on which he has made one hundred dollars' worth of improvements, may be trans-
ferred and sold under execution. Wells v. Francis. Col. 217.

See MEXICAN GRANT; MINES AND MINING.

PUBLIC OFFICERS.

1. FEES OF RECORDER FOR SANTA BARBARA COUNTY-COUNTY CLERK.-The county
clerk of Santa Barbara county is not the recorder thereof, and fees collected by him,
purporting to act in such capacity, must be delivered to the recorder. The county
clerk cannot escape from liability for such fees by paying them into the county trea-
sury, under the statute of 1878, as the fees of the recorder's office are not subject
to such statute. Stoddard v. Williams. Cal. 440.

See IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER; LICENSE COLLECTOR.

PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS.

See JUDGMENT, 5.

QUANTUM MERUIT.
See ASSUMPSIT.

QUIETING TITLE.

1. ACTION TO DETERMINE ADVERSE CLAIM-COMPLAINT-POSSESSION.-The complaint
in an action brought under section 500 of the code of civil procedure, for the pur-
pose of determining an adverse claim, estate or interest in land, must allege pos-
session by the plaintiff, either by himself or by his tenants. Coolidge et al. v. For-
ward et al. Or. 702.

2. ACTION TO QUIET TITLE-EXECUTION-JUDGMENT INJUNCTION.-The legal own r
in the actual possession of real property can maintain an action to quiet his title
under section 500 of the code of civil procedure, as against one asserting an adverse
claim thereto under an execution issued on a judgment against a third person. In
such action the court may perpetually enjoin the sale of the real property under
the execution, but cannot declare the judgment a nullity. Murphy et al. v. Sears
et al. Or. 558.

QUITCLAIM DEED.

See DEED, 10; PUBLIC LANDS, 7.

RAILROAD.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1–3.

RECEIPT.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6.

RECORDING.

See MINES AND MINING, 2; MORTGAGES, 15.

REFEREE.

See APPEAL, 2, 4.

REFORMATION.

See MISTAKE, 1-3.

RELATION.

See DEED, 4, 8; SHERIFF'S SALE, 2.

REMANDING CAUSE.

See NEW TRIAL, 4.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS-TRIAL IN ONE ACTION -- REMOVAL OF CAUSES-
WAIVER.When two actions are brought in the state court on the same cause of
action, and between the same parties, or their successors in interest, the court may
require the parties to elect in which they will proceed, or may consolidate them.
If the same are not consolidated, any steps taken in one of them will bind the parties
in the other. Consequently, if, after the right of removal to the federal courts had
been established in both suits, the parties proceed to trial in the state courts in
either action, the right to remove the action not tried, under the act of 1875, is
waived. Evans et al. v. Smith. (U.S. Cir. Ct.) Col. 243.

2 REMOVAL OF TAX SUITS TO FEDERAL COURTS. -The lower court did not err in re-
fusing to approve the bond given with a petition for the removal to the federal courts
of an action to recover taxes due from a corporation created under the laws of the
state. People v. S. P. R. R. Co. Cal. 655.

REPLEVIN.

1. REPLEVIN-DEMAND UNLAWFUL TAKING.-No demand is necessary, in an action to
recover the possession of personal property, where the original taking was unlaw-
ful, although the defendant came into the possession of the property without any
imputation of fraud, or intention to do a wrong. Surles v. Sweeney. Or. 569.

See PARTNERSHIP, 5.

RES GESTE.

See MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER, 2.

RESIDENCE, PLACE OF.

See CORPORATIONS, 1; JURISDICTION, 1, 2; VENUE, 4.

RESTRICTION ACT.

See CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT.

RIPARIAN OWNERS.

See TIDE LANDS; WATER RIGHTS, 11.

ROADS.

See NUISANCE, 2, 3; STREET.

SACRAMENTO BONDS.

See BONA FIDE PURCHASER, 2; BONDS; MANDAMUS, 2-4.

SALES.

1. SALE-DELIVERY-COMMON CARRIER-BILL OF LADING.-Where goods are delivered
to a common carrier, and the bill of lading is made deliverable to the order of the
vendor, such facts, when not rebutted by evidence to the contrary, are almost de-
cisive as showing the intention of the vendor to reserve the jus disponendi, and to
prevent the property from passing to the vendee. Reynolds et al. v. Scott et al.

Cal. 291.

2. SALE OF FIRE-WOOD IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY.-Fire-wood is not a maru-
factured article, within the meaning of the code, and the sale thereof does not
imply a warranty that it is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was sold.
Correio v. Lynch. Cal. 41.

