Where woman In Rer v. Harley, 4 C. & P. 369, it was held that if a servant put poison not quick with into a coffee-pot which contains coffee, and when her mistress comes down to child. breakfast, the servant tells the mistress that she has put the coffee-pot there for her (the mistress's) breakfast, and the mistress drink the poisoned coffee, this is a "causing the poison to be taken" within the 11th section of the 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, («) relative to attempts to murder by poison, and the servant is therefore indictable under that act. And from the same case it should also seem that this is also an "administering" within that act; as to constitute an administering it is not necessary that the poison should be delivered by the hand of the party.

It is, it seems, necessary, to constitute an offence within the act, that the thing administered was swallowed by the woman to whom it was administered; merely giving it, if no part be swallowed, is not sufficient. In a case where the prisoner was indicted for administering poison to E. D. with intent to murder her, the proof was that the defendant gave her a bit of cake, which contained arsenic and sulphate of copper. She put this into her mouth and spit it out again, but did not swallow any part of it: this was held not a sufficient administering within the 43 Geo. III. c. 58. (Rex v. Cadman, Carr. C. L. 237, 3d ed.) (b)

It is not necessary that there should be an actual delivery of the poison, &c. by the hand of the defendant. (Rer v. Harley, 4 C. & P. 369.)

It is immaterial whether in fact the drug or other thing administered was likely or calculated to procure abortion; it is sufficient to prove that the defendant administered the drug, &c. with intent to procure miscarriage, and that the drug, &c. was a "poison" or "other noxious thing." (Rex v. Coe, 6 C. & P. 403.) (c)

measures about nine inches, and the
testes of the male begin to descend into
the scrotum, but are not found there till
the eighth. From the fifth to the seventh
month, it may be born alive, but can
never maintain a separate existence; but
beyond the seventh month we cannot
carry the consideration of abortion, the
child being then on the same footing with
one perfectly mature, and only deficient
in size and weight; and about this time
the membrana pupillaris disappears. (Sm.
-For. Med. p. 292.)

Of Savin and Colocynth. These are
things commonly taken by women to
procure abortion. They generally do not
answer their intended purpose, and al
ways do injury to the health of the woman
who takes them. Savine is a shrub,
whose leaves have a hot and bitter taste,
and a disagreeable smell. It is a power-
ful stimulant, and it acts on the nerves,
the stomach, and rectum, but has no
specific effect on the uterus. (2 Par. p.
379.) Colocynth (also called Collo-
quintida, or Bitter Apple) is bitter in
taste, and is a powerful drastic purgative.
(Id. p. 377.) For these there are no
chemical tests.

As to symptoms of pregnancy and diseases that have the effects of recent delivery, see post, "Children, Concealing Birth of."

(a) Post, "Malicious Injuries to Persons," Vol. V.

(b) This same case is also reported in 1 R. & Moody, 114, but the two reports

differ very materially; for by the latter, it should seem necessary, to constitute the offence, that the poison should be swallowed. According to the report of Rex v. Harley, 4 C. & P. 369, the former report in Mr. Carrington's work on the Criminal Law is the correct one.

(c) See Rex v. Phillips, 3 Camp. 74, which was an indictment under the 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, s. 2. In this case, witnesses having been called on behalf of the prisoner to prove that the shrub he used was not savin, the counsel for the prosecution insisted that he might, notwithstanding, be found guilty upon the last count of the indictment, which charged, that he administered a large quantity "of a certain mixture, to the jurors unknown, then and there being a noxious and destructive thing." The prisoner's counsel objected, that unless the shrub was savin, there was no evidence that the mixture was "noxious and destructive." Lawrence, J. held, that in an indictment on this clause of the statute it was improper to introduce these words; and that though they had been introduced, it was not necessary to prove them. And he further said, "it is immaterial whether the shrub was savin or not, or whether or not it was capable of procuring abortion, or even whether the woman was actually with child. If the prisoner believed at the time that it would procure abortion, and administered it with that intent, the case is within the statute, and he is guilty of the offence laid to his charge."

