considers himself thereby dispensed from performing the otherwise sacred duty of making reservations in the above respects, in favour of his former subjects. are The Finland soldiers and seamen VII. On the signature of the present Treaty, information thereof shall be transmitted immediately, and with the greatest celerity, to the Generals of the respective armies, and hostilities shail entirely cease on both sides, both by sea and land. Those acts of hostility which may in the mean time be committed, shall be regarded as null, and shall not infringe this treaty. Whatever may be, during the intervening period, taken or conquered, on the one side X. The Fins now in Sweden, as well or the other, shall be faithfully restored. as the Swedes now in Finland, shall be VIII. Within four weeks after the ex- at fall liberty to return into their respeccharge of the Ratifications of the present tive countries, and to dispose of their proTreaty, the troops of his Majesty the Em-perty, moveable and immoveable, without peror of Russia shall evacuate West Both-paying any duty of removal, or any nia, and repass the river Tornea.-During other impost due on the like occasions.the said four weeks, there shall be made The subjects of the two High Powers, no requisition of any kind whatever on the established in either country, Sweden or inhabitants; and the Russian army shall Finland, shall have full liberty to estadraw its supplies and subsistence from its blish themselves in the other, during the own magazines, established in the towns space of three years, from the date of the of West Bothnia.-If during the negocia-exchange of the ratification of the present tions, the Imperial troops bave penetrated Treaty; but shall be held to sell or aliein any other direction into the Kingdom nate, during the said period, to any subof Sweden, they shall evacuate the coun-ject of the Power whose dominion they tries they have occupied, in virtue of the before stipulated conditions. desire to quit. The property of those who, at the expiration of the above term, have not complied with this regulation, shail be sold at a public sale, by authority of the Magistrate, and the produce thereof delivered to the owners.-During the three years above fixed, it shall be allowable to all to make such use as they may please of their property, the peaceable enjoyment of which is formally secured and gua ranteed to them.-They may, themselves, or their agents, pass freely from one state to the other, in order to manage their affairs, without experiencing any obstacle whatever, in consequence of their quality of subjects of the other power. IX. All the prisoners of war, made on either side, by sea or land, and, all the hostages delivered during the war, shall be restored in mass, and without ransom, a speedily as possible; but at the latest within three months, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications; but if any prisoners may be prevented by sickness, or other cause, from returning into their country within the period specified, they shall not thereby be considered as having forfeited the right stipulated above. They shall be obliged to discharge, or to give security for, the debts they may have contracted, during their captivity, with the XI. There shall henceforth be a per inhabitants of the country in which theypetual oblivion of the past, and a general may have been detained. The expences amnesty for the respective subjects, whose which may have been incurred by the opinions, in favour of one or the other of High Contracting Parties, for all subsis-the High Contracting Parties during the tence and maintenance of the prisoners, present war, may have rendered them sus shall be reciprocally renounced, and pro-pected or liable to punishment. No trial vision shall respectively be made for their shall hereafter be instituted against them subsistence, and the expence of their on such grounds. If any process have journey to the frontiers of both places, been commenced, it shall be annulled and where commissioners from their Sove-supersede, and no new proceeding shall reigns shall be directed to receive them.- be commenced. (To be continued.) LONDON:-Frinted by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fleet - Street; Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent Garden :-Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall. VOL. XVI. No. 22.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1809. [Price 1s. 86 "Whilst there are the same advisers, we must expect the same advice; whilst there are the same Counsellors, we must expect the same results; and a change of men alone will not do; it is but the "first step to our happiness; the principles, or maximus, of state unust be removed. It is not taking away "this or the other man, and putting in another to act by the same rules, that will cure our disease; "but it is the change of principles that must do it. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * "I think it is very plain, that, till these principles are removed from Whitehall, all our labour and pains will end in nothing. The way, then, as I conceive, to do this, is, to lay before His Majesty the "state of the case; let us show him how unable these men are to serve him, and how destructive to his "interest it is to follow their advices." Mr. BOOTH's Speech, in the House of Commons, against Favourites, in the reign of Charles II. See Parliamentary History, Vol. IV. page 1268. 633] -[834 become us to consider well what is the cause of it? The answer of some will be; SUMMARY OF POLITICS. CHANGE OF MINISTRY.