The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $10,000, on which judgment was entered. Defendant duly filed a motion for new trial, among the grounds of which was: "(8) The court erred in refusing instructions offered by defendant over the objections by plaintiff." Defendant duly appealed to this court. in that respect in the motion for new trial is too general. There has been some conflict of opinion on this point, but it must now be considered as settled that the ground, assigned in general language, such as used by defendant in its motion for new trial, is sufficient. State ex rel. v. Reynolds et al., 213 S. W. 782, decided by the court en bane at this term of the court, but not yet officially reported. [4] III. We must rule that defendant's instruction A was properly refused. It is settled law in this state that assumption of risk is not a proper plea to an action founded on the negligence of the master. "The moment negligence comes in at the door it may well be said that the doctrine of assumption of risk goes out of the window." Patrum v. Railroad, 259 Mo. loc. cit. 121, 168 S. W. 624. [1, 2] I. Respondent contends that we cannot consider the question urged by appellant that upon the evidence the cause should not have been submitted to the jury, for the reason that the defendant did not ask an in- This instruction was therefore properly restruction in the nature of a demurrer to the fused so far as it is based on the theory that evidence. We rule this point in favor of the assumption of risk was a defense herein. If respondent. Defendant also failed to object the matter submitted to the jury constituted a to any instructions given by the court sub- defense, it was because it constituted contribmitting the case to the jury. In such cir-utory negligence. Patrum v. Railroad, supra, cumstances, to enable this court to pass upon 259 Mo. loc. cit. 121, 168 S. W. 622; Williams the sufficiency of the evidence to take the v. Pryor, 272 Mo. 613, 200 S. W. 53; Fish v. case to the jury, defendant should have asked Railroad, 263 Mo. 106, 172 S. W. 340, Ann. an instruction in the nature of a demurrer to Cas. 1916B, 147. the evidence. Kenefick-Hammon Co. v. Norwich Ins. Co., 205 Mo. loc. cit. 312, 103 S. W. 957; Boone County Lumber Co. v. Niedermeyer, 187 Mo. App. 180, loc. cit. 186, 173 S. W. 57; Heller v. Ferguson, 189 Mo. App. 484, loc. cit. 492, 176 S. W. 1126; Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. loc. cit. 451, 16 Sup. Ct. 571, 40 L. Ed. 746; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Unsel, 144 U. S. loc. cit. 451, 12 Sup. Ct. 671, 36 L. Ed. 496. In Kenefick-Hammon Co. v. Norwich Ins. Co., supra, 205 Mo. loc. cit. 312, 103 S. W. 961, this court after quoting from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra, said: "It would seem from the foregoing that the highest court in the land looks upon & failure of appellant to ask a peremptory instruction as equivalent to assuming that the case was a proper one for the jury on the facts-a theory he is bound by on appeal." [5, 6] But in order that contributory negligence may be of any avail as a defense, it must be properly pleaded in the answerunless it appears from the plaintiff's own evidence as a matter of law-which, as has been seen, we are not permitted to inquire into on this appeal. Defendant's plea was as follows: "The plaintiff's injuries, if any, he received at the time and place stated in his petition, were caused solely by and are due directly to his own carelessness in moving and handling the carboy mentioned in plaintiff's petition; and all of which conduct of plaintiff contributed directly to his injury, if any; and that sumed by the plaintiff in his employment and the injuries, if any, to the plaintiff, were aswork for defendant." It is evident that the pleader intended to and did confine his plea of contributory negligence to the "manner" in which plaintiff and his coemployé moved and handled the carboy, and the other matters touching the plaintiff's conduct, such as those mentioned in this instruction, were intended to be embraced in the plea of assumption of risk. But however that may be, we hold they were not embraced within the plea of contributory negligence, and said instruction A was therefore proper We are satisfied with the rule thus announced, in cases like the present, where defendant also failed to object to any of the instructions given submitting the case to the jury. If such objection had been made and the point duly saved, then it would be proper for us to consider all reasons why said instructions should not have been given, including the reason, if it existed, that there was no evidence to justify the giving of any in-ly refused. We do not decide one way or the structions, or submitting the case to the jury at all. [3] II. Learned counsel for respondent also contend that we cannot review the action of the lower court in refusing instructions asked by the defendant, because the ground of error other as to whether the matter sought to be submitted to the jury in said instruction would have constituted a good defense, had it been properly pleaded; but we leave that question wholly undecided, because it is not necessary to a disposition of this appeal. It (216 S.W.) will be sufficient for us to examine and determine that question when it properly comes before us for decision. [7] IV. Defendant's instruction B was properly refused. Plaintiff, at the time contemplated in this instruction, was in imminent danger, and his conduct in trying to save his fellow workman will not be attributed to him as culpable. Kleiber v. Railway Co., 107 Mo. loc. cit. 247, 17 S. W. 946, 14 L. R. A. 613; Underwood v. Railway, 190 Mo. App. loc. cit. 418, 177 S. W. 724. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of SMALL, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the Judges concur, except BOND, J., not sitting. STATE ex rel. SMITH, Tax Collector, v. WIL- (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1. SCRIPTION OF LAND. A description of land as "11 acres more or less ne pt se nw 22-25-10 2500," is too uncertain to constitute a valid tax assessment and basis for a lien, since no boundaries are given, and judgment sale could convey no particular parcel of land. Appeal from Circuit Court, Stoddard County; W. S. C. Walker, Judge. Action by the State of Missouri, on the relation of R. J. Smith, collector of delinquent taxes, against Sibyl L. Williams and others. Judgment for relator, and defendants appeal. Reversed. J. L. Fort, of Dexter, for appellants. [8] V. Instruction C should have been given. There is abundant evidence that the in- TAXATION 421(3)—INSUFFICIENCY OF DEjury might have been due to accident. The plaintiff and Waller both testify that the carboy was much heavier than they anticipated, and, after they raised it up, they found they could not carry it, and, in struggling to let it down, Waller stumbled or fell-he says, on account of an open hole in the floor which he had never seen and of which he knew nothing. Plaintiff did not see the hole nor see Waller's foot or leg in it. The defendant's evidence tends to show that they were seven feet away from the hole when they lowered the carboy and the accident happened. If so, Waller must have stumbled or fallen on the bare floor for some reason not shown. If he had not so stumbled, there is little doubt that, notwithstanding its weight, they would have safely lowered the carboy to the floor. If so, the injury to the plaintiff happened from an unforeseen and unknown cause and was an accident. Henry v. Grand Ave. Ry., 113 Mo. 527, 21 S. W. 214; Simon v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 178 S. W. 449, where the authorities are collected and reviewed. Furthermore, plaintiff's witness Morganson testifies that the plaintiff repeatedly, at the time of the accident and for a year thereafter, told him that it was a pure accident for which no one was to blame. This was, in itself, evidence that the injury was accidental. None of the instructions given covered the ground embraced in said instruction C. [9] VI. There was no error in refusing instruction D asked by the defendant. The jury were required by instruction No. 3, given by the court, before they could find for the plaintiff, to find that the injury was caused by Waller's leg slipping through the hole in the floor. Instruction D is but the converse of said instruction No. 3. "There was no error in the ruling of the court in refusing to instruct the jury on the same question in a negative form when it had already instructed the jury in an affirmative form." McCaffery v. R. R. 192 Mo. loc. cit. 159, 90 S. W. 816. GOODE, J. I. This is an action to recover delinquent taxes alleged to be due the city of Dexter, in Stoddard county, for the years 1914 and 1915, and to enforce a lien for the taxes against the land on which they were assessed. The only evidence introduced for the plaintiff was the tax bill for those years; and the principal defense is that the description of the land in the tax bill (presumably the same description given in the assessor's books), is too indefinite to constitute a good assessment. The land is recited to have been assessed against Lee Williams (one of the defendants) for both years by this description: "Lot, Lots or parts of Lots "11 acres more or less ne pt se nw 22-25- The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the taxes, penalties, etc., shown to be due by the tax bill, to wit, $87.15, and declared the judgment to be a first and paramount lien against the land. The tract against which the lien was declared was described in the judgment as indefinitely as it was described in the tax bill For the error above indicated, the cause and petition, and it was orderedis reversed and remanded. BROWN and RAGLAND, CC., concur. "that plaintiff's lien be enforced against said land, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy this judgment, interest, penalties, For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes commissions, attorney's fees and costs, and that a special execution issue therefor, which said execution shall be executed as in other cases of special judgments." tiff had a general reputation, known to defendant at the time of the arrest, of being a disturber of the peace, quarrelsome, turbulent, and violent in his behavior, was admissible on the questions of malice and probable cause. 4. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION —3—ACIS OF PO LICE OFFICEBS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DE- II. We consider the description of the land too uncertain to constitute a valid assessment and basis for a lien. No boundaries are given of the 11 acres intended to be assessed, and although they are stated to be in rested for tearing down a fence, cannot be predLiability of defendant, who had plaintiff arthe northeast part of the southeast quar-icated on the action of the police in prosecutter of the northwest quarter of the section, ing plaintiff on the technical charge of trespasswhat part they constitute could not be as-ing, a matter of which defendant was ignorant certained from the description. It is ob- and which was not attributable to any fault of vious that tracts containing 11 acres, with various boundaries, might be taken out of the northeast part of the section, and that, if a sale occurred under the judgment, no particular parcel of land could be conveyed to the purchaser. his. 5. WITNESSES 248(2) — UNRESPONSIVE AN SWER IMPROPER. Answer of a police officer in an action for malicious prosecution, upon being asked concerning the general reputation of the plaintiff for peace and quiet in the community in which he lived, that it was bad among the officers of the district, was not responsive and was improper. 6. TRIAL 90-WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS BY The case does not differ materially in its facts from State ex rel. v. Linney, 192 Mo. 49, 90 S. W. 844, and State ex rel. v. Burrough, 174 Mo. 700, 174 S. W. 610. In the former case it was said that assessments must contain an accurate description of the land An objection that an answer was not reto be taxed, and that if one is vague and un-sponsive and was improper was waived, where certain in respect of description, it will not no motion was made to strike it out. sustain a judgment for taxes. The judgment is reversed. (280 Mo. 5) BOYERS v. LINDHORST. (No. 20424.) (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1. Dec. 1, 1919.) FAILURE TO MOVE TO STRIKE. 7. TRIAL 76-WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE. Where no objections in such respects were made at the time, that questions asked witnesses on reputation were not in proper form, and that some of the witnesses stated that plaintiff's general reputation was bad without first having qualified by stating that they knew his reputation, they were waived. Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Wil 1. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 59(4)—Gener- liam T. Jones, Judge. AL REPUTATION OF PLAINTIFF ADMISSIBLE. In an action for malicious prosecution, proof of the general bad character of plaintiff, if known to defendant at the time of the prosecution, is admissible in evidence on the issues of malice and want of probable cause; but the reputation of plaintiff sought to be shown must be bad in respect to such matters as naturally would be calculated to effect the probability of the plaintiff's having committed the crime with which he was charged. 2. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 63-PROOF OF PLAINTIFF'S BAD CHARACTER ADMISSIBLE TO MITIGATE DAMAGES. In an action for malicious prosecution, proof of the general bad character of the plaintiff is admissible on the measure of damages, where damages for mortification and disgrace are sought; but the reputation sought to be shown must be bad in the same respect in which his reputation was, or otherwise would have been injured by the malicious prosecution. Action by John A. Boyers against Frank Lindhorst. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. James T. Roberts, of St. Louis, for appel lant. O. J. Mudd and Charles H. Franck, both of St. Louis, for respondent. RAGLAND, C. An action for damages in the sum of $10,000. The petition counts reSpectively on false imprisonment and maliCious prosecution. Plaintiff being cast on the trial to a jury has in due course prosecuted his appeal to this court. Defendant was the holder of a note se cured by a deed of trust on a lot owned by the plaintiff in the city of St. Louis which was fenced but otherwise unimproved. Plaintiff defaulting in the payment of interest, a foreclosure sale was had under the deed of trust, 3. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 59(4) EVI-through which and a mesne conveyance de DENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S GENERAL BAD REPU TATION. In an action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff having been arrested for tearing down a fence belonging to defendant, proof that plain fendant acquired the full title. After some specious efforts to redeem, the plaintiff began tearing down and removing the fence inclosing the lot. According to defendant's version, which the jury seem to have accepted, (216 S.W.) the pleadings, the inquiry should have been confined to general reputation for integrity and moral worth, or to conduct similar in character to that with which he was charged by defendant. It must be conceded that on the question of damages the general bad reputation of plaintiff sought to be shown, if admissible, must be bad in the same respect in which his reputation was, or otherwise would have been, injured by the malicious prosecution, and on the questions of malice and probable cause it must be bad in respect