would have conveyed more useful information, though probably at the expense of considerably more expansion, than has been allotted to it in the work as it stands. Probably much of the treatise would be improved, for the practical man's purposes, by greater development, by sharply defining a principle, and then exhibiting it ever recurring one and the same, through various concatenations of facts. The easier mode, of bringing into juxtaposition or sequence a family of decisions, stating the results in each case, and leaving the reader to eviscerate for himself the common principle that dominates the whole, is probably not so useful a plan, or so well adapted for the purposes of most minds. It is not meant to say, much less to insinuate, that this mode of treatment is the rule; on the contrary, in very many parts of this large and pregnant book, there has evidently been in guidance for a time the mode we have adverted to; we only say that, in the case adverted to, it is to be regretted more development was not applied. While on this subject, it may be useful to our readers if we mention, that the rules of the civil law respecting water, may be very conveniently consulted in Mackeldy's Compendium of Modern Civil Law1-a work not cited, by the way, by Mr. Addison, who here, and throughout his work, appears to have acted on the principle of seeking no aid, either by way of illustration or comparison, or for the sake of elucidating the history of our law of torts, from the civil law, quod mirum.

Let us now lay before the reader some examples of the mode in which the author buckles to his work. The first is one in relation to a not unimportant question. We find, early in the book, the right of support from the subsoil to the surface spoken of; then comes a heading of "infringements of the natural right to support;" but then, farther on, there is another heading of— "When an easement of support from the adjoining land of the grantor passes as accessorial to a grant of land or of a tenement.” Again he speaks of the right of support, and once more he does the same. But, again, he speaks of "the easement of support 'Mackeld. Kauffman's Translat. S. 286; note S. 315. 2 Addis. Torts, pp. 9, 11, 32, 36, 37, 45, 35.

it

being gained by twenty years' uninterrupted user," &c.; but in fact it seems now to be well settled, "that the right of one man's land to support from the adjoining, is not an easement, or in the nature of an easement at all, but a natural right, like the right to the flow of the water in a natural river." The right to support for one building from an adjoining building, it will be borne in mind, is not the same thing; it is certainly not a natural right; may arise in different ways,2 but not, apparently, from the fact of standing twenty years, as Mr. Addison seems to intimate; for he not only fails to mark clearly that support is not an easement, but a right; he further appears to have been incautious in stating the law respecting the right of support for one house from the adjacent one. It is extremely difficult to see how the circumstance of a house having stood for twenty years makes any difference, or creates any right, where the houses are supposed to have been built by different adjoining owners, each with its own separate and independent wall. For, suppose one of them, upwards of twenty years ago, got out of the perpendicular, and leaned upon, and was in fact supported by the others, so that if the latter were moved the other would fall-then what is the right? Not a right by prescription, from the nature of the case, nor a right derived under the prescription act of William IV.3 It does not appear why Mr. Addison has not chosen to be guided by the decision of Solomon v. The Vintners' Company, and the case below cited. As he cites both of them for other purposes, we must suppose it was an oversight that caused him not to state in his work the valuable matter above extracted from them.

In speaking of easements and customary rights, and enforcing the rule, that all claims, in respect of them, should be made with some limitation and restriction or they will not be valid, he seems to have pursued the plan of aggregating cases one after the other, without stopping to mention the principle which governs them

1 Solomon v. Vintners' Co., 5 Jur. N.S., 1178. The North Eastern Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 6 Jur. N.S., 819. Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 E. & B. 123. See Allaway v. Wagstaffe, 29 L. J. Ex. 51.

2 See cases cited per Cur. 5 Jur. N.S., 1178.

3 Solomon v: Vintners' Comp., and Rowbotham v. Wilson, vide L. M. & R., vol. viii. p. 384 (Feb. 1860), ubi supra.

all.(It is obvious, however, that by substituting the details of an

instance for the statement of a principle, you do not teach the law, To exemplify. The case given in Mr. Addison's text is that of a claim alleged to be immemorial and prescriptive, put forward by A, to the effect that he had a right to dig and carry away all the clay in B's land, if he (A) so pleased; and that, we are told, could not be allowed, "for it would, as claimed, enable the defendant to take all the clay, in other words, to take from the plaintiff the whole close." But there is no statement of the ultimate principle which governs the case, and which is, that the effect of such a claim would be to prescribe for title to realty, which is contrary to a fundamental proposition of the old law.1

Touching on the common law as relates to bathing in the sea, Mr. Addison lays down the usual doctrine-dixit solennia verba; but it seems hard to leave his readers with the subject incomplete, by refusing to refer them to the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1858, incorporating the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847.

