to mathematics and other sciences which do not enter upon the ground of theology or ethics.

There is a final group of enemies to political economy who condemn it as politically dangerous. This accusation is formulated in two different and contradictory propositions; political economy is declared:

1. By the one group to be an enemy of the principle of authority, favouring the absolute non-intervention of the state in economic matters;

2. By the other to be an enemy of social progress and a supporter of the existing inequalities in the economic organism.

To the accusation of the first we reply, to begin with, that truth as such is never dangerous, and that it is necessary to distinguish the conclusions of the science from those hastily put forth in worthless and superficial doctrines. And further the limitation of the economic functions of the State, when affecting matters altogether outside its natural and legitimate sphere of competence, does not in the least weaken, but rather strengthens, the principle of authority, by giving it a true position and assigning to it reasonable limits. And it should be observed that economists, and especially those of to-day, do not propound it absolutely, but with the necessary modifications, and with due regard to conditions of time, place, and civilisation, and to precedents of all kinds.

It is strange indeed that political economy should be considered hostile to authority and at the same time favourable to socialism, as if the very essence of socialism were not the desire to substitute authority for liberty, and as if socialists had not declared themselves the fiercest enemies of modern economic science.

Finally, in replying to those who contend that political economy is opposed to beneficial reforms, and is the primary cause of social inequalities, we remark :

1. That, in its rational part, as we have already several times asserted, it does not invent nor create, but observes the natural laws of certain phenomena ; it does not occupy itself with that which is nor with that which ought to be, but rather with that which is constant and necessary, thus bearing an unchangeable relation alike to the present and the future;

2. That, in its applied part, the principles that it propounds are decidedly favourable to wise reforms, and only opposed to certain thoughtless and ill-timed changes, which would cause the ruin of civil institutions;

3. That political economy cannot be the cause of social inequalities, which have existed apart from its influence. Indeed this influence has never hitherto been so powerful nor so universal as some seem to think;

4. That with regard to natural inequalities, these are the inevitable result of differences in the habits and customs of men; hence they are a useful factor in true

social progress. In any case, to condemn political economy because there are the poor, the idle, the avaricious, and the dissipated, is like accusing anatomy of creating blindness, lameness, and deformity;

5. That if we turn to artificial inequalities, the offspring of privilege and corrupt political institutions, we shall find that political economy has never ceased to attack them, and that to it may in part be ascribed those reforms through which such institutions are gradually losing ground where they have not altogether disappeared.

In short, it seems to us that the strong aversion to the theories of pclitical economy shown both by the laudatores temporis acti, and by those who with little modesty call themselves the men of the future, may be considered as an indirect proof, if others were wanting, of the great usefulness of political economy.1

1 On the subjects treated in this first part, besides the already mentioned works of Whately, Cairnes, Kautz, &c., the following may be consulted :—

N. W. Senior, Four Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, London, 1852.

E. Pickford, Einleitung in die Wissenschaft der Politischen Oekonomie, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1860.

v. Mangoldt, article "Volkswirthschaft," in vol. xi. of the Deutsches Staatswörterbuch. Stuttgart, 1869, p. 97—126.

V. Hermann, Staatswirthschaftliche Untersuchungen, 2nd ed. Munich, 1870, p. 1-77 of the reprint of 1874.

F. Lampertico, Economia dei Popoli e degli Stati. Introduzione. Milan, 1874.

John K. Ingram, The Present Position and Prospects of Political Economy. London, 1878.

Th. Ed. Cliffe Leslie, Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy. Dublin, 1879.

E. Nazzani, La Scuola Classica d'Economia Politica. Milan, 1879.

HISTORICAL PART.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONCEPTION, DIVISION, METHOD, AND SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

P. Rossi, Introduction à l'Histoire des Doctrines économiques. In the Journal des Économistes, Vol. II. (1842), p. 201—223. (Preface to a historical course given by Rossi during the last years of his teaching at the Collège de France.)

Giovanni Bruno, Sull' Origine dell' Economia sociale, o Teoria della Storia di questa Scienza. Palermo, 1854, 8vo. (The object of the work is to prove that political economy, as a science, did not exist until after the rise of Christianity.)

H. Baudrillart, De l'Histoire de l'Écon. polit.—In the Journal des Econ., Vol. V. (3rd. series), 1867, p. 57-75. (Treating of the method, the characteristics, and the usefulness of a history of political economy.)

The History of Political Economy is an explanatory narrative of the origin and development of economic

theories considered in connection with social institutions.

It follows from this definition that such a history should not be confined to a mere chronological exposition of the various doctrines held by successive generations. It should also take upon itself the higher task of determining their absolute and relative worth. Taking these different theories singly, it should investigate their origin and growth and observe them as they manifest themselves in disconnected and isolated forms, so that it may be able to build them up into a distinct and consistent system of science.

Further, as to the relations between economic theories and social institutions, we must draw attention to the fact that these are of two kinds.

In the first place writers are almost always influenced, though in different degrees, by the circumstances, ideas, and peculiar institutions, either of the country and period to which they belong, or of some other to which they have specially given their attention. The power of such influences is often not suspected, or even flatly denied, by those who are subject to them. They make unfounded pretensions to philosophic impartiality, which is, in the nature of things, impossible. In fact, if we turn to the essential points of the different theories, and if we eliminate peculiarities of an incidental kind in order to compare these theories with the external circumstances preceding or accompanying their growth, it will be easy to discover in them an underlying aim. Either they apologise for certain economic institutions of which the author approves and, so to speak, idealises, or they attack certain other institutions of which he does not approve, laying down principles opposed to