-The speech, from which I have taken my motto for the present Number, should, at this moment, be read by every man in the kingdom. In more than one respect the present situation of this kingdom, bears a strong resemblance to its situation at the time when this excellent speech was made; and, our members of parliament, those, I mean, who are independent, will find in this speech sentiments and language worthy their adoption and imitation.Then, as now, it was not so much a change of men, as a change of principles, a change of maxims and rules of governinent, that was wanted; or, at least, it was not solely a change of men that would have done any good. The advice of MR. BOOTH was not followed. There was, in spite of the complaints of the people, no change of principles; all change was resisted, and, as often as possible, the advocates of such change were persecuted and punished. Force, of one sort or another, was employed for the purpose of stifling the voice of truth and justice. But, what did it finally effect? Why, the renewal of those bitter and loud complainings which at last, it was attempted to put a stop to by the bayonet; and, then, in a twinkling, away went the whole thing.- -There is no man who will attempt to deny, that our present situation is a most alarming one. Ask -Well, then, ought we not to suppose, any man of sense, what he thinks will be that there is something wanting in the the result of the present contest; and, no principles, upon which our rulers, since matter of what party he may be, he will, 1793, have acted? There has no change at best, tell you, that he cannot even guess taken place in the geographical situation at that result. He will tell you, that he of England and France: the countries lie kopes, that we shall still remain an inde- where they did formerly; their physical pendent nation; but, he will hardly state means of defence and of offence are what any grounds of such hope.Now, if this they formerly were; and, of course, all be the case; if this be the prevalent state that France has gained, she has gainof mind through the kingdom, does it noted by superiority of moral means. It Why, the cause of it is the power of Buo"naparté." This is true, as far as it goes; but, what has been the cause of Buonaparte'. having so much power ?- -The state of the case is this: England and France had, for centuries, been rival nations. Many, previous to the year 1793, had been their wars and their negociations. Many their struggles for the upperhand in the affairs of Europe. But neither seemed to prevail much over the other. Sometimes France appeared to be rather uppermost and sometimes England; but, still the rivalship continued; and, as to England's fearing her rival, the idea never entered into any man's mind. The contest was always for some colonial or commercial or continental object. But now, our rulers themselves tell us, that the contest is, on our part, for existence as a nation. Not for honour, not for glory, not conquest; no, nor for selfdefence, in the usual sense of that word; but, for existence. Yes, they are not ashamed to tell us plainly, that they have brought us into such a state, that it is become a question whether we shall continue an independent nation or become the slaves of the sovereign of France. This question is undisguisedly stated in parliament as well as out of parliament, and it was reserved for this time to state it; for never was it stated before, since England was England. is in vain to tell us, that her means have been of an extraordinary kind; for, the answer to such an observation, is, that we should have employed extraordinary means also. France began a revolution, and our government set their faces against that revolution. The revolution took place, and, as our rulers chose to set their faces against it, it was for them to be prepared for all the effects of the resentment of the revolutionists.No disturbance has, at home, been given to any of the schemes of our rulers. Opposition to those schemes have frequently been attempted, but it has never succeeded. They have, in short, done just what they pleased, as to the raising of money and the expending of money. Their partizans have always contended, that what they did was right. Their opponents have contended, that most of their measures were bad, and that they proceeded upon wrong principles. The result is, that these rulers themselves now tell us, that the contest is become, at last, a contest for our very existence as a na tion, while no man pretends to believe, that France is in any danger at all from us. This is a most humiliating confession. We are exposed to great danger from France, and France to none, from us. We would fain have peace; but France will not give us a peace in which we shall have a moment's safety. Our war, as we have long been told, is a war purely defensive. Our government first undertook to correct French principles; next it undertook to repress French ambition; next it undertook to repel French aggression; but, it has long been content to confine its expressed hopes to the keeping of the French out of England; to preserve itself and the people from the yoke of the Emperor Napoleon, so long the object of the ridicule of all good Anti-Jacobins, who, to secure his degradation, thought it quite sufficient to publish his private letters and expose his bad spelling.A contest for existence may sometimes be honourable for both parties, or, at least, not disgraceful to either. But, it is when the existence of both is at stake. How cheerless, how heart-sinking, must that contest be, in which my existence is at stake, and in which I openly confess that my adversary, supposing him to be disappointed in all his views, is still in no danger? France could tomorrow give us a peace, which o government would be well satisfied ny without any humiliation on her part; but without causing the world to believe, that she could not have subdued us if she had chosen to continue the contest.