CHAP. very few of whom ever returned to tell the melancholy tale of their disasters to their countrymen. XL. 1840. 83. culties in tan. Scarcely was the British Government in India relieved Fresh diffi- from the dread awakened by this apparition of the MusAffghanis covite battalions on the table-land of central Asia, when they had more serious grounds for apprehension from the difficulties in Affghanistan, which were daily thickening around them. The skill of the British officers, however, who were in command of the different detachments which occupied the country, the bravery of the troops employed under them, and the superiority of their arms, especially in artillery, of which the Affghans were nearly destitute, for long chained victory to our standards, and preserved the country to appearance quiet, when in reality convulsed with angry passions. Favourable accounts at first came in from nearly all quarters. The Bamian Pass was occupied without resistance; the Khyber, though not without much fighting and considerable loss, was kept open by the aid of detachments from Jellalabad and the downward passage of Keane's army; and so confident was Macnaghten that the country was quietly settling down under the restored rule of the Douranee princes, that he sent for his wife from Hindostan, and despatched a body of horse under Edward Conolly to escort her from the plains of India. In vain Nott warned the Government of the coming dangers: his voice, as is generally the case with advice at variance with preconceived opinions, was disregarded.1 1 Kaye, i. 484, 486; Nott, i. 285, 358. 84. Meanwhile intelligence of the most disquieting nature Disquieting was received from Herat. The liberality of the British intelligence from Herat Government to its Khan had been extreme; twelve lacs and the Punjaub. of rupees (£120,000) had been sent to its ruler, and two men of distinguished ability, Captains Todd and Shakespeare of the artillery, with Mr Abbot, had been long in the city to superintend the expenditure of that large sum on the fortifications. But in spite of all that they could do, great part of the money was misapplied or wasted by the venal or corrupt Affghan authorities, and at length it XL. 1840. was discovered that the vizier, Yar Mahommed, while CHAP. living in affluence on British bounty, was superadding to his innumerable other treacheries that of intriguing with the Persians. So evident was the perfidy of this hoary traitor, that Macnaghten did not hesitate to recommend offensive measures against him, and the annexation of his state to the dominions of Shah Soojah. But Lord Auckland, who had his hands sufficiently full nearer home, and was beginning to feel, in the ceaseless demands for men and money from Affghanistan, the cost of operations in those distant mountain regions, wisely declined the proposal, and endeavoured to effect the object by increased advances of money. These Yar Mahommed willingly received, and meanwhile continued his intrigues with the Persian government, and carried his effrontery so far as actually to boast, in a letter to Mahommed Shah, the Persian ruler, which was afterwards laid before the Governor-general, that he was cajoling the English, who 515, 521; were freely spending their army at Herat while he was vi. 207-209. throwing himself into the arms of Persia.1 1 Kaye, i. Thornton, The accounts from the Punjaub also were of a kind to 85. excite some apprehensions, and evince the immensely in- Threatencreased circle of hostility in which the operations beyond of things in ing aspect the Indus had involved the British Government. The the Punjaub. old chief who had founded the empire of Lahore, and, amidst all his faults to others, had ever been faithful in his alliance with the English, had expired shortly before the entrance of our troops into Cabul, and Nao-Nehal Singh, and the Sikh chiefs generally, who had succeeded to his power, were by no means equally well disposed towards us. The continued and apparently interminable passage of troops through their territories had not unnaturally excited their jealousy; and they asked themselves, not without reason, what chance the Sikh monarchy had of maintaining its independence, if the British power was established in a permanent manner in Affghanistan, and their dominions were used only as a stepping-stone betwixt XL. 1840. CHAP. it and Hindostan ? Symptoms of disaffection had appeared in the auxiliary Sikh forces; one entire regiment had turned about when led to the attack of the Khyber, and never ceased flying till they were out of the pass; and the demands of the Sikh authorities for money, on account of the alleged damage done by the passage of the troops, were daily increasing. Already Macnaghten had declared, that unless the proceedings of their generals were checked, he did not see how a rupture with the Sikhs was to be avoided, and that "we should be in a very i. 514, 515. awkward predicament, unless measures are adopted for macadamising the road through the Punjaub.” 