3. SALE ACCEPTANCE BY VENDEE.-A vendee of fire-wood cannot avoid the payment
of its real value, although not of the quality contracted to be delivered, if he accepts
and uses it, after a full opportunity for examination. Id.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1, 2; INSOLVENCY, 9; LICENSE, 1.

D

SALVAGE.

See ADMIRALTY.

SAN FRANCISCO.

See STREET ASSESSMENT, 5.

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY.

See PUBLIC OFFICERS, 1; STREET ASSESSMENT, 3, 4.

SECRETARY OF TREASURY.

See DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

SEDUCTION.

2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-SEDUCTION OF MINOR-MAJORITY.-The statute of limit-
ations does not commence to run against the right of a minor to sue for own seduc-
tion, until she attains her majority. Morrell by her Guardian v. Morgan. Cal. 683.
2. SEDUCTION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-PRIOR JUDGMENT.-An action by an infant
suing by her guardian, to recover for her seduction, is not barred by a judgment in
favor of the defendant in a prior action by the plaintiff, in which the complaint con-
tained no averment as to infancy, and such judgment was entered on a demurrer
thereto on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id
3. SEDUCTION CONSENT OF FEMALE-PERSUASION.-The right of a female to maintain
an action for her seduction is not defeated by her consent procured by persuasion,
inducement or artful means.

Id.

SENATORS.

See ELECTION, 1.

SEPARATE PROPERTY.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1; MARRIED WOMEN.

SERVANT.

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

SET-OFF.

See JUDGMENTS, 13.

SHERIFFS.

1. SHERIFF'S FEES FOR MILEAGE.-The provision of the statute of 1869–70, p. 159,
authorizing the sheriff to charge for "mileage in any criminal case or proceeding,"
does not authorize him to charge mileage for other traveling than that which is ex-
pressly mentioned in the statute, but simply fixes the rate which may be charged
when mileage is allowed by any other statute. Boughton v. County of Santa Bar-
bara. Cal. 22.

See CONVERSION.

SHERIFF'S SALE.

1. THE PLAINTIFF IN AN EXECUTION CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST A BIDDER
at a sheriff's sale, to recover the amount of his unpaid bid. The sheriff only can
maintain such action. Burbank v. Dodd. Or. 338.

2. SHERIFF'S

SALE-EXECUTION-LEVY-JUDGMENT-RELATION.-The title of the pur-
chaser at a sheriff's sale does not depend on the sheriff's return to the writ, whether
such return be good or bad, suflicient or insufficient. Such title relates back to the
date of the judgment, and not from the date of any real or pretended levy. Hib-
berd v. Smith. Cal. 446.

See INJUNCTION, 3, 4; PARTNERSHIP, 1.

SHIPPING.

See ADMIRALTY.

SLAUGHTERING ANIMALS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-PAROL CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-PART PERFORM-
ANCE.-Possession of a lot of land under a parol contract for the sale thereof, the
expenditure of money in the improvement thereof, and partial payments of the
purchase-price, constitute part performance of the contract, which takes it out of
the statute of frauds, and entitles the vendee to specific performance of the contract,
as against a subsequent purchaser from the vendor, who took with notice of the
vendee's equities. Day v. Cohn. Cal. 577.

2. PAYMENT OF PURCHASE-PRICE-TIME ESSENCE OF CONTRACT-VENDOR'S ACQUIES-
CENCE. When the purchase-price of such land was to be paid from time to time,
as the vendee earned it," time is not of the essence of the agreement, and a failure
to make payments as the same were earned will not defeat the vendee's right to a
specific performance, when the vendor acquiesced in the delay. Id.

3. POSSESSION OF VENDEE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-NOTICE.-The equitable right of
a vendee, under an executory contract for the sale of land, to a specific performance
of his contract, is not affected by the statute of limitations so long as he is in pos-
session of the land under the contract. Such possession is notice to subsequent
purchasers from the vendor of the vendee's equities. Id.

4. CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER.
One in possession of government land under a written contract, by the terms of
which his vendor agreed to convey to him the legal title as soon as it was obtained
from the United States, upon payment by the vendee of the government price per
acre, and a just proportion of the expenses incurred in procuring the patent, is en-
titled to priority over, and may have his agreement specially enforced against, a
subsequent purchaser from such vendor. Peasley v. Hart. Cal. 623.

5. THE SAME-PAYMENT-CONDITIONS PRECEDENT. -The vendor under such contract
was bound, as a condition precedent to his right to demand judgment from the
vendee, to notify him of the issuance of the patent, and of the amount of the pur-
chase-money to be paid by him. Id.

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR.

See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 1.