-Again, therefore, I ask, whether the principles, upon which our government has acted, for the last seventeen years, must not be wrong? And, whether it be not absurd to suppose, that out of our present state we can be brought by a mere change of ministers, without any change of the principles upon which ministers act?A correspondent (who does not give me leave to publish his letter) asks me, if "it would be doing nothing to grant the reasonable prayer of the Irish Catholics." As this is, at this time in particular, a subject of great national interest, I shall answer the question fully and explicitly. I have always, since I obtained a true account of the state of Ireland, been of opinion, that to grant what the Catholics now ask for is necessary; but, that, to grant them that, without granting more, would produce little effect. Since, however, this question was before agitated; namely, in the spring of 1807, circumstances have materially altered. Spain and Portugal were then tributary to France and very much harrassed by her; but, the sovereigns of those countries were upon the throne, and their ports were not at the command of France. Now, if I were to predict, that the whole of the Peninsula will be in the hands of Napoleon, in the space of eight or ten months from this day, I should, I dare say, be most violently abused by all those, whose ba siness it is to delude the public. I will, therefore, argue hypothetically; I will merely, for argument's sake, suppose the thing possible: not likely, but merely pos sible. And, upon such a supposition, I hardly need point out to my readers (I am sure I need not point out to Buonsparté) the great increase of means, which he will possess of invading Ireland. It is a well-known fact, that, of all the ports of Europe, those of the Southern Peninsula are most favourable for such an undertaking; and, there is, I believe, no man, who is at all acquainted with naval affairs, who will not acknowledge, that, if we had ten times as many ships as we now have, would be next to impossible so to guard the outlets and inlets, for any length of time, as to prevent a fleet of French ships from finding their way to Ireland, suppos ing the Peninsula to be wholly and safely in the possession of France. Supposing then, that Napoleon should obtain this possession, and supposing that he should ready to join us in the war, and did join have the means of making ships, in which us in the war; when Spain and Portugal, I have before shown that he will not be though tributary, were still formidable to wanting, we need not ask, whether he will France; and, which is not the smallest have troops for the service, seeing, that, his circumstance, when the port of Antwerp work once accomplished in Spain and Por- contained neither ships nor arsenal: if tugal, the difficulty with him will be and invasion was not a thing to be despised, must be, how to find employment for his nay, if it was a thing to be dreaded, and troops. His is that sort of situation, that greatly dreaded, then, what is it now; when, requires war. For years to come war will with the exception of the Southern Pebe necessary to him. The inordinate love ninsula, the whole of the continent of Euof glory, inherent in Frenchmen, will be rope has been subjugated by our enemy, continually craving. It must be satisfied, or is his ally?--If we look back as far or it will turn into contempt of him who as the year 1803, we shall find, that, since fails to satisfy it. So that, even if we could that time, every power on the Continent, suppose, that he, whom we are incessantly not then dependent on France, has been, accusing of ruthless ambition, will, for our by us, raised up against our enemy. That sakes, cease to be ambitious, the moment enemy has beaten them all. Our minithe pursuit of his ambition becomes greatly sters have all along told us, that, by our dangerous to us, whom he must hate more money, paid away in subsidies, we were, than all the world besides; even if we in the most effectual manner, carrying on war could suppose, that, when in possession of against our enemy. Of these means we the best means, he will, all at once, want have employed a great mass. Many and the will to endeavour to annoy and to many a million of money have the peoconquer us; even if we could lay this flat-ple of these kingdoms toiled for, and have tering unction to our souls, we must per- then seen it given to foreign nations by ceive, that he would be pushed on against way of subsidy. Well, then, if this was his will. In short, it is, I think, quite im- "the most effectual manner of carrying on possible to believe, that, when he has made "war against our enemy;" if this was so, himself master of the Southern Peninsula, is it not now time to look about us ?—— he will not set systematically to work Because the flotilla is no longer seen sailing to invade and to conquer this kingdom. along the coast of France, is it, therefore, The reader will, I hope, without he- supposed, that the flotilla is annihilated, sitation, exclaim: "aye, but he will never and not to be revived? The contrary is succeed!" I hope such is the sentiment well known. It is well known, that the of every soul of us. But, if we think that boats and all belonging to them, are prehe will make the attempt, it is surely wise served with the greatest care, ready to be in us to consider of our means of resist- drawn forth upon any occasion; and who ance. I like to hear men speak boldly can doubt, that that occasion will soon be upon the subject; but I like to hear them found, when the affairs of the Peninsula reason as they speak. I remember that in are settled, supposing them to be settled the year 1803, there was no small panic to the liking of Napoleon? From the prevailed through the country: the flotilla flotilla itself, there could not be much at Boulogne caused the people in London danger; but, the flotilla must be attended to stop each other in the streets; it is no- to, and that alone will require a considertorious that many persons removed from able naval force. Antwerp will have, the coast nearest France, taking their va- indeed she has, her fleet of ships of the luables with them: nay, why need I state line