propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the royal government of Serbia; 5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of June 28 who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian government will take part in the investigation relating thereto; 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian state employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo; 8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier; 9. To furnish the Austro-Hungarian government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of June 28 to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian government; and, finally, 10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads. To these demands Serbia made answer on July 25, shortly before the expiration of the time limit. The Serbian government agreed to hand over for trial any subject of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs were forthcoming, and also to publish an official statement condemning the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary. Nearly all the other Austrian demands were accepted by the Serbian government, which offered, in case its reply was considered unsatisfactory, to refer the questions at issue to the Hague Tribunal or to the mediation of the Great Powers. The Austrian government rejected this reply as insincere and only a play for time," and on July 28 declared war against Serbia. 170. Dispatches between Kaiser and Tsar 1 The issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipitated a crisis. The peace of Europe was gravely threatened. Russia, the greatest of Slavic nations, whose interest in the Balkans was well known, could not regard without concern the crushing of a smaller Slavic state. But if Russia intervened to protect Serbia, by making war on AustriaHungary, then Germany, as the latter's ally, would surely attack Russia, and France, bound to Russia in firm alliance, would be obliged to attack Germany. To prevent the catastrophe of a general European war, peace parleys began at once. The most important suggestion was made by Sir Edward Grey, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs. He proposed that the four powers not directly interested in the dispute, namely, Germany, France, Italy, and England, should mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Austria-Hungary, however, refused to accept any outside interference in settling what it regarded as a private quarrel with Serbia. The Austrian declaration of war against Serbia on July 28 was followed on the same day by the beginning of Russian mobilization. On the evening of the 28th the Kaiser, who had returned to Berlin from a holiday in Norway, sent the following telegram to his cousin, the Tsar. I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own king and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment. On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty 1 German White Book, exhibits Nos. 20-23a. encountered by you and your government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. To this telegram the Tsar, early in the morning of July 29, replied as follows: I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far. Later in the same day the Kaiser sent this message to the Tsar. I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the preservation of peace. However, I cannot — as I told you in my first telegram-consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war, without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your government and Vienna, an understanding which as I have already telegraphed you my government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might be construed as menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator, which-upon your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted. A few hours later, on the morning of July 30, the Kaiser sent another message, stronger in tone. My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of your government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization. I have told you the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to your advice and that of your government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator with which you have intrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon your express desire, is threatened, if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon your shoulders: you have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. The Tsar, on the afternoon of July 30, made this answer: I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner your position as mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us. The situation quickly became acute. The two rulers exchanged further telegrams without result, since Russia refused to discontinue military preparations as long as Austria-Hungary was actually at war with Serbia. On the night of July 31 the German government sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding demobilization of the Russian army, in default of which Germany would herself mobilize. Having received no answer to the ultimatum, Germany on August 1 declared war against Russia. 171. The Attitude of England 1 1 War between Germany and Russia meant also the breaking out of hostilities between Germany and France. Under such circumstances what would be England's attitude? That country at first refused to take sides. Finally, on July 29 Sir Edward Grey informed the German ambassador in London that if France were involved England would be drawn into the conflict. At this very time the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, held an interview with the British Ambassador in Berlin for the purpose of securing England's neutrality. If England would remain aloof, Germany would agree not to take any French territory in Europe, should the German arms be victorious. The Chancellor refused, however, to give any assurance that the French colonies would remain untouched. Sir Edward Grey's reply to this offer, as sent to the British Ambassador at Berlin, was in these words: His Majesty's government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal to bind itself to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, as long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether 1 British White Book, No. 101. |