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vessels, extensive works would be altogether unnecessary, either at Mobile point or Dauphin island, since sloops-of-war only can navigate the deepest channel. But it is not for that purpose alone that these works are intended. It is to provide, also, against a formidable invasion, both by land and sea, the object of which may be to shake the foundation of our system. Should such small works be erected, and such an invasion take place, they would be sure to fall at once into the hands of the invaders, and to be turned against us.

Whether the acquisition of Florida may be considered as affording an inducement to make any change in the position or strength of these works, is a circumstance which also merits attention. From the view which I have taken of the subject, I am of opinion that it should not. The defence of New Orleans and of the river Mississippi, against a powerful invasion, being one of the great objects of such extensive works, that object would be essentially abandoned if they should be established eastward of the bay of Mobile, since the force to be collected in them would be placed at too great a distance to allow the co-operation necessary for those purposes, between it and that at the city. In addition to which, it may be observed, that by carrying them to Pensacola, or further to the east, that bay would fall immediately, in case of such invasion, into the hands of the enemy, whereby such co-operation would be rendered utterly impossible, and the state of Alabama would also be left wholly unprotected.

With a view to such formidable invasion, of which we should never lose sight, and of the great objects to which it would be directed, I think that very strong works at some point within the gulf of Mexico will be found indispensable. I think, also, that those works ought to be established at the bay of Mobile, one at Mobile point, and the other on Dauphin island, whereby the enemy would be excluded, and the complete command of that bay, with all the advantages attending it, be secured to ourselves. In the case of such invasion, it will, it is presumed, be deemed necessary to collect, at some point other than at New Orleans, a strong force, capable of moving in any direction, and affording aid to any part which may be attacked; and, in my judgment, no position presents so many advantages as a point of rendezvous for such force, as the mouth of that bay. The fortification at the Rigolets will defend the entrance by one passage into Lake Pontchartrain, and also into Pearl river, which empties into the gulf at that point. Between the Rigolets and Mobile bay, there are but two inlets which deserve the name, those at St. Louis and Pascagola, the entrance into which is too shallow even for the smallest vessels; and from the Rigolets to Mobile bay, the whole coast is equally shallow, affording the depth of a few feet of water only. Cat island, which is nearest the Rigolets, is about seven and a half miles distant from the coast, and thirty from the Rigolets. Ship island is distant about ten miles from Cat island, and twelve from the coast. Between these islands and the coast, the water is very shallow.

As to the precise depth of water, in approaching those islands from the gulf, the report of the topographical engineers not having yet been received, it is impossible to speak with precision; but admitting it to be such as for frigates, and even ships-of-the-line to enter, the anchorage at both is unsafe, being much exposed to northwest winds. Along the coast, therefore, there is no motive for such strong works on our part; no town to guard; no inlet into the country to defend; and, if placed on the islands

(and the entrance to them is such as to admit large ships-of-war), distant as they are from the coast, it would be more easy for the enemy to assail them with effect.

The position, however, at Mobile bay is essentially different. That bay takes its name from Mobile river, which is formed by the junction of the Alabama and Tombigbee, which extend, each, about three hundred miles into the interior, approaching, at their head waters, near the Tennessee river. If the enemy possessed its mouth, and fortified Mobile point and Dauphin island, being superior at sea, it would be very difficult for us to dispossess him of either, even of Mobile point; and holding that position, Pensacola would soon fall, as, without incurring great expense in the construction of works there, it would present but a feeble resistance to a strong force in its rear. If we had a work at Mobile point only, the enemy might take Dauphin island, which would afford him great aid in attacking the point, and enable him, even should we succeed in repelling the attack, to render us great mischief there, and throughout the whole gulf. In every view which can be taken of the subject, it appears indispensable for us to command the entrance into Mobile bay; and that decision being taken, I think the considerations which favor the occupation of Dauphin island, by a strong work, are conclusive. It is proper to observe, that after the repulse before New Orleans, in the late war, the British forces took possession of Dauphin island and held it till the peace. Under neither of the reports of the board of engineers and naval commissioners could any but sloops-of-war enter the bay, or the anchorage between Dauphin and Pelican islands. Both reports give to that anchorage eighteen feet at low water, and twenty and a half at high. The only difference between them consists in this: that in the first, a bar leading to the anchorage, reducing the depth of water to twelve feet at low tide, was omitted. In neither case could frigates enter, though sloops-of-war of larger size might. The whole scope, however, of this reasoning turns on a different principle -on the works necessary to defend that bay, and by means thereof, New Orleans, the Mississippi, and all the surrounding country, against a powerful invasion both by land and sea, and not on the precise depth of water in any of the approaches to the bay or to the island.

