RULE I.—" You should not reward children for doing what you would punish them for leaving undone."

It is due, I believe, to the neglect of this rule that rewards have in so many instances defeated their proper purpose, and tended to lower, instead of to raise, the standard of what is good. And yet the rule when stated seems so simple as almost to be implied in the terms used.

If it is a merit to have reached any given degree of excellence, it cannot properly be a disgrace to have failed to reach it; and, conversely, if it is disgraceful to fall below a given standard, it ought not to be accounted very meritorious to attain it.

Even if the authorities of a school confuse the two, the shrewd logic of the children will keep them well apart. "If doing this deserve a prize, it cannot be so very bad to leave it undone." The more the teacher-from a mistaken wish to encourage a greater number-pulls down his standard of what is creditable, the more will the children push down their standard of what is discreditable; and thus the sure consequence of making prizes too cheap is to demoralize your

school.

The simplest and most obvious way of guarding against this depreciation of the prize is to adopt the principle of competition, whereby the candidates, in their efforts to surpass one another, themselves push up the standard. But this principle is open to the objection, that it makes each one's loss his neighbour's gain.

I am content, therefore, to secure a sufficiently high standard of excellence by providing that it be readjusted from time to time, with special reference to the following rule :—

RULE II.-" Prizes should not be attainable without positive effort."

I hold this rule to be of the greatest importance, because in this effort lies, I conceive, the moral value of prize-schemes. When this rule is observed, the examination becomes a trial of strength, a struggle after excellence; it stirs all that is most generous in a child, and whether he gain the prize or not, he has tasted a new pleasure,-a pleasure that will not soon be forgotten,-the pleasure of putting forth his best energies, one of the most valuable experiences that can be given to a child in the whole course of his education.

I now come to a point which to some may seem open to question, but which to me appears to admit of little doubt, if Rules I. and II. be conceded.

Should prizes be given for moral excellence? The duty of

making children understand the immeasurable superiority of moral excellence over intellectual excellence, renders this a most important question.

I answer, that indirectly they may be, and must be, connected with moral excellence. For the very effort which they ought to require, according to Rule II., is a moral one; and the previous training, which in a well-constructed prizescheme success always implies, is a moral training,—involving punctuality in attending school, industry while there, honesty in doing their own work, and other moral habits. And on this ground, therefore, in schools for children, I should object to a prize which could be won by mere cleverness, without necessarily indicating any of these moral qualities. But directly, and apart from other qualifications, I hold that moral excellence ought not to bring a prize. My reasons may be very briefly expressed. In moral matters there can only be a right and a wrong. The wrong should always be put before children as something that deserves punishment; and, consequently, according to Rule I., the right should not receive a prize. Rewarded it always will be, in a right state of things, by the approval of the teacher, and by that happiest of all feelings that a child can havethe feeling that he is more and more winning his teacher's confidence. But I am speaking throughout of material rewards in the shape of prizes. In this sense, therefore, I would say, that if idleness, falsehood, impurity, are punishable; then industry, truthfulness, chastity, are not to be rewarded. The duty of being good is one of the earliest that a child may be expected to understand. The duty of intellectual exertion is seldom recognized until considerable progress has been made. Moreover the value of virtue depends almost entirely on its being practised for its own sake; whereas intellectual exertion bears valuable fruit from whatever motive it is made.

If the Gospel parables are quoted against me, as they have been, as affording high authority for directly rewarding moral excellence, I answer, these parables set forth a providential arrangement in God's world, which will, so far as He sees fit, extend itself to our little school world, without any intervention on our part. We should mislead our children if we taught them to expect that as the Divine order connects holiness and happiness together eternally, so goodness would surely be followed by its reward in the affairs of daily life. Far more truly shall we interpret our Lord's teaching, if in all moral matters we accustom our children to say, when they have done all that is commanded them, "We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do."

I therefore deprecate entirely the practice of giving children prizes for good conduct, or for learning their daily lessons, as tending to enervate their sense of duty. It seems to imply that good behaviour is something exceptional; whereas good behaviour ought to be put before them as the rule, and misbehaviour as the exception. Indeed the very way in which persons who wish to give prizes for good conduct are forced to measure it, viz., by the comparative fewness of the faults recorded, seems to be a confession that it is at best a negative good; and, if so, it is enough that, so far as mere outward effects go, it should exempt from punishment, without entitling to reward.

Now I can conceive no punishment for misbehaviour so just or appropriate, as exclusion from opportunities of distinction that are open to all the rest. And, therefore, while I would make the award of prizes exclusively depend on the intellectual acquirements of the candidates, I would take care that children of bad character were rigorously excluded from becoming candidates.

I hope I have made it plain that I am perfectly consistent in replying to the question raised about moral excellence by the two following rules :—

RULE III.—Prizes should not be given for good behaviour.* RULE IV. Children of bad character should be excluded

from competition.

