mean Lincoln's-cling to the voluntary principle, is to us marvellous and portentous-a sign of timidity, it points to coming change. The "voluntary" principle has indeed, in the report recently circulated, been most scrupulously and puritanically carried out--procul, procul este profani! Away from the precincts of our Inn all ye who prattle of the science of law-who would disturb the pleasant dolce far niente of our students!

The report alluded to, therefore, cautiously suggests that the examinations of the students upon the subjects of the several courses of lectures shall be "voluntary;" and in place of a compulsory examination before a call to the bar, it proposes that no student shall be eligible to be called to the bar "who shall not have attended, during one whole year, the lectures and private classes of two of the readers; or have been a pupil during one whole year in the chambers of some barrister, or of some certificated special pleader, conveyancer, or draftsman in equity, or have satisfactorily passed a public examination."

We are well aware that a majority of the masters of the bench at either Temple-and we think also at Gray's Innhave tendencies more liberal than their congeners of the fourth society. Yet, through the obstinacy of the latter, and concession by the former, we are apprehensive lest the machinery of legal education, which has been in motion, and productive of appreciable results during the last eight years, should come suddenly and prematurely to a stand-still. Nothing, we may venture to affirm, can arrest the decadence of the English bar, unless it be the establishment of a compulsory competitive examination for the degree of barrister, coupled with a more strict surveillance, on the part of the constituted authorities of the Inns, over the members in statu pupillari.

That the average amount of professional knowledge possessed by members of the bar might, before many years have elapsed, very materially be raised, is, we think, demonstrable. At the Universities of Cambridge and London, for example, are now operative systems of legal education, which, though defective and unsatisfactory when separately viewed, might, without much

difficulty, be made ancillary towards effecting the object indicated. By a mere interchange amongst the professors at these Universities and at the Inns of Court, of the programmes for lectures and examinations, much of what we advocate could be accomplished, and the rest might be achieved by re-moulding the educational course at either of the Universities with special reference to the curriculum established at the Inns of Court. If (we put this hypothetically, and for argument's sake only) we are to give up as impracticable the idea of a Law University, we might very tolerably content ourselves with ensuring more combined action amongst institutions actually existing, and rest not wholly unsatisfied in the belief, that thereby the status of the bar would most essentially be raised.

To the author of the volume before us-a perusal of which has led to the foregoing train of thought-we would put on record our thanks, for having, in a judicious and painstaking manner, exhibited, interspersed with many original remarks, the elaborate schemes of reading which have from time to time, by divers distinguished men, been propounded for the legal student. From each of these, without adopting any one in its integrity, something useful may be culled. Common sense, however, tells us that one and the same course of study, however admirably and laboriously devised, cannot be suited alike for all capacities, or for minds of different degrees of culture. And an error, into which, also, we conceive that the propounders of such schemes have fallen, is, that they have made them too comprehensive and too vast; through forgetfulness, may be, that much of polite literature has usually become familiar to those for whom they write, before entering upon technical reading for the bar.

It is, then, to the radical defects inherent in our existing system of legal education, that we would in part attribute the gradual decline of the bar in this country.

Of course, as the standard of professional knowledge becomes lower, so may we expect to find that the moral susceptibilities

In support of this remark we would refer to Part II. chap iv. of Mr. Smith's volume, in which various lists of books are specified for perusal by the law student.

will become blunted or more dull, and that the conception of what the duties are which devolve upon the advocate, will become more vulgar, and be less clearly defined. Throughout Mr. Warren's excellent work on law studies, of which we gladly observe that a new edition is announced, a very high tone has been maintained in regard to professional responsibilities, and the proper mode of meeting and discharging them. Mr. Smith also dilates upon this subject con amore, and in a manner wholly unexceptional; at p. 147, he proposes for discussion these questions "What are the limits within which an advocate's support of his client is to be held ?" and "How is a barrister to reconcile a full discharge of his duty to his client with a firm adherence to his duty as a man-that of being in all cases truthful and fair ?" These are questions difficult indeed of solution, but in regard to which our author "ventures to present the following theory," which we offer to the perusal of our readers :

