the parties in interest are represented by attorneys, such attorneys will be recognized as fully controlling the cases of their respective clients." 105.-"All notices will be served upon the attorneys of record." 106.-"Notice to one attorney in a case shall constitute notice to all counsel appearing for the party represented by him; and notice to the attorney will be deemed notice to the party in interest."

These are familiar rules common to all practice, and appear to me decisive of the question. When Mr. Campbell's attorneys were served he was at that instant served. The time began to run, and his motion to be effective must be filed within it. But if it were not so, an affidavit stating that he received actual notice on or about the 17th or 18th of April is not a declaration that he did not receive it on the 16th or earlier, and does not prove the application to be within the rule.

Upon the merits there is nothing in the application bringing it within. the circumstances which would call for a review or rehearing in the courts, to the rules of which in this respect the practice here is required by Rule 76 to conform. Nothing is presented, except an argument upon the correctness of the conclusion reached as to the sufficiency of the testimony offered in Moore's behalf to support his bona fides in making settlement upon the lands.

The motion for review is accordingly dismissed.

SWAMP LAND.

STATE OF OREGON (ON REVIEW).

The State by its appeal from the decision of the General Land Office is estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the Department over the subject-matter.

The government is not concluded by the report of the local office upon the evidence submitted as to the character of the land.

Acting Secretary Muldrow to Commissioner Sparks, June 30, 1885.

I have considered the motion of counsel for the State of Oregon for a review of departmental decision of April 9, 1885 (3 L. D. 474), affirming the decision of your office, dated October 22, 1883, holding for rejec tion the claim of said State under the act of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat., 519), as extended by act of March 12, 1860 (12 Stat., 3), to certain tracts in township 41 S., R. 42 E., Lakeview land district, Oregon.

The ground of the motion is that since a hearing was duly had before the register and receiver, who rendered their joint opinion upon the testimony, from which no appeal was taken, your office had no authority to review their finding under Rule 47 of the Rules of Practice.

On the 20th instant, this Department received a communication from said counsel waiving "claim to so much of the lands involved therein as are included in the Hay Reservation of Camp McDermitt, Nevada.” It is not alleged that the record was incorrectly stated in said decision,

nor is it asserted that there has been discovered any additional evidence. It is, however, insisted that the conclusions arrived at are erroneous and should be revoked.

Whatever might be said with reference to the authority of your office in the premises, there can be no question that this Department has full jurisdiction over the subject matter. The State is estopped from denying that fact by its appeal. Griffin v. Marsh (2 L. D., 28).

The conclusive effect of the joint report of the district land officers was pressed with great earnestness by counsel in his able argument upon the appeal, and was carefully considered in said decision. It should be remembered that the State of Oregon is the claimant under said acts, and the sole question for determination was, did the State have the right to claim the land under her grant? Fraser et al. v. O'Connor, (115 U. S. 102.)

The hearing was held for the purpose of ascertaining the character of said tracts at the date of said grant, and the United States is no more concluded by the report of the register and receiver in the case at bar than it would be if a hearing had been ordered to inquire into the legality of an entry, and it should appear from the testimony that the entry was illegal. It was held in said decision, that "a careful consideration of the testimony taken at the hearing fails to show that the lands in question were swamp and overflowed at the date of said grant." It does not appear that there is any error in said decision, and the motion for review and revocation must be denied.

SETTLEMENT BEFORE SURVEY.

COLLIN v. HOTCHKISS.

As the land in dispute was claimed before survey, in good faith, by both parties, and each filed within the statutory period, a joint entry is awarded.

Acting Secretary Muldrow to Commissioner Sparks, June 30, 1885.

The case of Richard Collin v. Charles R. Hotchkiss has been considered, on appeal by Hotchkiss from the decision of your office dated June 12, 1884, awarding the NE. † of SW. of Sec. 17, T. 47, R. 8, Gunnison, Colorado, to Collin.

Hotchkiss filed declaratory statement No. 6, April 19, 1883, for the SW. of Sec. 17, alleging settlement August 1, 1882. 1

of

Collin filed declaratory statement No. 24, May 2, 1883, for the N. SE. and NE. of SW. of Sec. 17, alleging settlement September 28, 1882. Township plat filed March 22, 1883. Hotchkiss published notice of his intention to make final proof in support of his claim; whereupon Collin filed a protest, alleging his superior right to the NE. † of SW. 1 of Sec. 17. In pursuance of the protest, a hearing was held November 25, 1883, when both parties presented proof in support of their respective 7747 LAND——39

claims to the tract in controversy. The facts as presented by the record of the case are as follows: During June, 1882, Hotchkiss selected a tract of land and planted what is termed a location stake on which was this inscription, "28th day of June, 1882, I, the undersigned, claim 160 acres of land, running south 160 rods, east 160 rods, north 160 rods, and west 160 rods to place of beginning. Charles R. Hotchkiss." During July, 1882, he placed the inscription "N. E. C. R. Hotchkiss" on a small cottonwood stump situated in the midst of a close growth of brush and timber, about 160 rods southeast of the former stake. This stump was utilized to indicate the NE. corner of his claim, which after survey was found to lie on the western part of the land in controversy. During August, 1882, he erected a house on a spot near the first stake and within the lines describing his claim, which was occupied by his family as their home.

In September, 1882, Collin selected a piece of land included in the tract in controversy, and placed six stakes, one at each of the four corners and one each at the center of the boundary lines running lengthwise; each stake contained a plainly written notice of his intention to claim the land lying within the boundary lines indicated. He then cut a number of logs for building purposes on the land. The survey in the field was completed during November, 1882, and for the first time the parties were enabled to learn where the section lines were situated. They discovered that Collin's claim as staked just about covered the land as described in his declaratory statement, while that of Hotchkiss lay off toward the northwest, so that the northwest corner of the location claim lay thirty rods northwest of the northwest corner of the southwest quarter of Sec. 17.

In December, 1882, Hotchkiss erected a cabin on the land in controversy and moved his effects therein. During January, 1883, Collin completed his house on the tract and made it his abode. Both parties appear to have acted in good faith as to their intention of claiming the land, and as they both made substantial settlement thereon prior to survey and filed their respective declaratory statements within the time prescribed by law, they will be given notice of their right to make joint cash entry of the tract in controversy, under section 2274 of the Revised Statutes within sixty days after notification to each; at the expiration of such period, if either party fail to consent, the said tract is hereby awarded to the other.

Your predecessor's decision is accordingly modified.