and held that the shares of the grandchildren were not inde- | imprisonment from the 26th of February to the 18th of March, feasibly vested, but were subject to be defeated at any time 1902, shall amount to the maximum period of one year allowed during the existence of the tenancy for life. by sect. 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869. Solicitors: Young & Sons; Leslie, Antill & Arnold; Marshal & Co.; Oldfield, Bartram & Oldfield. G. A. S. Solicitors: Edward Lee, Davis & Lee; Dyson, Smith & Mar chant. Swinfen Eady J. G. R. A. July 29. CHURCH'S TRUSTEE MONTAGUE HIBBARD & Co. Attachment—Release by governor of gaol—Mistake-Leave to issue further writ-Jurisdiction-Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 4. Motion. On the 6th of December, 1901, Swinfen Eady J. made an order in this action directing the defendants Hibbard and Vickers (trading as Montague Hibbard & Co.) to pay the plaintiff the sum of 12007., admitted by them to be in their hands as his agents. On the 12th of February, 1902, Swinfen Eady J. gave the plaintiff leave to issue writs of attachment against the defendants for non-compliance with this order. On the 25th of February, 1902, a writ of attachment was issued against each defendant. On the same day the defendant Hibbard was arrested and lodged in Holloway Gaol under a writ of attachment issued against the defendants Hibbard and Vickers in pursuance of an order of Byrne J., dated the 7th of February, 1902, for noncompliance with an order for delivery of accounts in another action. On the 26th of February, 1902, the sheriffs lodged a warrant or detainer against the defendant Hibbard with the governor of Holloway Gaol under Swinfen Eady J.'s writ of attachment, and made their return accordingly. The defendant Vickers was subsequently arrested. On the 15th of March, 1902, Byrne J. ordered the defendants to be discharged so far as concerned the contempt of his order. On the 18th of March, 1902, Swinfen Eady J. ordered Vickers to be discharged so far as concerned the contempt of his order. On the 18th of March, 1902, the governor of Holloway Gaol, misapprehending the effect of these orders, released both defendants. The plaintiff now applied for leave to issue a writ of attachment against the defendant Hibbard for non-compliance with the order of the 6th of December, 1901, or, alternatively, for leave to issue a further writ of attachment under the order of the 12th of February, 1902. Micklem, K.C., and Edward Clayton, for the plaintiff. Eustace Smith, for the defendant Hibbard, submitted that, as the writ of attachment had been issued and executed, the matter was now in the hands of the executive, and the Court was functus officio, and had no jurisdiction in the matter. SWINFEN EADY J. I am quite satisfied that the Court has full jurisdiction to put this matter straight. The proper order will be to allow the plaintiff to issue a further writ of attachment on the terms that it shall contain a notice that it is not to authorize the imprisonment of the defendant Hibbard for a longer period than such time as, together with his period of TORBOCK v. LORD WESTBURY. Company-Meetings-Notice-Special resolution-Amendment--Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 51. Witness action. This was an action by a shareholder to restrain the Northern Nigeria Exploration Syndicate, Limited, and its directors from giving effect to a special resolution as to the directors' remuneration passed and confirmed at general meetings held on the 4th of March and the 20th of March, 1902, on the ground (inter alia) that, owing to an amendment at the first meeting, the resolution actually passed differed from the resolution of which formal notice had been given under sect. 51 of the Companies Act, 1862. The directors' remuneration had been originally fixed under art. 79 of the company's articles. On the 24th of February, 1902, the board gave notice that an extraordinary general meeting would be held on the 4th of March, 1902, for the purpose of altering art. 79 by substituting a new article set out in the notice. The new article provided that, after the shareholders should have received dividends amounting in the aggregate to 100 per cent., the directors should be paid 40 per cent. of all further profits as remuneration for their services. The meeting was duly held on the 4th of March, 1902, and at the suggestion of a shareholder the resolution was amended by reducing the remuneration to 30 per cent. The amended resolution was passed at this meeting and confirmed at the meeting of the 20th of March, 1902, of which due notice was given. The plaintiff voted against the resolution at the first meeting, but did not attend the second meeting, having issued his writ on the 17th of March, 1902. Martelli, for the plaintiff. No "notice specifying the intention to propose such resolution," i.e., the resolution actually passed, was given. There is, therefore, no statutory special resolution under sect. 51, and the alteration of the articles is invalid: Buckley on Companies, 8th ed. p. 223. An Eve, K.C., and Ward Coldridge, for the defendants. amendment in pari materia with the resolution specified in the notice does not contravene the statute. SWINFEN EADY J. The plaintiff's contention