The reasoning which is applicable to the works near New Orleans, and at the bay of Mobile, is equally so, in certain respects, to those which are to be erected for the defence of all the bays and rivers along the other parts of the coast. All those works are also erected on a greater scale than would be necessary for the sole purpose of preventing the passage of our inlets by large ships-of-war. They are, in most instances, formed for defence against a more powerful invasion, both by land and sea. There are, however, some differences between the works which are deemed necessary in the gulf, and those in other parts of our Union, founded on the peculiar situation of that part of the coast. The vast extent of the Mississippi, the great outlet and channel of commerce for so many states, all of which may be affected by the seizure of that city, or of any part of the river to a great extent above it, is one of those striking peculiarities which require particular provision. The thinness of the population near the city, making it necessary that the force requisite for its defence should be called from distant parts and states, is another. The danger which the army assembled at New Orleans would be exposed to of being cut off, in case the enemy should throw a force on the river above it, from the difficulty of ascending the river to attack it, and of making a retreat in any

other direction, is a third. For an attack on the city of New Orleans, Mobile bay, or any part of the intermediate coast, ships-of-war would be necessary only as a convoy to protect the transports against a naval force on their passage, and on their approach to the shore for the landing of the men, and on their return home, in case they should be repulsed.

On the important subject of our defences generally, I think proper to observe, that the system was adopted immediately after the late war, by Congress, on great consideration and a thorough knowledge of the effects of that war; by the enormous expense attending it; by the waste of life, of property, and by the general distress of the country The amount of debt incurred in that war, and due at its conclusion, without taking into the estimate other losses, having been heretofore communicated, need not now be repeated. The interest of the debt thus incurred is four times more than the sum necessary, by annual appropriations, for the completion of our whole system of defence, land and naval, to the extent provided for, and within the time specified. When that system shall be completed, the expense of construction will cease, and our expenditures be proportionally diminished. Should another war occur before it is completed, the experience of the last marks, in characters too strong to be mistaken, its inevitable consequences; and should such war occur, and find us unprepared for it, what will be our justification to the enlightened body whom we represent, for not having completed these defences? That this system should not have been adopted before the late war, can not be a cause of surprise to any one, because all might wish to avoid every expense, the necessity of which might be in any degree doubtful. But with the experience of that war before us, it is thought there is no cause of hesitation. Will the completion of these works, and the augmentation of our navy to the point contemplated by law, require the imposition of onerous burdens on our fellow-citizens, such as they can not or will not bear? Have such, or any burdens been imposed, to advance the system to its present state? It is known that no burdens whatever have been imposed; on the contrary, that all the direct or internal taxes have been long repealed, and none paid but those which are indirect and voluntary, such as are imposed on articles imported from foreign countries, most of which are luxuries, and on the vessels employed in the transportation-taxes which some of our most enlightened citizens think ought to be imposed on many of the articles, for the encouragement of our manufactures, even if the revenue derived from them could be dispensed with. It is known also, that in all other respects our condition as a nation is in the highest degree prosperous and flourishing; nearly half the debt incurred in the late war having already been discharged, and considerable progress having also been made in the completion of this system of defence, and in the construction of other works of great extent and utility, by the revenue derived from these sources and from the sale of the public lands. I may add, also, that a very generous provision has been made from the same sources, for the surviving officers and soldiers of our revolutionary army. These important facts show that this system has been so far executed, and may be completed without any real inconvenience to the public. Were it, however, otherwise, I have full confidence that any burdens which might be found necessary for the completion of this system, in both its branches, within the term contemplated, or much sooner, should any emergency require it, would be called for rather than complained of by our fellow-citizens.

