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may be worth more than its value,' or thus, 'Its value may be more than its worth,' because it has or may have expectations and contingencies besides its value. Now this, as the very words show, is a mistake. Everybody who knows any thing of compensation cases knows that everything, present, future, absolute, or contingent, is taken into account in putting a value on land, or finding out what it is worth. It is an 'improving neighbourhood,' or it is 'building land,' or it has 'brick earth,' or chalk, or stone, or some other actual or possible advantage, for which the takers of the land have to pay handsomely. If it is said it may be an advantage the owner prizes and no one else, and it is hard to take it from him, I say the legislature does not acknowledge such fancies. Many a man might be unwilling to sell at any price land which had been in his family for ages, but he must do so. In short, the legislature have laid down a general rule, that all the land to be taken may be taken at a fair market value, with an addition for compulsory sale.

"The next objection is, that great mischief might be done by severing parts of properties, and the case was put of a factory separated from a house, and enormous' and 'ruinous' loss ensuing. To this there are two answers; one was given by one of your lordships, viz., Compensation will be made, the owner will be no loser; the parts will not remain separate on his hands, but if he insists on a communication they may be bought and paid for by a sum which compensates. The other answer is, the thing will never be done; because it is never profitable for takers of land to take under compulsory power more than they can help. It will never be done therefore where the property is of great value, unless indeed the cost of making the communication is enormous, and then all the alarming consequences supposed to exist, if the Act is construed as the defendants construe it, will really ensue if construed as the plaintiff construes it, with this difference, that the takers of land will be subject to the enormous and ruinous loss, without the option of being compensated.

"The next objection is this. It is said, if section 94 includes land in a town or built on, that railway companies and other persons taking land would be buying vast quantities of houses and land. There really is no pretence for this. First, The quantity of land that may be held is invariably limited. Second, Superfluous land must be sold, section 127. Third, If the preceding difficulties were got over, the purchasing and holding of land not for the purposes of the undertaking would be ultra vires, and a breach of trust, and might be set aside at the cost (I should think) of the directors. Fourth, Supposing such a speculation possible, in point of law, and that the promoters' funds could be spared for such a purpose, it never would take place. It never would be profitable. As I have before observed, promoters of undertakings acquiring land under the compulsory powers of this Act, always pay more than the market price, and properly so; and I repeat that a committee of your lordships' house recommended that fifty per cent. should be added to such a sum as would be a fair price to a willing seller. I confidently ask if ever it was heard of that

a railway company bought land to sell again, or to hold as a profitable speculation unconnected with the railway? In the face of these difficulties it is said the defendants' construction might tend to make railway companies proprietors in towns for purposes foreign to that of their creation. I ask whether it is right to test, not a principle but a rule of practice, as this section is, by putting an extreme case, theoretically possible but practically impossible? The rule is ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt leges adaptantur.' Which mischief is the more likely to happen, and the more necessary to be guarded against, the unlawful wasteful purchase of land by railway companies in the face of the difficulties I have pointed out, or the exactions of a 'rapacious or capricious proprietor?'

"Lastly, the argument is used, that this being the defendants' statute, must be construed most strongly against them. Rules of this sort for construing documents are very often mere invitations for a superficial examination and unjust conclusion. But there is scarcely a pretence for applying such a rule to a general Act, a part of the general law of the land. Further, I see no room for its application, for I see no matter of doubt.

"In the result it seems to me, and I submit to your lordships, that grammar and the ordinary rules of construction, good sense and convenience, are alike on the side of the defendants, and that to decide this case for the plaintiff will be contrary to the ordinary rules of construction; the grammatical and natural meaning of the words1 will leave companies exposed to unreasonable and extortionate demands,' at the pleasure of any 'capricious or rapacious proprietor;' and in this particular case will condemn the defendants to an operation as wasteful and idle as digging a hole for no purpose but to fill it up again." Crompton J. said :

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"It seems to be very probable that the legislature did not in either of these sections intend to meddle with the very valuable property in towns, and I certainly cannot see my way, with any distinctness, to the conclusion that the legislature have sufficiently expressed their intention to give to the promoters of companies the power of taking compulsorily land in towns under the circumstances in question, and I accordingly answer your lordships' question in the affirmative.'

So Williams J. retained his former opinion, and answered the question in the affirmative, and Wightman J. concurred with him. From these three learned persons, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Lord Chief Baron entirely differed; and Pollock C.B. delivered himself of certain remarks, which cannot fail to arrest attention. He says:

"The ground upon which the latter view is sustained, is chiefly that the rules of grammatical construction require such an interpretation to

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be put on the act of parliament. Grammar may, no doubt, sometimes render assistance to law by helping to the construction, and thereby to the meaning of a sentence; but grammar, with reference to a living, and therefore a variable language, is perhaps more difficult to deal with than law, and the rules of legal construction are far more certain than the rules of grammatical construction. To resort to grammar where law fails is frequently, I think, to decide ignotum per ignotius ;' and it is remarkable that on more than one occasion there has been on the bench a difference of opinion, and for each opinion the rule of grammatical meaning and construction has been relied upon. The very case before your lordships is an example with reference to the manner in which this Act is framed, not by a train of consecutive clauses, but by sets of clauses, each referring to a particular subject. In my judgment the rules of construction, whether of grammar or good sense, require 'such land' to be referred to the heading, and not to the previous section. 'Such land' being, as I should construe it, the land with reference to which the clause is introduced.

