XL. position in Affghanistan without a strain upon the Indian CHAP. empire, which its resources, great as they were, might 1839. prove incapable of standing? The country now occupied by the British troops was of great extent, a thousand miles from its base of operations in Hindostan, and inhabited by warlike and hostile tribes inured to warfare, and with arms in their hands, which they well knew how to wield. To retain a great force in such a situation would prove an irremediable drain upon the resources of India, and to leave a small one only was to expose it 464-466. to imminent hazard of being cut off.1 1 Kaye, i. Lord Auck future in t. 2. istan. Oct. Lord Auckland, after carefully reviewing every side of 78. this difficult question, was of opinion that, although the Plans of British army beyond the Indus could not with safety be land for the entirely withdrawn, yet it would be sufficient to leave an Afghanauxiliary force of five or six regiments to aid in keeping Shah Soojah on the throne. To carry into execution this design, it was proposed to withdraw the Bombay army entire by the Bolan Pass, and a portion of that of Bengal by the Khyber, leaving British troops at Cabul and Candahar to support the government, and in Ghuznee and Quettah on the west, and Jellalabad and Ali-Musjid on the east. These designs were only partially carried into effect; it was found to be necessary to leave a much larger force in the country than was at first intended. The general orders announcing the ultimate decision of Government were looked for with much anxiety, and they at length made their appearance on the 2d October. comparatively small force, consisting of the 16th lancers, with two regiments of native horse and a large part of the horse-artillery, was to return to India under Sir John Keane; but the whole of the 1st division of Bengal infantry, with the 13th Queen's regiment of infantry, were to remain in Cabul and Candahar; Ghuznee and Jellalabad were to be strongly occupied by native regiSir Willoughby Cotton was intrusted with the command-in-chief. The forces in Ghuznee were under ments. A XL. 1839. Orders, Oct. CHAP. the immediate command of Major M'Laren, those in Candahar of General Nott, and in Jellalabad of General Sale. In addition to this, a detachment of infantry, with a troop of horse-artillery under Lieutenant Murray Mackenzie, with a Ghoorka regiment, was sent forward to 1 General the very extremity of the Shah's dominions to the northward, to keep an eye upon Dost Mahommed, who had found refuge among the Oosbegs on the other side of the lofty mountain-range of the Hindoo Coosh. This little vi. 200, 201, army, by incredible exertions, made its way through these Nott's Me- dreary wildernesses, reached the Pass of Bamian in safety, and prepared to pass the winter in caverns, amidst the ice and snow of the great Caucasian range.1 2, 1839, 465, 473; Thornton, moirs, i. 142-145. 79. Khelat. The The homeward march of the Bombay army was sigAttack on nalised by the capture of the strong fortress of Khelat, the Khan of which was judged to have merited deposition by the hostility and treachery he had shown. citadel, which stands on a high rock, overlooks the town; and on the north were three heights of nearly equal elevation, which the Khan had lined with infantry, supported by five guns in position. The attacking force consisted of the 2d and 17th regiments, a native regiment, six guns, and a detachment of local force, under General Willshire. The assault was directed, in the first instance, against the infantry on the hills, and the shrapnell shells from Stephenson's guns soon compelled them to seek refuge in the walls of the fortress. The guns were immediately pushed forward to within two hundred yards of the gate, notwithstanding a heavy fire from the matchlockmen of the enemy; and after playing for some time, it at last gave way. Pointing to the cleared entrance, Willshire gave the word to advance, and the British soldiers, springing up with a loud cheer from the rocks and bushes by which they had been covered, rushed forward, headed by Pennycuick and his men, to the assault. The other companies quickly followed, and the entrance was won; but a desperate struggle ensued before the citadel was taken, for every inch XL. 1839. of the ground was manfully contested. At its entrance CHAP. Mehrab Khan and his chiefs stood, sword in hand, prepared to give battle for his last stronghold. But nothing could in the end stand the fierce attack of the British. Volley after volley was poured in by the leading companies with deadly precision of aim; the Khan and eight of his principal officers fell dead or wounded; and at length, being convinced by Lieutenant Loveday, who went up alone to a parley, that further resistance was vain, they surrendered at discretion. The loss of the 489-491; British was thirty-two officers and men killed, and one vi. 201-205. hundred and seven wounded.1 1 Kaye, i. Thornton, 80. quarters of in Cabul The autumn and winter which succeeded this brilliant campaign passed pleasantly to the officers and men of the Pleasant army of the Indus. The fine climate, which felt deliciously the troops cool after the sultry gales of Hindostan, the keen bracing in autumn air, the fine forests and finer scenery, the ice-cold water of and winter. the environs of Cabul, rendered the place at first an earthly paradise to men who had been toiling for months under a burning sun, in a long and fatiguing march