Blake and Jeremiah Tully, two of the Poor-law Guardians of the E. T. 1845. Tuam Union, an order nisi for an attachment was granted. Skelton showed cause against this order being made absolute. There is a preliminary objection to this order; the affidavit on which it was obtained is defective. It is entitled "The Poor-law Commissioners v. The Guardians of the Poor of the Tuam Union;" whereas it should have been entitled the same as the rule, "The Queen at the prosecution of the Poor-law Commissioners v. the Guardians of the Poor of the Tuam Union": In re Haughton and Fallowes (a). There is another objection. These costs could only have been demanded by power of attorney, and the affidavit omits to state that any such was executed; neither does it state that a copy of it had been left with the parties by the person who demanded the costs, which is necessary in such a case: Laugher v. Laugher (b); King v. Packwood (c). The affidavit should also state that a copy of the order had been personally served: Rex v. Smithies (d); Parker v. Burgess (e). Henn, with E. Pennefather, contended that the informality in the affidavit had been waived by the defendants appearing to show cause. Queen's Bench. THE QUEEN v. THE GUAR- THE POOR OF THE TUAM UNION. Per Curiam. The affidavit is wrongly entitled, which is clearly irregular. We will, therefore, discharge the order, but without costs. 1846. April 20. An order di- should be indi AN amended order nisi was granted, that an attachment should issue against Jeremiah Tully, one of the Guardians, which order was founded on production of the power of attorney from the Poor-law Commissioners to one Michael Buckley to demand these costs, and vidually liable an affidavit verifying the execution of the power of attorney, and an affidavit of the demand of the costs by Buckley from Jeremiah Tully. for costs, and a rule nisi for an attachment having issued to enforce that order, such rule must be Skelton, with whom was Fitzgibbon, moved that this order be served on all quashed. This order was improvidently granted, as the Court has no power the members of the Board. THE QUEEN v. THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE TUAM UNION. E. T. 1846. to award costs in a case of this description. The statute 9 Anne c. Queen's Bench. 20, s. 2, amended by 1 W. 4, c. 21, awarding costs in mandamus cases do not apply to this country. The point has been raised in several cases, and now stands for judgment.* Further, the order directs that the costs are to be paid by the Guardians individually, and not to be charged on the rates; the true intention of that order was that the Guardians should not be charged in their corporate capacity, so as that the rates should be chargeable with the costs; but it could not be intended that any one of the Guardians should be liable individually for the whole amount, for in such case he would not be entitled to contribution from the other Guardians.-[BLACKBURNE, C. J. I think the order that they should be individually liable, meant personally.]-If that be so, this order cannot be made absolute, as but one of the Guardians has been served. Macdonogh and E. Pennefather, contra. We rely on the inherent power of the Court to award those costs: Rex v. Inhabitants of Wix (a). Lord Tenterden there observes, the parties on whom the writ is served may be punished for disobedience of it, and if the Court think the writ ought to issue, they will find some means of enforcing obedience to it. And in Regina v. Green (b), it is said the Court has a discretionary power to order costs to be paid by persons making affidavits in support of a motion; here the defendant whom it is sought to attach has been regularly served, and the Court ought not by a formal objection allow him to escape from punishment for his contempt.-[BLACKBURNE, C. J. If this order had been made a rule of Court, there must have been a joint execution against all the Guardians, which affords a strong ground for showing the analogy to a judgment must be followed.]An attachment is not in the nature of a judgment, it is a criminal proceeding inherent in the jurisdiction of the Court, and has been considered more in the nature of mesne process: Lewis v. Morland (c). The object of the writ is, to bring the party into Court to The question as to whether those statutes applied to Ireland was fully argued in the case of The Queen at the prosecution of Moss v. The Corporation of Dublin, in last Hilary Term, and on the 28th of April following. BLACKBURNE, C. J. observed that the Court were of opinion these Acts did not extend to this country. Subsequently thereto the 6 & 7 Vic. c. 67, passed, and by its enactments the Court are empowered to award costs in mandamus cases. Queen's Bench. THE QUEEN enable him to clear himself of his contempt, and for that purpose E. T. 1846. interrogatories might be put to him. The nature of final process or execution, on the other hand, is to satisfy the plaintiff.]-BLACKBURNE, C. J. This is an order on a certain number of persons to pay a certain sum of money, and the question is, whether that is not a complete contempt, being served on one only?] Fitzgibbon. They are not guilty of a contempt until all are served, the order being against all jointly. BLACKBURNE, C. J. There must be either an actual service of all, or what is equivalent thereto. Let the order be quashed, but without costs. v. THE GUAR- THE POOR OF THE TUAM UNION. ROONEY v. PALMER. DEBT brought by a stock-broker against the defendant for money paid to his use in the purchase of shares in several Railway Companies, to which nil debet had been pleaded. At the trial the objection was raised, that the plaintiff gave no evidence of either the complete or provisional registration of the Companies in which the shares had been purchased, pursuant to the 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110, ss. 4 & 7 (the Joint Stock Companies' Act); and that the sale of shares in unregistered Companies was illegal under under the 26th section of that Act.