and of frigates; the Texel, Rochfort, circumstances to prove the then-prevailing Brest, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz; each will dread of invasion, when we have upon have its fleet in one year from this date; record the official documents relative to and, it is to be observed, that the forming the preparations for fortifying the cities of of these fleets will, where it is required, London and Westminster. All this shows, greatly facilitate the work of subjugathat we are vapouring, when we treat the tion, and will, indeed, tend to reconidea of invasion with contempt. And, if cile the people to the rule of the new invasion was a thing not to be despised in dynasty. All this while no new taxes 1803, when Buonaparté was merely First will be necessary in France; and, as Consul; when Prussia was unbroken; when to Spain and Portugal, the people there Austria was unbroken; when Italy was would experience great relief; because the unsubdued; when Russia was actually heavy and odious imposts, founded on ex clusive privileges, would be abolished, and because a great part of the fruit of the people's labour, which is now swallowed up by those who do nothing, would remain for the use of those who perform that labour.This is a very material consideration; for, if the war continue many years longer, it is manifest, that the mere effects of its duration upon the distribution of property, in this country, must produce something very serious. It has, in fact, done so already; it has made great progress in the shifting of property; and it is daily going on. Napoleon has nothing of this sort to apprehend. France knows nothing of paper-money. There is nothing fictitious in her currency or her wealth. Her land yields more than she wants both for eating and drinking. Scarcely any part of her population now look for employment or for gain beyond her own European dominions. The wants of luxury are daily diminishing, because luxury itself is almost banished from the land. And, as to commerce, we have, for now more than two years, exerted all our mighty means in an endeavour to ruin France by cutting off her commercial connections; and, what is the result, why, that she has become more and more powerful. If we, from these reflections, and many other that might be offered, believe that Napoleon has very dreadful means of invading this kingdom, and has the hearty good will to employ those means, it becomes us seriously to consider on the means that we have of resisting him. What are our means? Let me not be answered by hopes. Let me not be told, that it is to be hoped his fleets and flotillas will be met at sea, and there beaten. They may be ; but they may not, Too many persons are apt to talk of blockading a port as they talk of stopping up a rat's hole, or a rabbit's bury. But, the sea is a wide place; and, perhaps, it is always an even chance, that, once in every month, at least, every blockaded fleet has a chance of getting out. Besides, is it possible for us to blockade all the ports from the Texel to Genoa, inclusive? The idea is absurd.- -Well, then, supposing Napoleon to send out, at one and the same time, troops from the Texel, the Scheldt, Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz, Toulon, and Genoa, with orders to sail for Ireland. I see, for my part, nothing more easy than this. Nay, I think, that some such expedition will be necessary to him. Some of his ships, and even many of them might, and, doubtless would, be met by our naval force, and, in all probability, would be taken, or destroyed. But, is it to be believed, that a part of them would not reach their destined port in safety? Nay, is it to be believed, that, seeing that he would menace England with his flotilla, while he was pushing out his fleets for Ireland, great bodies of his forces would not stand a fair chance of landing in the latter country? If I am answered in the affirmative; if I am told, in the language of poet Fitzgerald's odes, that "the Corsi"can's legions would be annihilated the "moment they set their foot upon this blest "shore ;" if this be the answer, I have, of course, nothing further to say. But, if the reader thinks, with me, that it is not only possible, but probable, that, in such a case, a French army to a very considerable amount would land in Ireland, he will not fail to be deeply interested in the question, How, in such a crisis, the people of Ireland would be likely to act? This, of all the questions that can now be agitated, is by very far the most interesting to all those, who are anxious for their country's independence. I shall not give any opinion of my own upon the state of the public mind in Ireland. I shall merely state, what is, indeed, almost too notorious to need stating at all, namely, that the people of Ireland now live under a law, called the Irish Insurrection Bill; that this law was passed on the ground of its absolute necessity; that it was declared, in the House of Commons, at the time of passing this bill, that "there had been held, in Ireland, treasonable meetings, "for the purpose of organizing a force to "assist the French, and that it was certain, "that there was a French party in Ireland." Upon this ground it was, that that law was passed, under which the people of Ireland now live.Is not this a fearful state of things? Ought not every means, in the power of our rulers, to be used, and that speedily, for the purpose of rendering this law unnecessary? What those means are it would, perhaps, be not very difficult to point out; but, in my next, I shall endeavour to show how, in one respect, at least, the Irish might be conciliated. I allude to the measure against which the abominable cry of No Popery was raised; and which I think myself able to prove, beyond all contradiction, to have been one of the most unprincipled attempts that ever was made, to impose upon the ignorant and the thoughtless. It is now the time |