30, his wife's birthday, and waited for him in the still unfinished railway station, filled with third-class travelers and workmen. My object, in taking this opportunity for an interview, was to set his Majesty at rest about a speech made by me in the Budget Commission on September 30, which had aroused some excitement, and which, though not taken down in shorthand, had still been reproduced with tolerable accuracy in the newspapers. For people who were less embittered and blinded by ambition, I had indicated plainly enough the direction in which I was going. Prussia- such was the point of my speech-as a glance at the map will show, could no longer wear unaided on its long narrow figure the panoply which Germany required for its security; that must be equally distributed over all German peoples. We should get no nearer the goal by speeches, associations, decisions of majorities; we should be unable to avoid a serious contest, a contest which could only be settled by blood and iron. In order to secure our success in this, the deputies must place the greatest possible weight of blood and iron in the hands of the king of Prussia, in order that, according to his judgment, he might throw it into one scale or the other. . . .

Roon, who was present, expressed his dissatisfaction with my remarks on our way home, and said, among other things, that he did not regard these "witty digressions" as advantageous for our cause. For my part, I was torn between the desire of winning over members to an energetic national policy, and the danger of inspiring the king, whose own disposition was cautious and shrank from violent measures, with mistrust in me and my intentions. My object in going to meet him at Jüterbogk was to counteract betimes the probable effect of press criticisms.

I had some difficulty in discovering from the curt answers of the officials the section in the ordinary train in which the king was seated by himself in an ordinary first-class carriage. The after-effect of his conversation with his wife was an obvious depression, and when I begged for permission to narrate the events which had occurred during his absence, he interrupted

me with the words, "I can perfectly well see where all this will end. Over there, in front of the Opera House, under my windows, they will cut off your head, and mine a little while afterwards."

1

I guessed, and it was afterwards confirmed by witnesses, that during his week's stay at Baden-Baden his mind had been worked upon with variations on the theme of Polignac, Strafford,2 and Louis XVI.3 When he was silent, I answered with the short remark, "Et après, Sire?" "Après, indeed; we shall be dead," answered the king. "Yes," I continued, "then we shall be dead; but we must all die sooner or later, and can we perish more honorably? I, fighting for my king's cause, and your Majesty sealing with your own blood your rights as king by the grace of God; whether on the scaffold or the battlefield, makes no difference in the glory of sacrificing life and limb for the rights assigned to you by the grace of God. Your Majesty must not think of Louis XVI; he lived and died in a condition of mental weakness, and does not present a heroic figure in history. Charles I, on the other hand, will always remain a noble historical character, for after drawing his sword for his rights and losing the battle, he did not hesitate to confirm his royal intent with his blood. Your Majesty is bound to fight, you cannot capitulate; you must, even at the risk of bodily danger, go forth to meet any attempt at coercion."

As I continued to speak in this sense, the king grew more and more animated, and began to assume the part of an officer fighting for kingdom and fatherland. In presence of external and personal danger he possessed a rare and absolutely natural fearlessness, whether on the field of battle or in the face of attempts on his life; his attitude in any external danger was elevating and inspiring. The ideal type of the Prussian officer who goes to meet certain death in the service with the simple words, "At your orders," but who, if he has to act on his own

1 One of the French ministers held responsible for the policy which led to the deposition of Charles X and the revolution of July, 1830.

2 See page 251.

3 See page 315.

responsibility, dreads the criticism of his superior officer or of the world more than death, even to the extent of allowing his energy and correct judgment to be impaired by the fear of blame and reproof - this type was developed in him to the highest degree.

.. To give up his life for king and fatherland was the duty of an officer; still more that of a king, as the first officer in the land. As soon as he regarded his position from the point of view of military honor, it had no more terror for him than the command to defend what might prove a desperate position would have for any ordinary Prussian officer. This raised him above the anxiety about the criticism which public opinion, history, and his wife might pass on his political tactics. . . The correctness of my judgment was confirmed by the fact that the king, whom I had found at Jüterbogk weary, depressed, and discouraged, had, even before we arrived at Berlin, developed a cheerful, I might almost say joyous and combative disposition, which was plainly evident to the ministers and officials who received him on his arrival.

