י

The society was registered in 1878, under the Building | to her, and in consequence of this

Societies Act, 1874, and had a nominal capital of 175,0001. in under sect. 1 of the Clergy Diffe, Henley & Sweet, for Tasker

this declaration. P
Act, 1892, " if
against

sen

Surrough

is appeal.

June 6.

Or No ner of 1002/ARMITAGE V. LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.

shares, and a paid-up capital of about 821. Prior to 1880 the vicarage to be vacant.
society became indebted to W. Stollard, a shareholder, in the
sum of about 311. for rent, and moneys paid on behalf of the
society. The society did not carry on business after the year
1880, and in 1895 its registration was cancelled under sect. 6,
sub-s. 5, of the Building Societies Act, 1894. Stollard petitioned
for the winding-up of the society, alleging that it had cea
carry on business for some years, that it was ins
that its assets, so far as he had been able to as
of the sum of 731. and interest in the han
P. Rose-Innes, for the petitioner.
BUCKLEY J. said that the obi
payment out, for the benefit
the bank. Sect. 6, sub-s
society whose registry"
cease to enjoy as s
Building Societie
actually incurr
enforced agr

taken plac ing any under mean'

peti' Ar

1

Appeal from Farwell J.

TUESDAY, June 10

Dismissed.

Employer and workman -Workmen's compensation -Accident arising out of and in the course of the employment-Tortious act of fellow-workman unconnected with employment-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), s. 1, sub-s. 1. Appeal from a decision of the judge of the Manchester County

Ex parte a Judgment Creditor. Appeal from Mr. Court upon a claim for compensation under the Workmen's

Our ade ruit.

Appeal from Farwell J. Part heard.

Home Brougham,

WEDNESDAY, June 11.

Appeal from Farwell J. Dismissed.

Appeal from Buckley J. Part heard.

Badierke Ani in und Soda Fabrik v. W. G. Thompson & Co., Limited. an accident under the following circumstances. A number of During the sittings of the Courts THE WEEKLY NOTES will be published iron, which was lying in the pit, and threw it at the boy who on Saturday, and will generally comprise Notes of Decisions up to and had pushed him. The piece of iron missed the boy at whom it including those of the previous Thursday. All cases of permanent was thrown and struck the respondent, causing the injuries in

interest noted therein will be reported in full in THE LAW REPORTS.

respect of which compensation was claimed. The county court judge held that the respondent had been injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and awarded

Supreme Court of Judicature. compensation

C. A.

COURT OF APPEAL.

C. A. Russell, K. C., and Spencer Hogg, for the appellants.
A. Powell, K.C., and McCleary, for the respondent.
THE COURT (Collins M.R., Mathew L.J., and Cozens-Hardy
L.J.) held that the accident did not arise out of the respon-
dent's employment, and therefore allowed the appeal.
Solicitors for the appellants: Woodcock, Ryland & Parker, for

Employer and workman-Workmen's compensation-Scaffolding | C. Moorhouse, Manchester.

-Ladder-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. |

The appellant was a workman, whose employer, the respondent, was engaged in executing repairs to the roof of a house exceeding thirty feet in height. For the purposes of these repairs a ladder was placed against the house, one end resting on the ground, and the other against the parapet of the house. The appellant was carrying slates up the ladder, when he fell off it, and sustained the injuries in respect of which he claimed compensation. The sole question raised was whether the ladder by itself was a scaffolding" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, s. 7, sub-s. 1. The county court judge held that it was not, and refused to award compensation.

66

Longstaffe, for the appellant.

Ruegg, K.C., for the respondent.

THE COURT (Collins M.R., Mathew L.J., and Cozens-Hardy L.J.) were of opinion that they could not say, as a matter of law, that a ladder used as above mentioned must be " a scaffold

CACKEIT v. KESWICK. June 11 Company-Prospectus-Omission of material contract—Waiver clause-Companies Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), s. 38. Appeal of defendant Keswick from a decision of Farwell J., noted [1901] W. N. 159.

Rufus Isaacs, K. C., and Muir Mackenzie, for the appellant.
Upjohn, K.C., and Martelli, for the plaintiff.