The defendant, if not convicted of the felony, may be found guilty of an Where woman assault, if the evidence shall warrant such a finding. (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. not quick with c. 85, s. 11.) The enactment is as follows: "That on the trial of any person child. for any of the offences therein before mentioned, or for any felony whatever, Defendant may where the crime charged shall include an assault against the person, it shall be found guilty be lawful for the jury to acquit of the felony, and to find a verdict of guilty of an assault. of assault against the person indicted, if the evidence shall warrant such finding, and when such verdict shall be found, the Court shall have power to imprison the person so found guilty of an assault for any term not exceeding three years."

Offence not

This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. (5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1.) The punishment is transportation for life, or for any term not less than triable at sessions. fifteen years, or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years, at the Punishment. discretion of the Court, (ante, p. 11,) with or without hard labour, or with or without solitary confinement for any portion of such imprisonment, with hard labour not exceeding one month at one time, nor three months in any one year. (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 8.)

If found guilty of an assault only, imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years. (Id. s. 11.)

accessaries.

Principals in the second degree and accessaries before the fact are punish- Principals in the able in the same manner as principals in the first degree; and accessaries second degree and after the fact are liable to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, which imprisonment may be regulated as before. (Sup.) (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 7; and see " Accessary," post.)

Forms.

day

Commencement as usual, as ante, p.9.] for that he the said C. D. on the of in the year of our Lord at the parish of in the said county, unlawfully, meliciously and feloniously, did cause to be administered to and taken by S. L. a large quantity of a certain noxious thing, to wit, a noxious thing called savin, [or, "a certain poison, to wit, a poison called," &c.; or, use a certain instrument, &c. to wit, an instrument called, &c."] with intent then and there and thereby to procure the miscarriage of the said S. L., against the form of the statute in that case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c. [conclude as usual, as ante, p. 9.]

"

(1.) Commitment for administering drugs, &c. to pro of a woman.

cure the abortion

a woman, under

ante, 11.

[venue.] The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present, that (2.) Indictment C. D. late of the parish of A. in the county of B. [yeoman] on the day of in the for administering year of the reign of our Lady the now Queen Victoria, with force and arms, poison to procure at the parish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully, maliciously and the miscarriage of unlawfully did administer to and cause to be taken by one S. L. a large quantity 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 6, of a certain noxious thing, to wit, a noxious thing called savin, to wit, four ounces of the said norious thing, with intent then and there and thereby to procure the miscarriage of the said S. L., against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen. [If the facts justify it, add a count or more, stating the administration of the thing differently; and add a count for administering, &c. "a certain noxious and destructive thing to the jurors aforesaid unknown," with the like intent.]

Commence as in preceding form, No. 2, to the asterisk, and then thus] use a certain instrument called a by then and there [state concisely the mode of using it, and if any doubt, add other counts to meet it] with intent, &c. [conclude as in preceding form, No. 2.]

(3.) Indictment on
same act for using
an instrument,
&c. to procure the
miscarriage.

Acceptance. See " Bill of Exchange," Vol. I.; "Forgery," Vol. II.

(1.) Of Principals in general.

Principals in the first degree.

Accessary. (a)

A PARTY guilty of an offence may be either a principal in the first degree, a principal in the second degree, or an accessary before or after the fact.

I. Of Principals in General, 14.

[7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 31; c. 30, s. 26.]
II. Of Accessaries in General, 19.
[7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 55.

III. Of Accessaries before the Fact, 20.
IV. Of Accessaries after the Fact, 21.
V. Of the Proceedings againt Accessaries, 23.
1. In General, 23.

2. Indictment against, 25.

3. Trial of, 28.

4. Evidence, 30.

5. Punishment of, 32.

[7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 9, 10, 11; 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62 ; c. 30, s. 26; 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, s. 3, 31; 2 Will. IV. c. 34, s. 18; 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 7 ; c. 86, s. 6; c. 87, s. 9; c. 88, s.4; c. 89, s. 11; c. 36, s. 35; c. 66, s. 25; and 4 & 5 Vict. c. 56, s. 2.]

VI. Particular Enactments against Receivers of Stolen Goods, 33. [7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 54, 55, 56, 60 ; 2 Geo. III. c. 28, s. 12, 14, 18, 19; 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 87, s. 22; 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 75, s. 1, 12, 15, 21, 22.]

VII. Forms, 39.

1. Of Principals in General.

In order to ascertain who are accessaries, it will be expedient to inquire in the first place who are principals.