* brought by him to recover money paid for the defendant in the purchase of shares, it is no defence that such shares were in Companies not registered. * Sec. 26 provides "That no shareholder of any Joint Stock Company completely registered under this Act, shall be entitled to receive any dividends or profits, or be entitled to the remedies or powers hereby given to shareholders, until he shall have executed the deed of settlement of the said Company, or some deed referring thereto, and also have paid up all instalments or calls due from him, and shall have been registered in the Registry-office aforesaid; and further, that it shall be lawful for every shareholder who shall have signed such deed and paid up such instalments E. T. 1846. ROONEY ย. PALMER. A verdict, however, was found for the plaintiff, subject to the objection. Hamilton Smythe having, on a former day, obtained a rule nisi, that the verdict so had should be set aside, or that a nonsuit be entered Macdonogh showed cause, and relied on Young v. Smith (a), deciding that the 26th section of 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110, prohibiting the sale of shares before complete registration, did not apply to Railway Companies requiring an Act of Parliament. Smythe, contra, argued that this being an action of debt to recover money paid for the defendant in the purchase of shares in several Companies, and no evidence being given of any of those Companies being provisionally registered, the plaintiff could not maintain it, for he was liable to a penalty by contracting for the sale of shares in Companies before such provisional registration; that a person who had paid money for another for an illegal purpose could not recover it: De Begnis v. Armistead (b). Per Curiam. A stock-broker cannot be brought within the meaning of the (a) Exch. 15 Law Jour. 81; S. C. 15 M. & W. 121. or calls, and shall have been registered, to be present at all general meetings of the Company, &c., subject, nevertheless, to the provisions of this Act and of the deed of settlement of the Company or other special authority, so far as such provisions shall either regulate or restrict the exercise of such powers, but not so as to deprive such shareholders thereof; and further, with regard to subscribers and every person entitled, or claiming to be entitled to any share in any Joint Stock Company, the formation of which shall be commenced after the 1st of November 1844, that until such Joint Stock Company shall have obtained a certificate of complete registration, and until any such subscriber or person shall have been duly registered as a shareholder in the said Registry-office, it shall not be lawful for such person to dispose by sale or mortgage of such share, or of any interest therein, and that every contract for, or sale or disposal of, such share or interest, shall be void; and that every person entering into such contract shall forfeit a sum not exceeding £10; and that for better protecting purchasers, it shall be the duty of the Directors of the Company, by whom certificates of shares are issued, to state on every such certificate the date of the first complete registration of the Company, as before provided," &c. term "promoter," as used in the 24th section* of 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110; and the 26th section has been held, and we think rightly held, in Young v. Smith, not to apply to Railway Companies: the verdict, therefore must stand. Cause allowed. E. T. 1846. ROONEY บ. PALMER. * 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110, s. 24.—" And be it enacted, that if before a certificate of provisional registration shall be obtained, the promoters, or any of them, or any person employed by or under them, take any monies in consideration of the allotment either of shares or of any interest in the concern, or by way of deposit for shares, to be granted or allotted; or issue, in the name or on behalf of the Company, any note or scrip, or letter of allotment, or other instrument or writing to denote a right or claim, or preference or promise absolute or conditional to any shares; or advertise the existence or proposed formation of the Company; or make any contract whatsoever for or in the name or on behalf of such intended Company; then every such person shall be liable to forfeit for every such offence a sum not exceeding £25; and that it shall be lawful for any person to sue for and recover the same by action of debt." THE QUEEN v. DUFFY. April 28. In this case the defendant had been indicted for a seditious libel, to The statute which indictment he pleaded as follows: "And the said Charles Gavan Duffy, by John Mitchell his attorney, comes, and having heard the said indictment read, protesting that "he is not guilty of the premises above laid to his charge, or any or "either of them, or any part thereof, for plea nevertheless thereto, "pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided, says that "the same ought not to be prosecuted against him the said Charles "Gavan Duffy, and that he should be discharged and dismissed of "the premises therein specified. Because he says that heretofore, and "before the composing and publishing of the supposed libels in the "said indictment mentioned, entitled Threats of Coercion,' to wit, 46 6 & 7 Vic., Act), does not apply to seditious libels. A justification under that Act, therefore, cannot be pleaded to such indictment. The privilege of the Attorney-General opening a demurrer, is a personal privilege, and 'on, &c., at, &c., threats of coercion had been made use of against a cannot be de"large portion of the Irish people, to wit, that portion of the subjects puted to ano"of her Majesty in that part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain "and Ireland called Ireland, hereinafter mentioned, in certain articles "in public newspapers, to wit, in the articles of the newspapers here"inafter mentioned, to wit, at the time and place aforesaid. And the ther. |