THE COURT (Vaughan Williams, Romer, and Stirling LJJ.) dismissed the appeal. They held, first, that the contract of the 10th of March, 1899, was a contract which it was materia for intending investors to know, and ought to have been dis closed in the prospectus; and consequently that this prospectus must be deemed to be fraudulent on the part of the pr moters and directors within sect. 38 of the Companies Act 1867; secondly, that the waiver clause was misleading and gave no sufficient notice to intending investors that it wa intended to apply to a contract of the character of this contrac

H. B. H.

High Court of Justice.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

the 10th of March, and that the plaintiff was not thereby, after such roads should have been first made and used for one Jarred from taking proceedings. year, and then put into good and sufficient repair by the said Solicitors: Stephenson, Harwood & Co.; Rowcliffes, Rawle & company of proprietors, beyond or further than the extremity Jo., for Clayton & Gibson, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. of the wing walls of any such bridge; but nothing therein contained should be construed to exonerate the said company from the future repairs of all such bridges, and of the wing walls, ramparts, and side banks thereof." This enactment was in substitution for and replacement of sect. 10 of 4 Geo. 3, c. iii., which contained a recital that "doubts had arisen how far the said company of proprietors were liable to repair the roads leading to bridges already made or which might happen to be made over the said canal." There was a bridge over the canal known as Tussess Bridge, to which sect. 26 of the Act of Geo. 4 was applicable. The Warwickshire County Council, in whom the roadway over the bridge was vested contended, that, upon the true construction of the section, the defendants were liable to keep in repair the fences of the side bank and inclined embankments approaching the bridge, and they claimed a declaration that the defendants were liable to repair the fences. It was not denied that the fences were in fact out of repair.

Kekewich J.

MURRAY v. SITWELL. May 31. Practice-Infant-Guardian ad litem-Appearing in Court in person.

In this case one of the defendants was an infant appearing by Mr. J. S. Sitwell, his guardian ad litem. Mr. Sitwell had briefed counsel to appear on behalf of the infant, but subsequently withdrew the briefs. He now claimed to be heard in

person.

Renshaw, K. C., and MacSwinney, for the plaintiff, contended that a guardian ad litem was not a party, and could not be heard in person. Until the passing of rule 29 of Order XXXI., a guardian ad litem could not be interrogated: Ingram v. Little, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 251. The point now in question was raised in In re Hurst, (1891) 36 S. J. 41, as to a next friend, and the matter was referred to the official solicitor, and ultimately counsel was instructed. The true view was that a next friend or guardian ad litem was an officer of the Court to protect the interests of the infant: Rhodes v. Swithenbank, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 577. A suitor had a right to appear for himself, but he could not appear for himself and another.

P. O. Lawrence, K.C., and Waddilove, and Stewart-Smith, K.C., and Jason Smith, for other defendants.

Mr. Sitwell in person, on the question whether he was entitled to be heard, said that he was not competent to argue this question; and ultimately he undertook to instruct other counsel on behalf of the infant.

KEKEWICH J. Said that it had become unnecessary to decide the very important question which had been raised, but he was strongly of impression that a next friend or guardian ad litem of an infant was not entitled to appear in person on behalf of that infant.

Solicitors: A. R. & H. Steele, for Eddowes, Derby; Cutler, Allingham & Nesfield; Taylor, Son & Humbert. H. B. H.

Macmorran, K C., and P. Bagnall Evans, for the plaintiffs, referred to Nottingham County Council v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company, (1894) 71 L. T. 430, as shewing that approaches to a bridge are in general to be deemed a part of the "bridge."

Warrington, K.C., and J. H. Etherington Smith, for th defendants.

It was

KEKEWICH J. Said that the case cited would apply where the Legislature had given no guide to the meaning of the word "bridge," but could not apply to the present case. impossible in construing this enactment to say that a bridge included the approach to it. The Legislature had in truth distinguished between the approach to a bridge and the bridge itself. He was asked to decide whether the defendants were liable to put these fences in repair; the Act of Parliament clearly said that they were not, and he was bound to decide accordingly.

Solicitors: Field, Roscoe & Co., for Algernon S. Field, Leamington; Stockton & Sons, Banbury. C. C. M. D.

The testatrix, in anticipation of death, informed her sister Anna that in the event of her death she wished her to have all her money in the Post Office Savings Bank, including a sum which the bank had invested in Government Stock for her; and ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND WARWICKSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. she delivered to her a desk containing her bank-book and an

Kekewich J.

OXFORD CANAL NAVIGATION.