to such matters as naturally would be calculated to affect the probability of the plaintiff's having committed the crime with which he was charged. There must be some logical on knowledge of plaintiff's action coming to him, he went to plaintiff for an explanation of his conduct and to expostulate with him. Having previously learned from plaintiff's neighbors that plaintiff was reputed amongst them to be a dangerous man, he took a police officer with him to the interview for protection against any violence that the plaintiff might exhibit. No particular altercation took place, but plaintiff told defendant in effect that the foreclosure sale was invalid, that he (defendant) had no title, and that he could not stop plaintiff from taking the fence down. Thereupon defendant requested the officer to arrest plaintiff for tearing down the fence. Pursuant to the request, plaintiff was placed under arrest, police patrol wagon was call-relation between the two. The question here, ed, and plaintiff was therein conveyed to the police station. There the officer, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, then or thereafter, preferred a charge of trespass ing against the plaintiff.. Plaintiff was locked up. but later released on bond. On the trial a few days afterwards he was acquitted. In the trial of this cause the court, over the objection of the plaintiff, admitted in evidence the testimony of several witnesses offered by the defendant to the effect that the general reputation of plaintiff for peace and quiet in the community in which he lived was bad. This is assigned as error and is the sole matter preserved by the motion for a new trial for consideration on this appeal. [1, 2] 1. Appellant's chief contention is that his reputation was not put in issue by the pleadings, in that he did not ask for compensation for injury to us reputation. Whatever construction may be put upon the petition in that respect, it is indubitably true that the essential issues tendered by the count on malicious prosecution were malice and want of probable cause. On these it was unquestionably admissible for the defendant to introduce in evidence in chief proof of the general bad character of the plaintiff, if known to him at the time of the prosecution. Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47, 67 S. W. 650; Peck v. Choteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S. W. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 236; Gregory v. Chambers, 78 Mo. 294; Warren v. Flood, 72 Mo. App. 199. But the count on malicious prosecution avers that by reason of such prosecution the plaintiff "was subject to great pain of mind, humiliation, mortification, and disgrace," and for these he asks compensation. From the use of the terms "humiliation" and "mortification," it may be inferred that the plaintiff claimed that he had suffered either in his own esteem, or in that of others; but by the use of the term "disgrace" he necessarily charged that he had been brought into disrepute, so that the proof of general bad reputation was admissible on the measure of damages. Peck v. Choteau, supra. [3, 4] 2. Appellant next makes the point that, even though evidence of the general bad reputation of plaintiff was admissible under in concrete terms, is whether the general bad reputation of plaintiff for peace and quiet, considered in connection with the other facts and circumstances in evidence, would have any effect in inducing a belief of plaintiff's guilt of the statutory crime of malicious destruction of property in the mind of a reasonable and cautious man. As shown by the evidence, the fence was the property of defendant. The plaintiff had no interest in it, and in tearing it down either he was acting under the honest belief that he had such an interest in it as gave him the right to do so, or else he did it maliciously. If the act was done under an honest claim of right, it was not a crime; if it was not so done, it was malicious and criminal. If the latter, it was because plaintiff was evilly disposed toward the owner, not the property itself, and by his action he invited retaliatory measures on the part of the owner and a possible breach of the peace. Is it then more probable that he was actuated by malice, if he was a man who was a disturber of the peace and who was quarrelsome, turbulent, and violent in his behavior towards others than if he had been a man who respected the tranquility of his community and conducted himself in a quiet, orderly, and peaceable manner towards its members. Under the circumstances shown, it seems to us that it is, and we rule that the evidence was admissible on the questions of malice and probable cause, at least. We have not overlooked the fact that the plaintiff was prosecuted on the technical charge of trespassing, but the only complaint that defendant made against plaintiff and for which he requested his arrest and prosecution was that of tearing down the fence. He supposed that the prosecution was based and conducted on that complaint. His liability cannot be predicated on the action of the police of which he was ignorant and which was not attributable to any fault of his. [5-7] 3. A police officer, being asked concerning the general reputation of the plaintiff for peace and