from the plains of India. There were shows, spectacles, and amusements: the officers rode races, to the no small astonishment of the Affghans; reviews on a grand scale, and with princely magnificence, were held; and the king, who delighted in scenes of pageantry, established an order of knighthood, and distributed the insignia, to the persons selected to receive them, with grace and dignity. Amidst these scenes of festivity and amusement the time passed pleasantly away, as it ever does when it "only treads on flowers ;" and the officers who were left, deeming the campaign at an end, and that they were only destined to reap its fruits, sent for their wives, and scarcely 471, 472; envied those who, on the 18th September, commenced ii. 136, 147; their march back to India by the route of the Kojuk and vi. 201. Bolan passes.2 But the thorns were not long of showing themselves; 2 Kaye, i. Havelock, Thornton, XL. 1839. CHAP. and the British officers were soon taught, to their cost, that their military occupation of Affghanistan was not to be entirely of a pacific character. The detachments sent out in different directions did not meet with any open of the Brit- opposition in the field, but they soon found that they were ish position. surrounded by secret enemies, and that the great majo 81. Growing difficulties rity of the clans wanted only a leader, and some prospect of success, to break out into insurrection. Even in the capital, notwithstanding the presence of government and five thousand British troops, and the occupation of the Bala-Hissar, impregnable to the whole forces of Cabul, unmistakable symptoms of discontent appeared. The prices of everything had risen seriously, in some articles doubled; the necessary result of a commissariat which, at extravagant prices, bought up all provisions within their reach; and all this, which told severely upon the poorer classes, was set down, not without justice, to the hated presence of the Feringhees. Severe oppression was exercised by Prince Timour's troops on the natives, which at length reached such a pitch that General Nott flogged one of the marauders in his train in his own presence. The evils of a tripartite government, almost equally divided between Shah Soojah, the nominal sovereign; Sir William Macnaghten, the political agent; and Sir Willoughby Cotton, the military commander-in-chief, were already beginning to be felt. Power so divided became impotent. Responsibility was no longer felt when it could so easily be devolved on another. To these many sources of danger were ere long added others, less formidable in appearance, but scarcely less so in their ultimate results. The idle hours of the officers were soon beguiled by more exciting pursuits than the race-course; the zenana presented greater attractions than the hunting480, 614; field; and the general partiality of beauty for military success inflicted wounds on the Affghan chiefs more painful than those of the sword, and excited a thirst for ven 1 Kaye, i. Nott, i. 194-206. geance more intolerable than the subjugation of their CHAP. country, or the forcible change of their government. XL. 1839. 82. expedition Khiva. While difficulties were thus besetting the English army in Affghanistan, the early and unlooked-for success of the Russian expedition had fixed the attention and excited the jeal- against ousy of the cabinet of St Petersburg. Something re- Oct. 1839. quired to be done to re-establish Russian influence in central Asia, and counterbalance the check it had received from the failure before Herat, and the triumphant march of the British to Affghanistan. For this purpose advantage was taken of numerous acts of violence committed by the Khiva chiefs upon the Russian merchants carrying on trade with central Asia, and who had been, in a great many instances, slain or carried into captivity by those ruthless marauders, to demand reparation and the punishment of the offenders; and upon this being refused or delayed, an expedition was prepared to invade and occupy the country.* The Russians had ample cause for aggression-much more so than the English had for their expedition into Affghanistan-and, like it, they shared the fate of all the incursions which the powers of Europe have made into central Asia. After gaining, as is usually the case, considerable advantages in the outset, it was entirely defeated, and with frightful loss, in the end.1 The climate, the snows, pestilence, famine, and the inconceivable difficulties of the land carriage, proved fatal to 'Kaye, i. a powerful body of brave men, 6000 strong, with twelve 511. guns, amply provided with all the muniments of war, "Not one of the Russian caravans can now cross the desert without danger. It was in this manner that a Russian caravan from Orenburg, with goods belonging to our merchants, was pillaged by the armed bands of Khiva. No Russian merchant can now venture into that country without running the risk of losing his life or being made a prisoner. The inhabitants of Khiva are constantly making incursions into that part of the country of the Kirghiz which is at a distance from our lines, and, to crown all these insults, they are detaining several thousand Russian subjects in slavery. The number of these unfortunate wretches increases daily, for the peaceful fishermen on the banks of the Caspian are continually attacked and carried off as slaves to Khiva."-Proclamation of Emperor, October 28, 1839; Moniteur, 14th November 1839. 498, 504, |