elphinstone, Mr Edmonstone, Mr Metcalfe, and other Indian statesmen, took the same view of the question."-M. MARTIN, 435, note. XL. 1838. carrying them into effect. After a brief negotiation with CHAP. the discrowned exile at Loodiana, a tripartite treaty was concluded at Lahore, on the 26th June 1838, between the Governor-general, Runjeet Singh, and Shah Soojah, which, to the infinite astonishment of the latter, restored him to his ancestral throne. The principal articles of the treaty were, that the British Government and the chiefs of Lahore recognised Shah Soojah as the sovereign of Affghanistan; and he on his part engaged to cede Peshawur, Attock, and their dependencies, to the Rajah of Lahore; that the rajah undertook to despatch a body of troops to aid in re-establishing the Affghan prince on the throne; that the three contracting powers engaged mutually to defend each other in case of attack; and the Shah promised not to enter into any negotiations with any foreign state without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh governments, and bound himself to "oppose any power having the design to invade the British and Sikh territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability." Lastly, Shah Soojah promised not to disturb his nephew, the ruler of Herat, in his possessions, and renounced all claim of supremacy over the ameers of Scinde, who were to remain in possession of their country under the condition only of paying a mode- Treaty in rate tribute to Shah Soojah, the amount of which was to 320-323. be fixed by the British Government.1 1 See the Kaye, i. on this It must be confessed that at first sight the treaty 55. appeared to have conferred as great a benefit upon the Reflections British as the Sikh government. It secured the two treaty. powerful states of Lahore and Cabul in the English alliance, solved, in appearance at least, the differences between them, and seemed to provide an effective barrier against Muscovite aggression, alike in the mountains of Affghanistan and on the banks of the Indus. But these advantages, so specious in appearance, and not altogether destitute of foundation, in reality were entirely neutralised, and in effect turned into evils, by the inherent injustice VOL. VI. 2 P XL. 1838. CHAP. with which it was tainted. It professed to regulate everything from views of expedience, and the supposed advantage of the British Government, by treaties concluded only with courts, forgetting that the people also lock's War required to be thought of; and that it was an unhalistan, 1. 87; lowed mode of cementing an alliance intended to serve as 1 Have in Affghan Martin, ton, vi. 150 435; Thorn- a barrier against Muscovite aggression, to commence with an act of spoliation equal to any of those with which the great northern potentate was charged.1 153. 56. It was at first intended to assist Shah Soojah for the Prepara- recovery of his throne only by a very small British auxiliary Afghanis force; and with this view it was announced in a proclatan expedi- mation issued by the Governor-general, that the Shah tions for the tion. "should enter Affghanistan surrounded by his own troops." With this view, 4000 irregulars were raised and placed under the nominal command of Prince Timour, eldest son of Shah Soojah, but really under the direction of British officers, and entirely paid from the British treasury. To this were to be added 6000 Sikhs under the command of Runjeet Singh's generals, who was also to station an army of 15,000 men in observation in the province of Peshawur. These forces, with the aid of the terror and influence of the English name, and the supposed anxiety of the Affghans to regain the rule of their old princes, would, it was hoped, suffice for the change of dynasty in Affghanistan, without imperilling any considerable body of British troops in its terrible defiles. Burnes, though he earnestly counselled that the case of Dost Mahommed should be reconsidered, and that we should act with him* rather than against him, yet gave it as his decided opinion, that * "It remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahommed. He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart a high opinion of the British nation; and if half of what you must do for others were done for him, and offers made which he could see would conduce to his interests, he would abandon Russia and Persia to-morrow. It may be said, that opportunity has been given him; but I would rather discuss this in person with you, for I think there is much to be said for him. Government have admitted that he had at best but a choice of difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing, and Persia and Russia held out a great deal."-CAPTAIN BURNES to GOVERNOR-GENERAL, June 1, 1838. KAYE, i. 340. |