STALLION.

See EXECUTION, 1.

STATUTES.

1. CONSTRUCTION OF ACT-TITLE AND PREAMBLE.-In the construction of a statute,
both the title and preamble may be considered in doubtful cases. Kahn v. Salmon
(U. S. Cir. Ct.) Or. 383.

2. ACT TO PREVENT FRAUD AND INJUSTICE-CONSTRUCTION OF.-An act to prevent fraud
and injustice, as the assignment act of 1878 (Or. Ses. L. 36), should be liberally
construed to that end. Id.

See CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT; JURY AND JURors, 3.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. SALE OF MINING CLAIM-PAROL CONTRACT-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-A parol contract
for the sale of a mining claim is void under the statute of frauds.
true as to a parol modification of a written contract. Kelly v. Ruble.

See MARRIED WOMEN, 5; MORTGAGES, 7; VESSELS, 1.

And the same is
Or. 737.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. PLEA OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-In an action for the recovery of the pos-
session of real property, the defense of the statute of limitations should be pleaded
directly, as that the cause of action did not accrue within the ten years next before
the commencement of the action; but the allegation that neither the plaintiff nor
his grantor were seized or possessed of the premises during that period, is sufficient
to allow proof of adverse possession by the defendant, inconsistent with the plaint-
iff's right to maintain the action. Zeilin v. Rogers (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Or. 466.
2. AMENDMENT AFTER VERDICT.-In the furtherance of justice the defendant may and
ought to be allowed to amend such a defense, after verdict, so as to make it conform
to the ultimate fact proven-the action did not accrue, etc. Id.

3. PROOF OF POSSESSION.-The fact that the plaintiff's grantor abandoned or relinquished
the possession of the premises in controversy to the defendant absolutely, for any
cause or consideration, and that the latter thereupon took and held such possession
to the exclusion of such grantor and his assigns, may be shown by parol in support
of the defense of the statute of limitations. Id.

4. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS MAY BE PLEADED by referring to the appropriate rec
tions of the code. Packard v. Johnson. Cal. 763. Packard v. Moss. Cal. 769.
See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 6; BONDS, 1; COUNTER-CLAIM, 1; DECEIT; MALICIOUS PROSE-
CUTION; SEDUCTION, 1, 2.

STOCK AND STOCK-HOLDERS.

See CORPORATIONS, 2-4.

STREETS.

1. SUPERVISORS OPENING ROAD-NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS.-The board of supervisors
of a county have no power to cause the construction of a road through the lands of
a private individual without giving such person notice of the proceedings to open the
road. Silva v. Garcia. Cal. 769.

See DEDICATION, 1.

STREET ASSESSMENT.

1. COMPLAINT STREET ASSESSMENT-CITY OF STOCKTON.-The complaint in this action,
to enforce a street assessment as against certain lands in the city of Stockton, re-
viewed and held to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. City of
Stockton v. Dahl, and lots No. 2, etc. Cal. 303.

66

2. THE SAME-ASSESSMENT LISTS-EVIDENCE-PLEADING-IMPROVEMENT OF STREETS. —
Under section 29 of the charter of the city of Stockton, the assessment lists for
street improvements do not prove, even prima facie, that the city council has
caused a survey and estimates to be prepared of proposed work to be filed with the
city clerk," or fixed a time for the hearing upon such a proposition," or ' ordered
work or improvements to be done." Nor are such lists evidence of a publication of
notice, soliciting bids, or of the awarding of a contract, or of any of the acts of
officers of the municipality which precede the doing of the work. None of these
acts separately or together constitute the "levy" of an assessment. Yet all of
them must be averred in an action to enforce such assessment, and, if denied, proved
by competent evidence. Id.

8. SANTA BARBARA-OPENING STREETS-PETITION FOR.-The act of March 26, 1878
(Stats. 1877-8, p. 777), authorizes the common council of the city of Santa Barbara
to lay out, etc., any one street between certain termini, upon presentation of a peti-
tion signed by the owners representing a majority of the frontage "upon the pro-
posed improvement.' The act does not contemplate the presentation in one petition
of a prayer or demand for the improvement or laying out of more than one street,
nor empower the council "to open, extend, widen, straighten, or close up" a great
number of streets in one proceeding. Even if it does, such petition must have been
signed by the owners of a majority of the frontage upon each separate street. The
power of the council to act depended upon the presentation of a petition such as
the law requires. Boorman v. Santa Barbara. Ĉal. 104.

4. THE SAME UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT.-Such act is unconstitutional and void,
because it makes no provision for any process or notice to be served upon the persons
whose property is to be charged with the assessments.

Id.