Principals in First Degree.]-A principal in the first degree is he that is the actor or actual perpetrator of the offence. (1 Hale, 233, 615; 4 Bla. Com. 34.) It is not necessary that the act should be perpetrated with his own hands; for if an offence be committed through the medium of an innocent agent, the employer, though absent when the act is done, is answerable as a principal in the first degree. (See R. v. Giles, R. & M. 166.) Thus, if a child under the age of discretion, or any other instrument excused from the responsibility of his actions by defect of understanding, ignorance of the fact, or other cause, be incited to the commission of murder or any other crime, the incitor, though absent when the fact was committed, is, ex necessitate, liable for the act of his agent, and a principal in the first degree. (Fost. 340; 1 East, P. C. 118; 1 Hawk. c. 31, s. 7; R. v. Palmer, 1 N. R. 96.) But if the instrument be aware of the consequences of his act, he is a principal in the

(a) As to Accessaries in general, see 1 Chit. C. L. 256 to 275; Arch. Crim. Law, 9th ed. by Jervis; Deacon's Crim.

Law, title Accessary; 1 Russ. Crim.
Law, 31, &c.

first degree, and the employer, if he be absent when the fact is committed, is an accessary before the fact; (R. v. Stewart, R. & R. 363;) or, if he be present, a principal in the second degree. (Fost. 349; Arch. C. L. 9th ed. by Jervis, 4.) Also in other cases a party absent may be liable as principal; as he that puts poison into any thing to poison another and leaves it, though not present when it is taken: and so it seems all that are present when the poison is so infused and consenting thereto are principals. (Hale's Sum. 216.) Turning out a wild beast with intent to do mischief, so that thereupon death ensues, the party offending is guilty of murder as a principal. (Fost. 349; 1 Hale, 514.)

But if one came casually, not of the confederacy, though he hindered not the felony, he is neither principal nor accessary, although he apprehend not the felon; but for his negligence he is punishable by fine and imprisonment. (Hale's Sum. 216; 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 10.)

1. Of Principals.

Principals in Second Degree.]—A principal in the second degree is he who Principals in is present aiding and assisting with a felonious intention to commit the felony, second degree. (1 Hale, 233, 615; 4 Bla. Com. 34,) at the time the offence was committed. The presence need not be an actual standing within sight or hearing of the act: an active co-operation in the crime at the time of its commission completes the felony. As if several persons set out together, or in small parties, upon one common design, be it murder or other felony, or for any other purpose unlawful in itself, and each taketh the part assigned him, some to commit the fact, others to watch at proper distances and stations to prevent a surprise, or to favour, if need be, the escape of those who are more immediately engaged. They are all, provided the fact be committed, in the eye of the law, present at it: for it was made a common cause with them, each man operated in his station at one and the same instant towards the same common end; and the part each man took tended to give countenance, encouragement, and protection to the whole gang, and to insure the success of their common enterprise. (Fost, 350).

In case of stealing in a shop, if several are acting in concert, some in the shop and some out, and the property is stolen by one of those in the shop, those who are on the outside are equally guilty as principals in the offence of stealing in a shop. (Rex v. Gogerley, Russ. & R. C. C. 343; and see Rex v. Owen, 1 Ry. & M. C. C. 96; Rex v. Borthwick, 1 Dougl. 207.)

If several act in concert to steal a man's goods, and he is induced by fraud to trust one of them, in the presence of the others, with the possession of such goods, and another of them entices him away, that the man who has the goods may carry them off, all are guilty of felony as principals. (Rex v. Standley, Russ. & R. C. C. 305.)

All persons aiding and abetting the personating a seaman are principals; the offence is not confined to the person only who personates the seaman. (Rex v. Potts, Russ. & R. C. C. 353.) So in simony all are principals. (Baker v. Rogers, Cro. Eliz. 789.)