On the subject of Licences, around which there clings so much curious law, we venture to think that most readers will be of opinion, either that more or nothing ought to have been said in this work. The topics relating to it seem, as regards some of them, to have been touched upon, but not exhausted. Some additional cases to those cited in the work will be found below, and will lead onwards to various other decisions.2

3

As to the head of ways of necessity, and indeed of rights of way generally, we have them also touched upon on various occasions: still there is certainly a great deal more extant about ways of necessity, almost all of it turning on or involving questions of Tort, than is here stated. Then, if it was within the plan of the work to discuss the liabilities of trustees and commis

'See Wilkinson v. Proud, 11 M. & W. 33. This case, however, as well as Clayton v. Corby, have been much shaken, if not overruled, in a late case in the Excheq. Chamb.

2 Wood v. Manley, 11 A. & E. 4. Bringloe v. Morice, 1 Mod. 210. Sandys v Hodgson, 10 A. & E. 472. Coleman v. Foster, 1 H. & N. 37.

8 Pp. 31, 57, 554, 725.

See Denne v. Light, 26 L. J. Chanc. 459.

2

sioners of public roads for injuries suffered in the use of them, why omit the liability of surveyors of county bridges?1 There are, it may not be amiss to mention, various other kinds of rights of way, and other points on the subject, not mentioned by our author, but which have at least as good a title to a place in his work as many of those which are there. In fact, some very material parts of it are wanting. Why, for instance, does he not explain fully the material operation of unity of ownership ? 3 Now, this is not asking too much, because, judging from the modus operandi in other cases, the author's ostensible purpose is to state the whole law of ways so far as it can possibly be connected with the law of tort, just as much as his purpose is to state the whole law of water-courses, &c.

The head of nuisances must necessarily be a highly important one in all treatises on Torts; it will at present, however, be enough to say on this matter, that it appears to be doubtful whether the book might not be improved by some additions in these parts of it, particularly as regards continuing nuisances and noisy nuisances. This again is a subject on which it is always most satisfactory to have recourse to a principle.

5

4

Now, in general, the principle which gives the ratio decidendi on these matters of nuisance, is the duty of the parties, or rather the duty of one to the other; when that is ascertained, the question is put into a fairer way for liquidation. Of course, duty can not mean, in law or in a declaration, any thing different from that which arises out of a legal obligation; it must have equivalent meaning with legal liability, or none. In case of a trial the question always is-was the defendant bound in law to do that which

1 P. 725. See M'Kinnon v. Penson, 8 Ex. 319.

2 See 4 Bing. N. C. 799. See also 12 Q. B. 515; 26 L. J. Ex. 258; 21 L. J. Q. B. 406; 25 L. J. Chanc. 257.—Civil Law, Mackeld. s. 313 and note.

3 See Pheysey v. Vicary, 16 M. & W. 484 ; also 6 Mod. 4; 14 Vin. Abr. 117; 11 Idem, 449; 2 C. M. & R. 34; Cro. Jac. 170, 189; Parker v. Welsted, 1 Sid. 39, 111.

* See pp. 100, 104, 76, 105, 106. Add the cases 7 Q. B. 661. Salk. 459, 5 M. & W. 437.

Mumford v. Oxford, Worcester &c., Railway Co., 25 L. J. Ex. 265. Hegingbotham v. The Eastern and Continental, &c., P. Comp., 8 C. B. 337. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stra. 704.

the declaration charges him with having omitted to do, or vice versa? And the court must be put in a position to hold that, in every state of things consistent with the facts stated in the declaration, the defendant was bound to do (or the converse as the case may be) that which the plaintiff complains of his having omitted. This is not merely private duty that is here spoken of; it may be a duty of a public nature, in which case the plaintiff, to succeed, must show a breach of public duty as well as a special injury to himself. This is another instance also in which we regret that it did not enter into Mr. Addison's conception of his undertaking, to refer more to principle. It would have rendered the work more agreeable in perusal, and more attractive to the student of law, and certainly have promoted Mr. Addison's avowed object, in writing a work on jurisprudence adapted for the purposes of others than those who are accustomed to have their minds burthened with technical legal learning which is now obsolete," or their judgments perplexed with "contradictory and conflicting decisions." Further, we are not sure that the subject has not been left somewhat imperfect, by having little or no mention of the effect of transfer of the ownership in a nuisance from one person to another. Does the original owner, after transferring his possession and control to another, remain liable to those who may, subsequently to the transfer, become injured by the nuisance? or does he so remain liable, after parting with the control, without default of his? ex. gra. Does the owner of a ship sunk entirely, without any fault on his part, in the fairway of a river, so as to be a nuisance to vessels passing, remain responsible ?1 or is he to remove it, though the expense of removal be more than the value of the ship, and would have the effect of throwing on him a special and additional share in the consequence of a public misfortune, with which he had no particular concern, except that it arose out of a private disaster which he had innocently suffered ?2 There are the cases,

1 See Brown v. Mallett, 5 C. B. 618.

2 See R. v. Watts, 2 Esp. N. P. 675, and 5 C. B. 618, 619.

The case of Card v. Case, 5 C. B. 622, is cited in the work, p. 111, in respect to the law of keeping ferocious animals. Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Exch. 697, may be added on that subject.