From these views, applicable to the very important subject of our de

fences generally, as well as to the work at Dauphin island, I think it my duty to recommend to Congress an appropriation for the latter. I consider the withholding it, at the last session, as the expression only of a doubt by Congress of the propriety of the position, and not as a definitive opinion. Supposing that that question would be decided at the present session, I caused the position, and such parts of the coast as are particularly connected with it, to be re-examined, that all the light on which the decision, as to the appropriation, could depend, might be fully before you. In the first survey, the report of which was that on which the works intended for the defence of New Orleans, the Mississippi, the bay of Mobile, and all the country dependent on those waters, were sanctioned by the executive, the commissioners were industriously engaged about six months. I should have communicated that very able and interesting document then, but from a doubt how far the interest of our country would justify its publication, a circumstance which I now mention, that the attention of Congress may be drawn to it.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

MAY 4, 1822.

To the House of Representatives :

HAVING duly considered the bill, entitled, " An act for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland Road," it is with deep regret, approving as I do the policy, that I am compelled to object to its passage, and to return the bill to the house of representatives, in which it originated, under a conviction that Congress do not possess the power, under the constitution, to pass such a law.

It is

A power to establish turnpikes, with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of the tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete system of internal improvement. A right to impose duties to be paid by all persons passing a certain road, and on horses and carriages, as is done by this bill, involves the right to take the land from the proprietor, on a valuation, and to pass laws for the protection of the road from injuries; and if it exist as to one road, it exists as to any other, and to as many roads as Congress may think proper to establish. A right to legislate for one of these purposes is a right to legislate for the others. a complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes of internal improvement, and not merely the right of applying money, under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations; under which power, with the consent of the states through which this road passes, the work was originally commenced, and has been so far executed. I am of opinion that Congress do not possess this power-that the states, individually, can not grant it; for although they may assent to the appropriation of money within their limits for such purposes, they can grant no power of jurisdiction or sovereignty by special compacts with the United States. This power can be granted only by an amendment to the constitution, and in the mode prescribed by it.

If the power exist, it must be either because it has been specifically granted to the United States, or that it is incidental to some power which

has been specifically granted. If we examine the specific grants of power, we do not find it among them; nor is it incidental to any power which has been specifically granted.

It has never been contended that the power was specifically granted. It is claimed only as being incidental to some one or more of the powers which are specifically granted. The following are the powers from which it is said to be derived :

1st. From the right to establish postoffices and postroads. 2d. From the right to declare war. 3d. To regulate commerce. 4th. To pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare. 5th. From the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execu tion all the powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof. 6th, and lastly. From the power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States.

According to my judgment, it can not be derived from either of those powers, nor from all of them united, and in consequence it does not exist. Having stated my objections to the bill, I should now cheerfully communicate at large the reasons on which they are founded, if I had time to reduce them to such form as to include them in this paper. The advanced stage of the session renders that impossible. Having, at the commencement of my service in this high trust, considered it a duty to express the opinion that the United States do not possess the power in question, and to suggest for the consideration of Congress the propriety of recommending to the states an amendment to the constitution, to vest the power in the United States, my attention has been often drawn to the subject since, in consequence whereof I have occasionally committed my sentiments to paper respecting it. The form which this exposition has assumed, is not such as I should have given it, had it been intended for Congress, nor is it concluded. Nevertheless, as it contains my views on this subject, being one which I deem of very high importance, and which, in many of its bearings, has now become peculiarly urgent, I will communicate it to Congress, if in my power, in the course of the day, or certainly on Monday next.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

MAY 4, 1822.

To the House of Representatives :

I TRANSMIT the paper, alluded to in the message of this day, on the subject of internal improvements.

Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements. It may be presumed that the propositions relating to internal improvements, by roads and canals, which has been several times before Congress, will be taken into consideration again; either for the purpose of recommending to the states the adoption of an amendment to the constitution, to vest the necessary power in the general government, or to carry the system into effect, on the principle that the power has already

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