Where the examiner is not the same person as the schoolteacher, it is a matter of no slight difficulty to determine the best form for the certificate of character. It must be free from ambiguity, and yet not too peremptory, else qualifications will be added by those who have to sign it, which will involve the examiner in endless perplexity.

The form adopted at the last examination was the following:

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religious duties."

bears a good character, and has been attentive to his [or her

And to this the following note was appended :

"N.B.-The responsibility of determining whether a candidate deserves this certificate or not, must rest with the minister and teacher. No qualified certificate can be accepted. It is the earnest wish of those who give these prizes, that no children should be admitted to the examination who have not shown, during the past year, at least a marked endeavour to merit the approbation of their ministers and teachers."

One possible exception occurs to me, but it belongs rather to home or nursery education than to that of a school; I mean the case of an individual child, where some bad habit is to be broken, and where the effort required is so great and so definite that a prize might be allowed according to the spirit of Rule II.; but I should wish to regard it as a concession to the child's low moral state in respect to some one particular duty.

I now come to the question, "what is the most appropriate subject-matter for prize examinations?" One answer is selfevident; it must be something in which excellence can be justly and definitely measured. And this simple condition will limit our choice much more than people not practically conversant with the work of examining might be disposed to imagine. If the violation of Rule I. explains the ill effects that have attended prizes in many cases, the neglect of this obvious principle, of not attempting more than can be really well done, has caused the mischief in many more. It were better, a hundred times, to have no prizes, than that the children should go away with an impression that the prizes have been determined very much by chance.

From my experience in conducting the ten examinations that have taken place in connexion with these prize-schemeshardly one of which has been free from some instructive blunder-I put forward the following suggestions with some degree of confidence:

RULE V." Where the result of an examination is to be a classification of the candidates, the examination should be confined to some one subject, or, at most, to some one class of kindred subjects."*

The following are my chief reasons for this rule :

1. Where many subjects are included, the examiner must adopt his own rate of valuation for the several kinds of merit shown; and this rate is sure to appear to some arbitrary and unfair. There will always be some who will say the result is unfair, because a higher value ought to have been assigned to this or that subject. What is arbitrary should be, as far as possible, excluded from these awards.

2. If several departments of school work form the subjects for examination, the absence of any one becomes a marked thing, and gives rise to an inference that the examiners do not attach to it much importance. The only way of avoiding this evil is, either to examine in all (which would occupy many days) or to make it quite plain upon the face of the prize, that it only professes to certify excellence in some specific subject.

3. My third reason is to be found in the moral effect of success upon the children.

* In the Staffordshire Prize-Schemes, I am sorry to say, this rule has not been observed; I have endeavoured to limit the subjects as much as possible, but I should regard it as a great improvement if there might be separate prizes given for arithmetic, drawing, needle work, &c. Knowledge of Scripture might then be intro"uced as a separate subject; at present I have found it almost impossible to harmose it with the other subjects of competition.

If the examination is limited to some one subject (say arithmetic), every one knows what the prize means. It proclaims the bearer to be excellent as an arithmetician. If, on the contrary, the examination includes many subjects, no one knows precisely what the prize means; and not knowing whether it means this thing or that thing or the other thing, people go away with the loose notion that it means all, and that the boy is so good a scholar that he cannot have much more to learn.

Now I ask every one who is accustomed to children, whether they have not found a reputation of the first kind good and stimulating in its effects, and a reputation of the second kind apt to foster conceit? The explanation of these opposite effects lies, I believe, in this ;-in the one case the child knows that people give him credit for what he really has; in the other case, he is conscious that people impute to him a good deal that he has not, and he is strongly tempted to accept the credit so given,-in other words, to pretend to excellences that he does not possess. Just praise invigorates, but flattery is enervating.

The intention of Rule V. would also require, that where the range of any subject is considerable, either the examination should be confined to some special department of it, sufficient notice of this having been previously given; or a large choice of questions should be proposed, a small number only being required to be answered. The necessity of this caution, to exclude the risk of chance, is obvious.

The question is often asked, "What is the best kind of prize for the children of an elementary school?" Some, I find, object altogether to a money prize; and if by this is meant a present of pocket-money, I entirely agree that this is the worst kind of prize that can be given. Nine people out of ten wish to make the prize an occasion for putting something instructive into the way of the child, and choose, therefore, the most useful book they can find. I am almost disposed to think that this is a mistake. The book may be read, or it may not; it may suit the child's taste, or it may not; it may be carefully treasured, or it may soon be lost. There is, as it seems to me, one paramount consideration that should guide us in the choice of the prize, and this forms my Sixth Rule:

RULE VI.—The prize should be of a kind to make a lasting impression upon the child.

The kind of prize that I myself prefer is one that is purely honorary; one that never can be diverted to any other useone that is, and must ever be, a prize, and nothing but a pri