June 4.

Bridge-Canal company-Statute-Construction-Liability to repair approaches to bridge over canal.

The defendants were a company established and regulated by several statutes of Geo. 3, which in the year 1829 were all repealed, and substantially re-enacted by an Act of 10 Geo. 4, c. xlviii. By sect. 26 of that Act it was provided that the company of proprietors thereby established "should not be liable to repair or amend any part of the road approaching to any

investment certificate issued to the testatrix by the Post Office Savings Bank for 50l. 10s. Local Loans 3 per cent. Stock, and she gave her the key of the desk. She died a few days later.

This was a summons taken out by one of the testatrix's executors to determine, (1) whether the delivery of the bankbook constituted a good donatio mortis causâ of the balance standing to the credit of the testatrix, and (2) whether the delivery of the bank-book and the investment certificate constituted a good donatio mortis causâ of the stock.

on

ir

.:

adv. vult.

FRIDAY, June 6.

ing" within the meaning of the W Ashworth v. English Card Company. Appeal from Joyce J. Cur. 1897. They therefore dismi

Solicitors for the

In re a Debtor. Ex parte the Debtor, No. 152 of 1902. Appeal from Hart, Scarb
Mr. Registrar Giffard. Stands over.
In re Debtors. Ex parte the
Mr. Registrar Linklater.
In re a Debtor. Ex parte the Debtor, No. 382 of 1902.
Dismissed.

Mr. Registrar Linklater.

In re a Debtor. Ex parte the Judgment
Appeal from Mr. Registrar Bra

Ripley v. John Arthur & C

Mc

back tipther with the de

LIMITED.

BAUGH, LIMITED.

wwuhlders' action-Form of judgment.

The note of this case, ante, p. 96, is cancelled.

orporated that the investment was Buckley J.

Sales

100 of the day on which it was made, and/ wt bert to the d positor by post.

In re CARATAL (NEW) MINES, Limited.

F. E.

June 3.

Declaration of chairman of meeting-Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 51.

Askmeli beyttested at the request of the depositor made Company-Winding-up-Resolution for voluntary winding-up

In re a Debtor. Er
Registrar Bro

Cackett v. Keswi

Cuckett v. F

Badische
Арт

D

the application being accompanied by the

the value of the stock at the current price of the day of sale, less
atjons bench and the surestent certificate, and in such case

Ergland in manner therein provided.

Creditors petitioned for a compulsory winding-up order. One

the comm ssion, would be forthwith paid by warrant to the defence to the petition was that the company was already in depositor at the Post Offi e Savings Bank most convenient to voluntary liquidation, and that the creditors were not thereby The rules also enabled the depositor to transfer stock prejudiced. The petitioners contended that the special resolustanding to his credit into his own name at the Bank of tion for voluntary winding-up had not been validly passed. tained an entry of the sum invested by the bank for the special resolution for reconstruction of the company and volunThe inves'n ent certificate certified that the 50%. 10s. Local After considerable discussion, on a show of hands the chairman credited in the Government S'ock Register of the Post Office by proxy, and I declare the resolutions carriel as required by Account of the National Debt Commissioners, and had been Those in favour, 6; those against, 23; but there are 200 voting Loans Sock had b en placed on the Savings Bank Investment said, "I will now put the resolutions for the reconstruction. been charged with the price of the stock at the date of invest-articles of association Swings Bank to the testatrix, and that the deposit account had Act of Parliament."

The bank-book con- The first of the two meetings for passing and confirming the

depositor

ment and commission.

H. E. Wright, for the summons. Lyttelton Chubb, for Anna Andrews.

George Cave, for a residuary and pecuniary legatee.

KEKEWICH J. said that, as

which he entirely concurred.

regards the cash deposit at the

tary winding-up with a view thereto was held in July, 1901.