165. The Schleswig-Holstein Question 1

When the Prussian parliament refused to grant appropriations for the enlarged army, Bismarck, with the king's consent, proceeded to govern the country by unconstitutional means. Taxes were arbitrarily levied and collected, and the necessary military reforms were then carried into effect. Meanwhile, fresh difficulties arose over the so-called Schleswig-Holstein question. These two duchies, though largely peopled by Germans, belonged to the crown of Denmark. On the death of the Danish king, Frederick VII, in 1863, Prince Frederick of Augustenburg came forward as a claimant for the duchies. His claims were strongly supported by the whole German nation, which desired to relieve the duchies from a foreign yoke. Bismarck, however, wanted to secure the duchies for Prussia, rather than allow them to become one more independent German state. With Austria as an ally, Bismarck in 1864 declared war on Denmark, not in support of Augustenburg, but on the ground that the Danish king was oppressing his German subjects. The unequal struggle soon ended with the surrender by Denmark of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia and Austria.

1 Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii, pp. 188–189.

The gradations which appeared attainable in the SchleswigHolstein question, every one of them meaning for the duchies an advance to something better than the existing conditions, culminated, in my judgment, in the acquisition of the duchies by Prussia, a view which I expressed in a council held immediately after the death of Frederick VII. I reminded the king that every one of his immediate ancestors, not even excepting his brother, had won an increment of territory for the state: Frederick William IV had acquired Hohenzollern and the Jahde district; Frederick William III, the Rhine province; Frederick William II, Poland; Frederick II, Silesia; Frederick William I, old Hither Pomerania; the Great Elector, Further Pomerania and Magdeburg, Minden, etc., and I encouraged him to do likewise. . . .

...

If the utmost we aimed at could not be realized, we might have gone as far as the introduction of the Augustenburg dynasty and the establishment of a new middle state, provided the Prussian and German national interests had been put on a sure footing these interests to be protected by what was the essential part of the subsequent conditions - that is, a military convention, Kiel as a harbor, and the Baltic and North Sea canal.

Even if, taking into consideration the European situation and the wish of the king, this had not been attainable without the isolation of Prussia from all the Great Powers, including Austria - the question was in what way, whether under the form of a personal union or under some other, a provisional settlement was attainable as regards the duchies, which must in any case be an improvement in their position. From the very beginning I kept annexation steadily before my eyes.

166. Peace with Austria 1

As Bismarck anticipated, the Danish War led to a quarrel between Austria and Prussia about the disposition of the conquered duchies. Austria wanted to hand them over to Augustenburg, but Bismarck

1 Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii, pp. 227-234.

would not consent to this arrangement. The question was temporarily settled by Prussia taking Schleswig and Austria, Holstein. Bismarck now made ready for war with Austria. Only by force, he believed, could that power be displaced from German politics and a new Germany be built up about Prussia. The first step was to isolate Austria from foreign support. This Bismarck did by securing the friendly neutrality of France and by arranging a treaty of alliance with Italy. The second step was to find a good pretext for attacking Austria. Here also Bismarck's clever diplomacy accomplished its purpose. In the Seven Weeks' War, which followed, Austria suffered the decisive defeat of Sadowa and at once sued for peace. Bismarck at this time showed the foresight of a true statesman. Having brought about the war for a purpose, namely, the exclusion of Austria from Germany, he held that Prussia should not humble her adversary further by taking any Austrian territory. Austria, Bismarck reasoned, might become a valuable ally in the near future, if she were now treated with moderation.

I was firmly resolved, in consequence of the above considerations, to make a cabinet question of the acceptance of the peace offered by Austria. The position was difficult. All the generals shared the disinclination to break off the uninterrupted course of victory; and during these days the king was more often and more readily accessible to military influences than to mine. I was the only person at headquarters who was politically responsible as a minister and forced by the exigencies of the situation to form an opinion and come to a decision without being able to lay the responsibility for the result upon any other authority. I was just as little able as anyone to foresee what shape future events would take, and the consequent judgment of the world; but I was the only one present who was under a legal obligation to hold, to utter, and to defend an opinion. This opinion I had formed after careful consideration of the future of our position in Germany and our relations to Austria; and was ready to be responsible for it and to defend it before the king. . . .

On July 23, 1866, under the presidency of the king, a council of war was held, in which the question to be decided was whether we should make peace under the conditions offered or continue