is not well founded. The resolution confirmed at the second meeting must, no doubt, be in the same form as that passed at the first meeting, but it is not necessary that the resolution passed at the first meeting should be in the identical terms of the resolu tion specified in the notice. In the present case full notice was given of the intention to fix the directors' remuneration, and the only difference between the resolution specified in the notice and the resolution actually passed was the reduction of the proposed remuneration from 40 to 30 per cent. This altera tion did not invalidate the resolution. The action is therefor dismissed with costs. Solicitors: H. H. Sherriff; Allen & Tennant. G. R. A. NOTICE TO SOLICITORS. With the view of insuring the greatest possible accuracy and sittings. Postponed till next at the instance of the plaintiffs, who were ratepayers, restrain ing the defendants from expending money on buildings intended to provide for that education. treated as the trial of the whole question in dispute. The defendants appealed. The appeal was, by consent, Jenkins, K.C., and Llewelyn Davies, for the defendants. Upjohn, K.C., Danckwerts, K.C., and H. Courthope-Munroe, for the plaintiffs. THE COURT (Vaughan Williams, Romer, and Mathew L.JJ.) held that the education in question was in reality "higher Aflalo v. Lawrence & Bullen, Limited. Appeal from Joyce J. Stands education," not the "elementary education" which was the over for further argument. only education contemplated by the Elementary Education Act, 1870, and therefore the expenses of providing that higher education could not be thrown upon the rates. The case was covered by Reg. v. Cockerton, [1901] 1 K. B. 726. The plaintiffs were entitled to a perpetual injunction, and the defendants' appeal must be dismissed with costs. Stay of execution pending appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Solicitors: C. E. Mortimer; F. A. Baker. G. I. F. C. Aug. 6 ERRATUM. In the Record of Business in the Court of Appeal No. II. for Saturday, the 2nd of August (ante, p. 156), it should have been stated that the appeals in Lambert v. Duvall and In re Duvall. Corbet v. Duvall, were allowed (not dismissed). W. L. C. During the sittings of the Courts THE WEEKLY NOTES will be published on Saturday, and will generally comprise Notes of Decisions up to and including those of the previous Thursday. All cases of permanent interest noted therein will be reported in full in THE LAW REPORTS. Easement-Tramway-Express or implied grant-Merger of agreement in conveyance. Appeal from a decision of Byrne J., noted [1901] W. N. 237. The defendant appealed. Levett, K.C., and Wrangham, for the appellant. Rowden, K.C., and Arthur E. Hughes, for the respondent, were not called on. dismissed the appeal on the ground, not relied upon in the THE COURT (Vaughan Williams, Romer, and Mathew L.JJ.) Court below, that the right to use the tramway, and the benefit of haulage, agreed to be given to the plaintiff by the letters of April, 1898, were not merged in the subsequent conveyance of December, 1899, and without expressing any opinion on the view taken by the Court of Appeal, did not arise, and were not questions of construction decided by Byrne J., which, in the argued. Solicitors: Thomas Charles; Hurrell, Christopher & Roney, for R. O. Davies, Ware. Supreme Court of Judicature. C. A. C. A. COURT OF APPEAL. DYER v. LONDON SCHOOL BOARD. Aug. 5 Education-School board-Pupil teachers' centres-School build ings Money raised by rate Limitation to payment for elementary education—Elementary Education Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75). The question was whether under the Elementary Education Act, 1870, the defendants, the London School Board, had power to provide, at the expense of the ratepayers, certain schools for the education of their pupil teachers, commonly called "pupil teachers' centres." Farwell J. granted an interim injunction In re FORD. FORD v. FORD. W. C. D. Aug. 7. Administration-Intestacy-Death of universal legatee and sole executrix before testator-Advancements to children-HotchpotStatute of Distributions, 1671 (22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10), s. 5. Appeal from the decision of Buckley J., [1902] 1 Ch. 218 [1901] W. N. 218. of the Statute of Distributions applied to an intestacy which The question was, whether the hotchpot provisions of sect. 5 arose thus. The intestate had executed a will, by which he gave the whole of his property to his wife absolutely, and appointed her sole executrix. She died in his lifetime. He had during his life made advances to some of his children. Buckley J. held that sect. 5 applied. The children who had received advances appealed. Astbury, K.C., and Gatey, for the defendants; and Ingpen, K.C., and Brodie Cooper, for another party, were not called upon. THE COURT (Vaughan Williams, Romer, and Mathew L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. said that in the result there was no one in whose favour the will could operate-there was no one who could take a beneficial interest under it. In his Lordship's opinion the statute applied. It was not true to say that the deceased did not die intestate. ROMER and MATHEW L.JJ. concurred. Solicitors: Ford & Co.; Rowcliffes, Rawle & Co.; Carr, Scott, Smith & Gorringe. W. L. C. C. A. HAYDON v. CARTWRIGHT. Aug. 12. Practice-Appeal-Length of notice-Final or interlocutory order - Solicitor - Account Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order LII., r. 25; Order LVIII., r. 3. Appeal from the refusal by Bucknill J. of an application by the plaintiff by originating summons from an order, under Order LII., r. 25, directing the defendants, who were solicitors, to deliver to the plaintiff a list of the moneys and securities which they had in their custody or control on behalf of the plaintiff, and to bring into court the whole or such part of the same within such time as the Court might order, and to deliver a cash account to the plaintiff. The master refused the application, and Bucknill J. on the 25th of July affirmed his decision. The plaintiff appealed. Bray, K.C., and Norman Craig, for the plaintiff. Boome, for the solicitors, took the preliminary objection that the order appealed from was final, not interlocutory, and that the plaintiff had given a four days' notice instead of a fourteen days' notice as required by Order LVIII., r. 3. He cited In re Herbert Reeves & Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 29. THE COURT (Vaughan Williams and Mathew L.JJ.) held that that case applied, and that the order was final. They allowed the objection and dismissed the appeal, without costs, but extended the time for appealing, so that the plaintiff might be able to give a proper notice. Solicitors: F. Kimber, Bull & Duncan; Hamlin, Grammer & Hamlin. W. L. C. bigh Court of Justice. CHANCERY DIVISION. this action they complained that he had built on the adjoining land a house which obstructed the access of light to some of their windows, and they claimed an injunction and damages. Some obstruction to the plaintiffs' light was proved, but the defendant objected that at the date of the transfer to the plaintiffs he had no such interest in the adjoining land as would support an implied grant of a right to light. The defendant, who was a builder, entered into a building agreement with the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, dated the 29th of August, 1899, comprising (inter alia) the land on which the plaintiffs' house was built and the adjoining land. This agreement gave the defendant a right of entry upon each plot for the purpose only of building a house thereon upon the terms therein mentioned, with a proviso that nothing therein should be deemed to create the relationship of landlord and tenant, and a further right to claim a lease when the house was completed. At the date of the transfer to the plaintiffs the defendant had commenced the foundations of the house now complained of, but the land still allowed the free access of light to the plaintiffs' windows. At this date the plaintiffs knew that the house to be erected was to be larger and more expensive than the other houses in the road, but they did not know the exact position of the house or that it would interfere with their lights. The lease transferred to the plaintiffs was in the form prescribed in the building agreement and provided that the lessors, the Commissioners, should have power to erect or suffer to be erected on the adjoining lands any buildings whatever, whether affecting the light then or at any time during the continuance of the term enjoyed by the lessee or not. Warrington, K.C., and C. T. Mitchell, for the plaintiffs. P. Ogden Lawrence, K.C., and R. J. Parker, for the defendant. KEKEWICH J. held, (1) that the defendant had at the date of the transfer a sufficient interest in the adjoining land to make himself obnoxious to the maxim that a man shall not derogate from his own grant; (2) that the reservation in sect. 35 of the Land Transfer Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 87), which was made applicable to this case by the 92nd rule of the Land Transfer Rules, 1898, although it preserved the right of the Commissioners to build as they pleased, could not enable the defendant to get rid of his personal obligation not to build on the adjoining land, whether such obligation was expressed or implied; (3) that by virtue of sect. 6, sub-sect. 1, of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, the obligation was expressed and not implied only; (4) that the plaintiffs had no such notice as to the contemplated building on the adjoining plot as to preclude them from maintaining this action, and that this case fell within the principle of Broomfield v. Williams, [1897] 1 Ch. 602. His Lordship gave judgment for the plaintiffs for 337. damages and costs. Solicitors: W. S. Barnes; J. E. Hetley. H. B. H. "6 Know By a transfer under the Land Transfer Acts, dated the 2nd Company-Prospectus-Omission of material contractof August, 1901, the plaintiffs acquired from the defendant a ingly issue"-Waiver clause-Companies Act, 1867 (30 & 31 In 1897 a lease for fourteen years of offices on the ground floor of a house was granted by Mr. Lee to the plaintiff. The lease contained a covenant by the lessor, his executors, adminis the plaintiff without any disturbance by the lessor or any person lawfully or equitably claiming from or under him. The prospectus of a company formed to acquire and work two