jurist, has in his incomparable introductory Discourse to his Lectures on the Law of Nations, given us a finished specimen of the advantages resulting from the mastery of foreign public writers. It would, perhaps, be difficult to select from the whole mass of modern literature, a discourse of equal length, which is so just and beautiful, so accurate and profound, so captivating and enlightening, so enriched with the refinements of modern learning, and the simple grandeur of ancient principles. It should be read by every student for instruction and purity of sentiment, and by lawyers of graver years to refresh their souls with inquiries, which may elevate them above the narrow influences of a dry and hardening practice.

But a still more striking example is Lord Stowell, (better known in this country as Sir William Scott,) the present venerable Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, of whom it may be justly said, in the language of Cicero, that he is jurisperitorum eloquentissimus. This great man has presided in the Court of Admiralty since the year 1798; and during this period he has commanded the admiration of all Europe by the learning, acuteness, and finished elegance of his judgments. There was a time, when it was somewhat the fashion in this country to undervalue the solid excellence of his opinions. Our commerce was brought so directly in conflict with his administration of prize law, that it was difficult to avoid prejudices on a subject, in which, as neutrals, we had so deep an interest, and were so liable to indulge strong animosities. But time has dissipated many delusions on this subject; and we have had in the late war ample opportunity to try the accuracy of his principles, when we changed the character of neutrals for that of belligerents. We can now look back upon his decisions with somewhat of the calmness and sobriety of a philosophical historian. With the exception of the doctrines respecting the colonial trade, in which it is but common justice to admit, that he either acted upon public Orders in Council, which he was bound to obey, or upon the Rule of 1756, which his government had previously chosen to consider as an established part of its prize code, the differences between his decisions upon prize law, and those promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, are so few, as to be almost evanescent. After the most powerful arguments VOL. XX.-NO. 46.

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under the highest political excitements, and with the aid of the most striking eloquence, there has been but a single principle adopted by him, which has been deliberately overruled by the Supreme Court; and on that occasion there was a serious difference of opinion among the Judges.

But it is not in respect to prize law, that we intend to speak of Lord Stowell, though he everywhere exhibits the most profound and accurate knowledge of all the publicists of continental Europe; but as a maritime judge, deciding, in what is called the Instance Court, the great principles of commercial jurisprudence. His superiority in this department over the technical reasoning of the common lawyers is most signal. He discusses every question with a persuasive and comprehensive liberality, with a tone of general equity, a knowledge of maritime usages, and a disposition to consider maritimne jurisprudence, as the unwritten law of the world, rather than the municipal monopoly of a single nation; and he draws from all sources, ancient and modern, the best and purest principles to aid, to illustrate, and to confirm his own. judgment. With him the grave learning of Grotius, the acute, bold, and somewhat vehement discussions of Bynkershoek, the reverend testimonies of the Consolato del Mare, the collections of Cleirac, the busy, practical sense of Roccus, the brief but clear text of Heineccius, the various and exhausting labors of Casaregis, the argumentative commentaries, and luminous treatises of the French jurists, appear as perfectly familiar, as the writers of his own age and country. He evidently reposes upon them, even when he does not cite them; and transfuses into his own eloquent and impressive judgments, whatever they afford of general doctrine, or just interpretation, upon all the doubtful questions of maritime law. One scarcely knows which most to admire, the simplicity of his principles, the classical beauty of his diction, the calm and dispassionate spirit of his inquiries, his critical but candid estimate of evidence, his strong love of equity, his deep indignation of fraud, chastened by habitual moderation, or that pervading common sense, which looks into, and feels, and acts upon the business of life with a discriminating, but indulgent eye, content to administer practical good without ostentation, and wasting nothing upon speculations, whose origin is enthusiasm, and whose end is uncertainty or mischief. Even

when he deals with subjects of another class, as in ecclesiastical causes in the Consistory Court, one is surprised to see with what admirable propriety he uses his knowledge of general jurisprudence and the civil law, to give vigor to his decrees. And upon questions involving the lex loci, he has triumphantly shown, that he can master the results of foreign jurisprudence, and, as in the very interesting case of Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, compose the strifes of the learned advocates of the Scottish bar, and fix forever upon an immovable basis a question, which had vexed the domestic forum of Scotland for a long period with its doubts and difficulties. We say, without hesitation, that the character of this eminent Judge, whatever may have been his original genius and ability, owes its present elevation, in a great measure, to his enlarged studies, and his cultivation of universal jurisprudence. Take, for instance, his celebrated judgment in the case of the Gratitudine in 1801, on the right of the master to hypothecate the cargo, as well as the ship and freight, for the necessities of the voyage; or the case of the Julianna in 1822, on the invalidity of a stipulation in the shipping paper to cut off the seamen from wages, unless the voyage was performed to the final port of destination; where shall we find in the annals of the common law, except among the judgments of Lord Mansfield, cases argued out upon such rational and enlightened principles, aided by sober and various learning, and ending in conclusions so irresistible? One seems in them to be reading, not the law of England merely, but the law of the world-the results of human reason and human learning, acting on human concerns, with reference to principles absolutely universal in their justice and convenience of application. We wish American lawyers would study the fine models of this sagacious Judge, with a diligence proportionate to their importance and utility.

