although not so in respect to other States, and as it had been the custom to call attention to statutes which had no direct relation to the science of jurisprudence or the administration of justice, I felt very much embarrassed in dealing with so many States. I could have compressed the review within reasonable limits, either by grouping States or by the classification of the subjects of legislation, but so many Legislatures protracted their sessions until late in the season I could not procure the statutes in time to pursue that course. As it is,

in many instances I have had recourse to advanced sheets of the statutes as they came from the press, without any index, and in the case of Delaware I have relied on an abstract taken from the parchment rolls in the archives of the State by the member of the General Council representing that State.

I was, therefore, compelled to treat each State separately, and if in so doing I trespass on your patience you must blame the command of the Constitution, the practice of my predecessors in office, the custom sanctioned by yourselves, the immense mass of legislation to be brought to your notice, and the inability of a large majority of the members of the General Council to communicate to the President, as enjoined by the Constitution, the changes in the statutes of their respective States.

This inability is principally to be attributed to the delay in the publication of the statutes. There were several laws of a general nature enacted by Congress during the past year which merit our attention,

The Act of March 3d, 1887, to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, to further regulate the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts, and for other purposes, takes from those courts the cognizance of any civil suit unless the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

Nor can any suit be brought against any person by any original process of procedure in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, unless the jurisdiction of the court is founded only on the fact that the action is between

citizens of different States; then the suit must be brought in the district where the plaintiff or the defendant resides.

Nor can an assignee or subsequent holder of a chose in action bring suit in the Circuit Court unless such suit could have been brought if no transfer had been made. The only exceptions to this rule are assignees of foreign bills of exchange and transferees of choses in action issued by any corporation payable to bearer.

The regulations as to the removal of causes are:

1st. No suit can be removed from a State court unless the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

2d. It can be removed only by the non-resident defendant except where the suit is between citizens of the same State, and the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depends on grants of land by different States.

3d. When in any suit there is a controversy wholly between citizens of different States, which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants interested in such controversy may remove the suit.

4th. The application for removal must be made before or at the time the defendant is required by the laws of the State to plead, except where the ground of removal is local prejudice, or when jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depends on grants of land by different States, as above stated.

5th. Removal on the ground of local influence or prejudice is allowed to the defendant only in suits where the plaintiff is a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and the defendant is a citizen of another State. The affidavit in such case must state that the defendant cannot obtain justice in the State court in which the suit is brought, nor in any other court of that State to which under its laws the defendant on account of prejudice or local influence might have the right to remove the cause; the affidavit of the petitioner is not conclusive, and the Circuit Court, if not satisfied with its

truth, may remand the cause to the State court. If there be several defendants, and the suit can be tried separately in the Circuit Court without prejudice to the parties, that court may remand the suit to the State court as to the defendants not affected by local influence or prejudice, and retain jurisdiction of the cause as to the other defendants.

This act also takes away the right to an appeal or writ of error to review the decision of the Circuit Court remanding a cause to the State court.

The other purposes referred to in the title of this act are developed in §§ 2, 3, and 7.

Section 2 requires receivers or managers in possession of property in any cause pending in any court of the United States to manage and operate such property according to the requirements of the laws of the State in which the property is situated, in the same manner as the owner would be bound to do if in possession.

Section 3 allows suit to be brought against a receiver in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with the property in his charge without the previous leave of the court which appointed him; such suit to be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court which appointed the receiver, so far as may be necessary to the ends of justice.

This section modifies the law as expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States, and it restores to suitors the right of trial by jury.

Section 7 is leveled at nepotism; it provides that no person related to any justice or judge of any court of the United States by consanguinity or affinity within the degree of first cousin shall be appointed to any office or be employed by such court or judge in any duty in any court of which such justice or judge may be a member.

On March 3d, 1887, Congress repealed the Tenure-of-Office Act, which it had passed twenty years before.

The repeal of this act is at least a recognition of the wis

dom of our ancestors, who believed that the power of removal was incident to the power of appointment.

The Act to Regulate the Counting of Votes for President and Vice-President, and the decisions of questions arising thereon, deserves commendation, because it contains a recognition of the principle that Presidential electors are State officers, whose appointment is to be determined by State authority; and it precludes the creation of extra constitutional tribunals to determine a contested election.

The Act to Regulate Commerce, commonly called the InterState Commerce Law, is so well known, and has been the subject of so much discussion, I will not dwell upon its provisions. The interpretation of the long and the short haul section seems to have given most trouble to those who are charged with the execution of the law, as well as to those who are expected to obey it. To determine what are "substantially similar circumstances and conditions" is no less difficult than the definition of the special cases in which the commission may authorize the common carrier to charge less for longer than for shorter distances. I cannot refrain from calling to your attention the phraseology of the sixth section, which provides for the issue against the offending carrier of a writ of mandamus "in the name of the people of the United States." I know of no other instance in which judicial process is issued, or judicial procedure is conducted, in the name of the people of the United States. The expression is calculated to arouse the attention of those familiar with the constitutional controversies which agitated the Republic in its earlier days.

Congress also passed an act to provide for bringing suits against the Government. It enacts that the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine—

1st. All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an Executive Department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government, or

for damages liquidated or unliquidated in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable, but war claims and claims heretofore rejected by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear them are excepted.

2d. All set-offs, counter claims for damages, or other demands whatsoever, on the part of the Government, against any claimant in said court.

But no suit against the Government is allowed unless brought within six years after the right accrued.

The Circuit and District Courts are vested with jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims-the Circuit Courts, where the amount of the claim does not exceed $10,000, and the District Courts, where the amount of the claim does not exceed $1,000. The causes are to be tried without a jury, and either party is allowed an appeal or writ of error, as in other suits.

A provision has been introduced into the act, whereby a party who is or has been indebted to the Government, or his surety or representative, may by suit compel an ascertainment or adjustment of the debt, or a settlement of accounts, and obtain a final discharge.

The Anti-Polygamy Act has been amended. In prosecutions for bigamy the lawful spouse, although made a competent witness, cannot be compelled to testify without the consent of the other spouse; but confidential communications made by either spouse to the other during marriage are protected from disclosure.

Adultery is punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding three years; both parties are declared guilty of adultery if the woman be married though the man be unmarried; but if the man be married and the woman unmarried the man alone is to be deemed guilty.

Every ceremony of marriage in any of the Territories of the United States, whether the parties be lawful subjects of