quiet in the community in which he lived, replied that it was bad among the officers of the district. The answer was not responsive and was improper; but, as 639(1)—Pros plaintiff made no motion to strike it out, his | an ordinance of which he was convicted of havobjection to it was waived. Appellant also ing violated, also failed to define the terms. complains that the questions asked the wit5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS nesses on reputation were not in proper form, ECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE CIVIL and that some of the witnesses stated that PROCEEDING. plaintiff's general reputation was bad without first having qualified by stating that they knew his reputation. No objections in any of these respects were made at the time, and consequently they were waived. Finding no error in respect to the matters preserved for review, the judgment is affirmed. BROWN and SMALL, CC., concur. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of RAGLAND, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the Judges concur. CITY OF PLATTSBURG v. SMARR. (No. 13318.) (Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri. Dec. 1, 1919.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 642(3) — OrDINANCE VIOLATED MUST BE SHOWN IN BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. On appeal from a conviction in the circuit court of violation of a municipal ordinance, the ordinance cannot be reviewed, where it was not included in the bill of exceptions. 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 642(3)-SCOPE OF REVIEW WHERE VIOLATED ORDINANCE WAS NOT IN BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. A prosecution for violation of a city ordinance being a civil proceeding, the sufficiency of the complaint is to be determined by the rules applicable to pleadings in other cases. 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 639(2)-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT CHARGING VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE. A complaint charging a violation of a municipal ordinance, in that plaintiff was guilty of a breach of the peace, which specified his act, consisting of an indecent proposal to a woman, as well as the ordinance, is sufficient, where the act committed and the ordinance violated were so clearly identified as to bar another prosecution. Appeal from Circuit Court, Clinton County; Alonzo D. Burnes, Judge. "Not to be officially published." Hampton Smarr was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Plattsburg, and on appeal to the circuit court he was again convicted, and again appeals. Affirmed. F. B. Ellis, of Plattsburg, for appellant. W. S. Herndon, of Plattsburg, for respondent. BLAND, J. Defendant was convicted in the mayor's court of the city of Plattsburg, Mo., for the violation of an ordinance of that city. He was again convicted on his appeal to the circuit court. The facts show that on the night of September 6, 1918, the prosecuting witness, Where ordinance under which plaintiff was been to a picture show in Plattsburg. They a girl 15 years of age, with another girl, had convicted was not included in the bill of excep-left the show between 8:30 and 9 o'clock. tions, the information cannot be held on appeal not to state an offense, unless the complaint on The defendant, who was but little more than which information was based described acts a stranger to the girls, followed them, and which could not be made subject to punishment by municipality. 3. BREACH OF THE PEACE 1-IMPROPER PROPOSAL TO WOMAN "BREACH OF THE PEACE." Breach of the peace includes all violations of public peace or order and acts tending to disturbance thereof, and may consist of such acts as tend to excite violent resentment; the use of improper language or the making of an indecent proposal to a woman may constitute a breach of the peace, amounting to a violation of an ordinance of a municipality, which was authorized to enact ordinances to prohibit disturbances of the peace. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Breach of the Peace.] 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 641-ESTOPPEL TO COMPLAIN THAT TERMS OF VIOLATED ORDINANCE WERE NOT DEFINED. Where defendant's own instructions failed to define terms used, he cannot complain that instructions given in behalf of the municipality, at a dark place in the street passed them, and, standing in front of the prosecuting witness, while holding out his hand with some money therein, asked her "if she wanted to make some money." She replied, "No. sir; I don't; if I did, I would make it;" and told him, "What do you want to stop a girl like me for on the street?" and defendant replied that "he didn't have any sense." To this the girl stated, "You surely don't, or you wouldn't try to get me to take money." She told him that she would have him arrested that same night, and she and her companion looked up a police officer, resulting in de fendant's arrest. On the following day the prosecuting witness swore to the following complaint, upon which he was tried: "Rose Simpson, aged 15 years, being sworn, on her oath states that on the 6th day of September, 1918, at the county of Clinton and state of Missouri, and within the corporate lim |