"I think what was omitted was intentionally omitted, and that the two sections refer the one to one description of land, and the other to another description of land; the first to intersected land not in a town, the second to intersected land whether in a town or not, and I think this is the most reasonable construction, taking both grammar and good sense into consideration.

"It must on all hands be admitted that, both in writing and speaking, the antecedent really referred to is often to be made out by the good sense of the hearer or reader, rather than by the position of a word in the sentence; frequently the actual last antecedent would make nonsense; and it seems conceded you must then go back to some other antecedent, and a curious question may be raised as to the degree of absurdity and injustice which may be tolerated rather than. retire to an earlier antecedent.

"The judicial exposition of any document ought to be the reasonable one, and not emphatically the grammatical one; here, however, I think, grammar and good sense do not differ, and I am of opinion that the operation of the 94th section of 8 and 9 Vict., c. 18, is not confined to lands not situate in a town or not built upon."

We do not readily follow the Chief Baron's preference for rules of legal construction to those of grammar; with certain recognised exceptions, the legal construction of documents must be the grammatical construction. Law and grammar cannot here be independent of each other. It is true, when an ordinary grammatical construction of the language in a document would be insensible or nonsensical, the law, through its officers, endeavours to attach some probable signification to it. But, be it observed, the grammarian does the like. Take, for example, almost any

page in Sir A. Alison's writings, and the chances are, that the reader will have to neglect the grammatical construction or nonconstruction of several sentences; nevertheless, he probably gets at the meaning of the author. Again, what are idioms of language generally, but ungrammatical phrases, and elliptical forms of sentences, which are interpreted by good sense, after having, probably, run an adventurous career, repudiated in their early stages by grammatical pedants stickling hard for their rules; next, peradventure, connived at by the lax for the sake of convenience, and finally accepted as repentant and useful outlaws, who, having been naturalized by the general voice, are to be forgiven and adopted. Good sense in construing acts of parliament is as much required as in interpreting Sir A. Alison's paragraphs. In each case the problem is to find out what the man who invented the sentences meant. Sometimes you find it out (or suppose you do) in one way, sometimes in another. Whatever learned judges may say, the language which Mr. Marriage has introduced to their notice is ambiguous, and, we dare to say it, fairly admits of both constructions contended for.

Under these circumstances, one mode of discovering what the egislature meant, is to consider the general policy of the statutes, and to assume that the draftsmen and parliament intended to enact that which was most expedient and to the purpose; and this necessity provokes necessarily a course of investigation, which Blackburn J. has thought it incumbent on him to describe, as " the judicature beginning to trespass on the province of the legislature." In a case of construction like this, it is obvious that one of the processes open to the judge anxious to determine the matter, was to penetrate the motives of the legislature, which had to deal with the subject before it, and for the moment to put themselves in the place of the legislature. If draftsmen will be careless, such necessities will be imposed upon judges. In so doing, and by applying ordinary grammatical and legal aids to arrive at the meaning of sect. 94, we confess, though with diffidence, we concur in the view expressed by the two chiefs, and by the Barons Bramwell and Channell.

From this case of unhappy Marriage, it is a natural transition to another relating to Divorce; and we find in the Divorce Court judgments which have excited no little discussion in the profession.' Here, again, was Williams J. of a different opinion to Bramwell B., with whom also disagreed the Judge Ordinary. In this case the judgment of the majority is sorely doubted; and, as we think the case comprehends important principles, and that justice miscarried, and the decision of the majority was in its results cruel, as well as in its law erroneous, we crave permission to draw attention to it. In one of the judgments delivered, the case is stated, which we must abbreviate slightly. It appeared that the lady was the petitioner, who applied for divorce on the ground of her husband's impotency, and other circumstances of great aggravation. The petitioner gave evidence on her own behalf, and proved the marriage and cohabitation as alleged in the petition; and, as to the non-consummation, stated that she and G. C. (the man who had married her) passed the first night after their marriage at Aylesbury; and that, when she entered the breakfast-room next morning, he exclaimed, "My poor virgin wife!"-that on two occasions afterwards he attempted to consummate the marriage, but did not succeed, and that the attempt was never repeated; that about ten months afterward she discovered what consummation should be, aud reproached him with his want of confidence in not telling her this; that he said he was not able to perform the part of a husband; that about fifteen months after the marriage he expressed a wish to consult a medical man, Dr. Crucifix (now deceased), whom she afterwards saw and conversed with; that they continued to live amicably together till the 10th October, 1838, but she found no change in his condition. That in 1838 her father and mother came on a visit to her; made a communication to her mother, which her father and mother repeated to him, whereupon he left his home, and wrote, saying that he would never meet her again; that she then left with her father and mother, and went to London; that she returned to his house and asked to be reconciled, but he refused. 'H— v. C—, 29, L. J. Matr., p. 81.

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