No poll was held or demanded. The provided (clause 58) that "at any general meeting, unless a poll is demanded by at least five members personally present, a declaration by the chairman that a resolution has been carried, and an entry to that effect in the book of proceedings of the company, shall be sufficient evidence of the fact without proof of the number or proportion of the

lank, the case was covered by In re Weston, [1902] 1 Ch. 680, in votes recorded in favour of or against such resolution"; and

As regards the Government

(clause 61) that "every member shall have one vote for every

Gore-Browne, K.C., and Martelli, for the petitioners.
John Henderson, for the company and the liquidator.
BUCKLEY J. said that it had been held that if the chairman

instead of purchasing so much stock in their own names, in having regard to the articles and to sect. 51 of the Companies Stock, the Post Office Savings Bank, in order to assist depositors, share held by him." The voluntary liquidator contended that, which case it could not be contended that the stock could be Act, 1862, the chairman's declaration could not be disputed. them-in other words, the bank acted as a trustee for the the sul ject of a donatio mortis causâ, invested the money for depositor. There was no transfer of the stock which was the subject-matter of this action at the Bank of England, but the by his declarat on held erroneously or by mistake that a resoluNational Debt Commissioners placed the stock on the Post tion had been carried, the Court could not go behind his declaNaice Savings Lank Investment Account, and credited it to the ration: In re Hadleigh Castle Go'd Mines, [1900] 2 Ch. 419; testatrix. If the depositor in this case wished to realize, there Arnot v. United African Lands, [1901] 1 Ch. 518. In the latter Would be a debit of so much as was to be transferred to her. case there was so much confusion that no one could understand There was no transfer, but the 501. 10s. would be credited to what resolutions were put, an l in the former case the meeting her at the current price, less commission, and by making the was a stormy one and there was a conflict of evidence as to requisite application the money would be paid to her by what took place. In both cases the Court refused to go behind warrant at the Post Office Savings Bank most convenient to the chairman's declaration. But those decisions did not apply ner. She could not get the money simply by asking for it, but where the chairman by his declaration found the figures, and certain forms had to be gone through. To hold that stock erroneously in point of law held that the resolution had been invested by the Post Office Savings Bank for a depositor in this duly pissed. The chairman had no right to count the 200 way could be the subject of a donatio mortis causâ would be to votes by proxy, and on the face of the declaration it was shewn push the doctrine beyond the decided cases, and he did not that the resolution had not been passed by the required think that this was a step which ought to be taken by a Court majority. The declaration was not conclusive; there was no of first instance. He therefore held that there was a good voluntary winding-up existing; and a compulsory winding-up donatio mortis causâ of the cash balance, but not of the Govern-order must be made. ment Stock.

Solicitors: Radford & Frankland; William Mercer; Pritchard & Sons.

NOTICE TO SOLICITORS.

EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN. Workmen's compensation-Death resulting from the injury-Death not the natural or probable consequence-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), s. 1; Sched. I., clause

With the view of insuring the greatest possible accuracy and rapidity in the various publications connected with the Law REPORTS, the Council will be obliged, if the Solicitors to whom application is made by any reporter acting for the Council Workmen's compensation" Engineering work"-" Railroad"

1 (a)

Tramway-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61
Vict. c. 37), s. 7

EVIDENCE.

PAGE

123

123.

will as soon as possible after application furnish the necessary Papers, together with any information in their power as to the names of the various Solicitors engaged in the case. At the same time, the Council thankfully acknowledge the assistance Credibility of-Breach of verbal contract—Rise in price of coal 122 they have already received from so many members of the Profession in furnishing the papers required to prepare accurate reports.

PRACTICE.

Examination of witness before trial-Attendance of country
solicitor-Costs as between party and party-Rule 10 of
Rules of the Supreme Court, January, 1902.
Order LXV.,
r. 27, reg 29. Appendix N, No. 147

RECEIVER.

PAGE Security-Bond of limited company-Ultra vires

SALE OF STOLEN GOODS.

123

124

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. Mayor, &c., of Bournemouth

Swinfen Eady J. 126

DUNHAM v. CLARE.

C. A. 123

FARQUHARSON BROTHERS & CO., Apps.; J. KING & Co., RESPS.

Wright J.

124

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Lease-Conditions of sale-Title-Time limited for requisitions—
Waiver of objection—Outstanding legal estate in the Crown. 125

OWEN v. SPIRITine, Limited

C. A. 124

SCTTON V. ENGLISH AND COLONIAL PRODUCE COMPANY

Absolute assignment (not purporting to be by way of charge only)—
Security for debt-Instrument passing whole right of assignor
-Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 25, sub-8. 6. 124 The King v. Howard and Others. Appeal from the Lord Chief Jus-

Robinow v. London and Northern Bank, Limited. Appeal from stolen from them by their clerk and sold without authority to Buckley J. Part heard.