If one encourage another to commit suicide, and is present abetting him while he does so, such person is guilty of murder as a principal; and if two encourage each other to murder themselves, and one does so, the other being present, but the latter fail in the attempt upon himself, he is a principal in the murder of the first: but if it be uncertain whether the deceased really killed himself, or whether he came to his death by accident before the moment when he meant to destroy himself, it will not be murder in either. (Rer v. Dyson, Russ. & R. C. C. 523 ; see Rex v. Russell, Moody, C. C. 356 ; Reg. v. Alison, 9 C. & P. 418 )

So if several persons come to a house with intent to commit an affray, and one be killed while the rest are engaged in riotous and illegal proceedings, though they are dispersed in different rooms, all will be principals in the murder. (Dalt. J. c. 161; 1 Hale, 439; Hawk. b. 2, c. 29, s. 8.) All those who assemble themselves together, with an intent even to commit a trespass, the execution whereof causes a felony to be committed; and continue

1. Of Principals.

Presence during

together, abetting one another till they have actually put their design into execution; and also all those who are present when a felony is committed, and abet the doing of it, are principals in felony. And where persons combine to stand by one another in the breach of the peace, with a general resolution to resist all opposers; and, in the execution of their design, a murder is committed, all of the company are equally principals in the murder, though, at the time of the fact, some of them were at such a distance as to be out of view. (Reg. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437.)

The offender, to constitute him a principal, it is not necessary that he the whole offence. should be present during the whole of the transaction: it is sufficient to show that he originally assented to the felony, and was present aiding and abetting when the offence was consummated, although he was not at the inception. As where the servants of A. feloniously removed goods in A.'s warehouse from one part of it to another, and B. several hours afterwards assisted in removing the goods from the warehouse, he was held a principal, since it was a continuing transaction. (2 East, P. C. 768.) If several combine to forge an instrument, and each executes by himself a distinct part of the forgery, and they are not together when the instrument is completed, they are nevertheless all guilty as principals. (Rer v. Bingley, Russ. & R. C. C. 446; sed vide Rex v. Kelly, Russ. & R. C. C. 421, and id. 332, infra.) As, if A. counsel B. to make the paper, C. to engrave the plate, and D. to fill up the names of a forged note, and they do so, each without knowing that the others are employed for that purpose, B., C. and D. may be indicted for the forgery, and A. as an accessary; (Rex v. Dale, Moody, C. C. 307;) for if several make distinct parts of a forged instrument, each is a principal though he do not know by whom the other parts are executed, and though it is finished by one alone in the absence of the others. (Rer v. Kirkwood, Moody, C. C. 304.)

Not sufficiently near to give assistance.

Persons not sufficiently near to give assistance, are not principals. Thus where Brighton uttered a forged note at Portsmouth, the plan was concerted between him and two others, to whom he was to return when he had passed the note and divide the produce. The three had before been concerned in uttering another forged note; but at the time this note was uttering in Portsmouth, the other two stayed at Gosport. The jury found all three guilty; but on a case reserved, the judges were clear, that as the other two were not present, nor sufficiently near to assist, they could not be deemed principals, and, therefore, they were recommended for a pardon. (Rer v. Soares, Atkinson and Brighton, 2 East, P. C. 974; Russ. & R. C. C. 25, S. C.; and see R. v. Stewart and others, Russ. & R. C. C. 363; and Rer v. Badcock and others, Russ. & R. C. C. 249; Rex v. Manners, 7 C. & P. 801.)

Going towards the place where a felony is to be committed, in order to assist in carrying off the property, and assisting accordingly, will not make a man a principal if he were at such a distance at the time of the felonious taking as not to be able to assist in it. (Rex v. Kelly, Russ. & R. C. C. 421.) Where H. and S. broke open a warehouse and stole thereout thirteen firkins of butter, &c. which they carried along the street thirty yards, and then fetched the prisoner, who was apprised of the robbery, and he assisted in carrying the property away; he was held not a principal, the felony being complete before he interfered. (Rex v. King, Russ. & R. C. C. 332; Rex v. M'Makin, id. 333, note.)

If a wife, by her husband's order, but in his absence, knowingly uttered a forged order and certificate for prize money, the presumption of coercion at the time of uttering does not arise, as the husband was absent, and the wife may be convicted. (Rex v. Morris, Russ. & R. C. C. 270.)

It is not sufficient to make a person a principal in uttering a forged note that he came with the utterer to the town where it was uttered, went out with him from the inn at which they had put up a little before he uttered it, joined him again in the street a short time after the uttering, and at some little distance from the place of uttering, and ran away when the utterer was apprehended. (Rex v. Davis, Russ. & R. C. C. 113; and see Rex v. Else, id. 142.)