breweries stated, amongst other things, that a contract for purchase of the 1st of December, 1896, had been entered into, and that, "during the negotiations for the purchase of the pro-trators, and assigns, for the quiet enjoyment of the offices by perties and the formation of the company, contracts have been entered into between various parties with reference to the formation and promotion of the company, and the subscription of its capital, but to none of which the company is a party. The businesses agreed to be purchased, or some of them, will be taken over subject to all existing contracts, which are of the ordinary trade character. The contracts referred to in this paragraph are, or may be, contracts within the meaning of the 38th section of the Companies Act, 1867; and accordingly applicants for shares are to be deemed to have notice of the said contracts, and to have agreed with the company (as trustee for the directors and other persons liable) to waive all claims, if any, against them for not more fully complying with the requirements of the said section, and allotments will only be made out upon this express condition." The plaintiff applied, on the faith of the prospectus, for twenty preference shares in the company; they were allotted to him, and he paid 2007. for them. He brought this action on the ground that contracts by the promoters or their agents, material to subscribers for shares had not been disclosed; and he asked for compensation. The defendant was a director who had taken part in the preparation of the prospectus. He said in his defence that he did not know of the contracts, and that the prospectus did not to his knowledge omit to specify them; and he relied on the waiver clause. R. F. Norton, K. C., and Joseph Ricardo, for the plaintiff. Levett, K.C., Rowden, K.C., and Bremner, for the defendant. BYRNE J. said that the contracts were material, and that the defendant had left the statements in the prospectus about these contracts to others without further inquiry, and had wilfully that is with knowledge that he was doing so abstained from inquiry. This was no answer to the claim under sect. 38. A plea of ignorance on the part of a director could only be maintained where the facts enabled him to establish that the prospectus was not a document for which he was responsible, or, in other words, that he had in fact been deceived into giving his sanction to a document which was not his. On the other point the law was that no protection could be afforded to those responsible for the issue of a prospectus, under a waiver clause which they invited subscribers to submit themselves to, unless they fairly disclosed what was the nature of the rights which they asked should be waived. The present prospectus did not sufficiently disclose the fact, which appeared from the contracts in question, that there had been enormous loading in the way of promotion profits. The plaintiff was entitled to recover 2001. and interest at 4 per cent. from the date at which the last dividend was paid. Solicitors: Joseph Davis; Ashurst, Morris, Crisp & Co. In 1898 Mr. Lee sold the house, subject to the lease, to the Town Properties Investment Corporation, Limited. In 1900 the company purchased from a stranger a house next door to that in which the plaintiff had his offices, pulled it down, and erected on the site of it buildings of a much greater height than the old house. This caused a chimney in the plaintiff's offices to smoke so as materially to interfere with his quiet enjoyment of one of the rooms. He brought this action for a declaration that the acts of the company constituted a breach of the covenant and for an injunction. R. F. Norton, K.C., and E. Clayton, for the plaintiff. Levett, K.C., and Austen-Cartmell, for the defendants. BYRNE J. said that the acts done by the defendants were not done by them, claiming the right to do such acts as authorized by or claiming under the plaintiff's lessor, but in exercise of their rights under an independent title acquired subsequently to the date of the covenant. The covenant must be construed having regard to the circumstances which existed at the date of the lease, and the assignees of the reversion could not b. held liable for acts lawfully done under an independent title created subsequently to the lease. The action must be dismissed. Solicitors: C. P. Eaton Taylor; F. A. K. Doyle, for S. T. Talbot, Birmingham. Farwell J. H. C. R. In re ACCLES, LIMITED. July 29. "33. The company shall pay to each of the trustees on the 1st day of July, 1897, and on each succeeding 1st day of July during the continuance of this security, the sum of 1057. as and by way of remuneration for their services as trustees hereunder, and the trustees shall be at liberty to accept such remuneration." "35. The trustees and every receiver, attorney, manager agent, or other person appointed by the trustees hereunder shall be entitled to be indemnified out of the mortgaged premises in respect of all liabilities and expenses incurred by them or him in the execution or purported execution of the trusts hereof, or of any powers, authorities, or discretions vested in him or them pursuant to these presents. . . . and against al actions, proceedings, costs, claims, and demands in respect o |