1 1 Mr Mac naghten to Governorgeneral, April 10 and 15, 1840; Kaye, 86. Progress success of and varied the insur gents. May 16. In the mean time, affairs in Affghanistan itself were daily becoming more alarming. The Ghilzyes, a clan peculiarly hostile to the Douranee dynasty, were in open arms between Candahar and Cabul, and had entirely cut off the communication between these two places. Captain Anderson, of the Bengal artillery, with a regiment of foot, four guns, and three hundred horse, attacked a body of two thousand of them on the 16th May, and defeated them, after an obstinate fight, with great slaughter. This victory for a time stifled the insurrection in that quarter, but it only tended to increase the smothered hostility of the Ghilzyes, which was daily spreading and becoming more inveterate. The southern provinces were all in a blaze. Quettah was besieged, Kahun invested by the insurgents, and the newly-won fortress of Khelat was wrested from the chief to whom it had been assigned by the British, and Captain Loveday, who had distinguished himself in the assault, barbarously murdered by the vi. 212-214; Beloochees, who had risen in arms. Yet, amidst all these 524, 535; serious and daily increasing difficulties, which threatened in so alarming a manner his rear and communications, Macnaghten still persisted in the belief that nothing Aug. 12, serious was to be apprehended;2 that Affghanistan might be considered as pacified; and that now was the time to consolidate British power in central Asia, by an expe June 28. 2 Thornton, Kaye, i. Sir W. Macnaghten to Lord Auckland, 1840; Ibid. 533. XL. dition against Herat, and its annexation to the domi- CHAP. nions of Shah Soojah. 1840. During the summer of 1840, the little detachment 87. the Bamian which had been sent to the Bamian Pass to watch the Checks in movements of Dost Mahommed, and had passed the Pass. winter amidst ice and snow in the caverns of that inhospitable region, was released from its forced inactivity, and pushing across the great mountain-range, it occupied the fort of Rajgah, which was found deserted, on the other side. But it soon became apparent that the occupation of this distant and isolated fort, surrounded by a hostile population, had been a mistake. Two companies of the Ghoorka regiment, sent out to escort an officer into it, were met by a superior body of Oosbeg horsemen, and June 29. only rescued from destruction, after having sustained a severe loss, by the opportune arrival of reinforcements sent out to extricate them from the fort. Meanwhile Dost Mahommed had been thrown into prison by the cruel and perfidious Khan of Bokhara, with whom he had taken refuge. He nearly fell a victim to a treacherous attempt upon his life; and having afterwards made his escape, his horse fell dead from fatigue, and he avoided detection only by dyeing his beard with ink, and joining a caravan which he accidentally overtook. At length he succeeded in joining the Wullee of Khooloom, an old ally, who received him in his misfortune with unshaken fidelity. Sheltered by this supporter, he again raised the standard of independence, and the Oosbegs having all flocked around him, he early in September advanced towards the Bamian Pass at the head of six thousand men. When reminded that his wives and children were 540, 547; in the hands of the British, he replied, "I have no vi. 230-234. family; I have buried my wives and children." 1 1 Kaye, i. Thornton, disasters in This fresh inroad of Dost Mahommed was soon 88. attended with serious consequences, and excited the Further utmost alarm in the whole northern provinces of Aff- the Bamian. ghanistan. Surrounded by an insurgent and inveterately XL. 1840. CHAP. hostile population, it was soon found to be impossible to maintain the posts which had been occupied beyond the Hindoo Coosh, and accordingly both Rajgah and Syghan were evacuated by the Ghoorka regiment which held them, who retired, after sustaining severe loss, to Bamian. An Affghan regiment, which had been raised to support Shah Soojah, openly went over to the enemy. These successes spread the flame all through Affghanistan; the ferment soon became very great, both in Cabul and Candahar; and it was universally believed that Dost Mahommed had raised the whole strength of central Asia to the south of the Oxus, and was advancing with an innumerable army across the Hindoo Coosh to exterminate the Feringhee dogs, who were devouring the land of the true believers. So far did the panic proceed, that people in Cabul shut up their shops, and began to pack up or hide their effects; and the military authorities, to be prepared for the worst, occupied a gate of the Bala-Hissar by a company of British soldiers.1 1 Sir W. Macnagh ten to Ma jor Rawlin son, Sept. 3, 9, and 12, 1840; Kaye, i. 547-552. 89. at the Ba mian Pass. Sept. 18. But at this very time, when affairs appeared most alarmHis defeat ing, and the star of Dost Mahommed seemed again in the ascendant, an unexpected event occurred, which entirely changed the aspect of affairs, and postponed for a year the final catastrophe. His first step in advance had proved eminently unfortunate. Advancing, on the 18th September, with his brave but undisciplined Oosbegs, down the valley of Bamian, he was met by Lieutenant Murray Mackenzie, with two companies of sepoys, two of Ghoorkas, two guns, and four hundred Affghan horse. Despite the overwhelming superiority of numbers, which were at least five to one, Mackenzie advanced with the utmost intrepidity to the attack. Never was proved more clearly the superiority of European arms and discipline over the desultory onset of Asia than on this occasion. The Oosbegs, confident in their numbers, and animated with the strongest fanatical zeal, at first stood their ground firmly; but when the guns, which were nobly served, |