"The advocate is to do for the person whom he represents all which that person could rightly do for himself, were he disencumbered of the excitement and confusion occasioned by his interest in the trial, and were he furnished with the ability, learning, and experience which his counsel should bring to the support of his cause. Therefore the advocate may and ought to see to it, that, as far as his powers allow, the whole strength of his client's case is brought out; that it is arranged in such order, stated with so much clearness, enforced with so much earnestness, that it will leave upon the minds of the judge and the jury the impress of its weight, well stamped, and proof against the defacing effects of antagonist reasoning. All the lesser points among the merits, or the evidence, which would escape a superficial view, must be diligently explored; all cross-lights, which one part of the case, properly understood, reflects on another, must be brought to the notice of the tribunal; incidental presumptions, which to a mind weighing probabilities should tell in support of the view urged, should be noticed, and receive the degree of enforcement which they deserve; and where these, though perhaps weak singly, become strong (like the sticks in the fable) when bound up in one fagot, the advocate should see that their strength is brought to bear united. If his client has suffered hardship, its naturę and extent should be so depicted, and its claims to sympathy so presented to the mind and imagination, that the hearers should be, if possible, affected as fully by the wrong as if they had witnessed it. If his conduct has been marked by justice, kindness, forbearance, courage, patience, or thoughtfulness, it is for his advocate to enkindle the respect which such qualities deserve. The case must be cleared of its intricacies, defended against prejudices, and, in each particular and in its connected

form, be brought home fully and forcibly to the understanding and the hearts of the tribunal.

"And while this is the positive side of the advocate's duty, there is a negative side scarcely, if at all, less important. If the argument for the opposite party be conducted with all the fairness which could reasonably be expected, it is yet likely to be tinged with natural prejudices, and grounded on partial knowledge. Against the effects of these causes of error the advocate should watch, not with the impartiality of a just judge, but with the earnestness of personal interest. Where mistaken views are put forth merely from error of judgment or imperfect information, he should carefully correct them; where they are persevered in obstinately he should strenuously contend against them. Fencing, when that is necessary, against the crafty feints and parries of arguments which would misapply correct principles or established decisions to fortify wrongdoing; and, when such artificial defences are eluded or thrust aside, striking right home with the strong blows of simple truth, the advocate should exert his best skill, constancy, aud vigour on his client's behalf.

"But, in the conduct of his own case, he should seek for it no advantages which would not belong to it in the judgment of an impartial bystander who thoroughly knew and appreciated its claims; and in resisting his opponent's he should not attempt to lessen its real merits, or to attach to it any blame or discredit which he does not really believe that it deserves. So, in the treatment of witnesses, while unsparing in the pursuit and detection of fraud and malevolence to the utmost of his power, and severe in its exposure, he should be so far from attempting to confuse or intimidate a blundering witness, who appears to be intending honestly, that he should rather assist him to recover his disordered faculties, and to recollect more clearly what he had forgotten. And in bringing out the evidence on his own side, he should not conceal or withdraw from disclosure facts which would naturally and properly accompany those which he elicits. Throughout he should hold it to be his duty to assist rather than retard the development of the truth."

The above extract presents a very fair specimen of Mr. Smith's style and method of disquisition; his remarks, as above quoted, appear to us discriminating and just. Sure, at all events, we are, that no sentiment is expressed in this volume which could be alien to a really elevated and lofty spirit-nothing is to be found there akin to the counsels of merely worldly wisdom, whose promptings too often are toward "winding and crooked courses," as of the serpent, "which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet."1

It still remains for us to exhibit—and this we shall do in a few

Lord Bacon's "Essay on Truth," quoted by Mr. Smith, at p. 153 of his volume.

words-the plan of Mr. Smith's volume. It "originated," as he tells us in the preface, "with the preparation of two papers read some time since before the Juridical Society;" the design of the writer "being to give, within a moderate compass, an account of what has hitherto been done for the education of the Bar; and, at the same time, to arrange, in a form available for students, selected opinions and plans of some among their more eminent predecessors, together with information which may serve to connect these with the altered circumstances of the present day, and discussions of a few of the principal questions relating to professional instruction and practice."

In carrying out this plan, our author gives a sketch, epitomized principally from Dugdale, of the early history of the Inns of court, the legal exercises of the students, and regulations affecting them; the mode of admission to the bar; the nature and dignity of the office of reader; the powers and privileges of the benchers. In the Second Part of his work, Mr. Smith sets forth various methods of study, and of self-education, which have been pursued by distinguished lawyers; and in Part III. he speaks of the modern system of legal education, specifying the various efforts which have been made from time to time for rendering it more efficacious, more complete, and perfect.

What we have above indicated as the contents of Mr. Smith's volume, has been pleasantly and ably handled by him, and we very much wish that, in lieu of merely proffering his views for acceptance amongst those who may be minded to examine them, he were actively and officially engaged in developing, exemplifying, and enforcing them.