We cannot quit this subject, without recommending to our brethren of the English bar, if perchance these pages should attract their notice, the study of American jurisprudence. Of course we do not mean of our local laws and peculiar systems, for we should as little advise this, as we should to our own lawyers, the study of the English law of tythes and moduses, and copy holds, from which we are separated toto cœlo. What we do recommend is the study of our commercial ad

judications. This is not said, we hope they will believe, from vanity, under a false estimate of our own attainments. American lawyers are in the constant habit of reading all the English Reports; and it would be worse than affectation to attempt to disguise, that we are greatly instructed and improved by them. They present to us the fruits of great experience, industry, intelligence, and ability. But we also are painters.' The American Courts, collectively considered, embrace a large proportion of talent and learning, and they are perpetually engaged in many of the discussions, which perplex the English tribunals. Of course, there is a great diversity in the attainments of the judges and lawyers in the different States composing the Union, arising from local circumstances. But in the principal Atlantic States, the system of maritime law is of daily application to business, and is studied with earnest diligence.

In one respect their is a striking contrast between the state of the English and that of the American bar. In England, the profession is broken up into distinct classes. The civilians engross, exclusively, the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts, and even these are separated into proctors and advocates. The Chancery Courts have their own solicitors and counsellors. The barristers and serjeants of the common law generally confine themselves to the practice of their own particular courts. The attorney is a being, who deals with processes and proceedings in suits, but is shut out from the rights of arguing counsel. The conveyancer pours over his own peculiar studies for chamber practice; and the special pleader, if he wins his way to a lucrative practice, sits under the bar a quiet spectator of forensic disputations, unless the niceties of his own craft come into play. In America all this is differThe same gentleman acts, or may act, (with scarcely an exception,) in all these different capacities; and in the course of a single term of a court may assume many of the functions of all of them. He is, or may be, at once, proctor, advocate, solicitor, attorney, conveyancer, and pleader; he may draw libels and bills, frame pleas and answers, direct process, prepare briefs, sketch drafts of conveyances, argue questions of fact to the jury, and questions of law to the court; and find himself quite at home in all these various employments. If it should be thought, that this singleness of occu

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pation and subdivision of labor give to the English lawyer more accuracy, minute knowledge, and perfect facility in the use of his materials, they carry with them on the other hand some disadvantages. The general tendency of such close pursuits is to narrow down the mind to mere technical rules; to exhaust its powers upon subtle distinctions and dull details; to make professional life an affair of collections and recollections; to create an acute and nice discrimination, rather than a solid and comprehensive understanding. What is gained by skill in the manipulation, is lost in the vigor of the blow.

The course of the American lawyer does not, it must be confessed, generally lead to such exact inquiries, and such perfect finish, although there have been eminent examples to the contrary. But a survey of the whole structure of the law conducts him to large and elevated views, to brilliant and successful illustrations, to reasonings from various contrasts and analogies of the law, and to those generalisations, which invigorate eloquence, and shadow out the finer forms of thought. His learning must be deep, and various, even if it is not in all respects exact; and will be tinctured with the hues of all his studies. His law silently acquires the tone and spirit of equity; and his commercial discussions urge him to search for and adopt in argument, whatever of excellence the genius and erudition of foreign jurists have brought to his notice. He knows too, that in the American courts there is no disposition to discourage the study of foreign jurisprudence. There is a freedom from restraint, and an habitual eagerness to expand our law, which favor every attempt to build up commercial doctrines upon the most liberal foundation. We do not mean to affirm, that American lawyers in general cultivate such extensive studies, or are distinguished by such elevated attainments. What we mean to assert is, that the general tendency of our system is to excite an ambition for such studies and attainments, and that the genius of the profession is perpetually attracted in its researches and reasonings to those general principles, which constitute the philosophy of the law. We could point out living models, who exemplify all, that we have suggested in commendation of the American system; and among the illustrious dead within our own brief career, we fear no rebuke in naming Hamilton, Dexter, Pinkney, and Wells. But it is unnecessary to trust to