at the outset mere customs and usages; but to suppose that a people so far advanced in the arts of peace, in the practice of commerce, and in the administration of mercantile law, should be contented with fleeting, shadowy customs, nor attempt to reduce them to the system of a written code, is contrary to what we know of all legislation. As the arguments against the authenticity of these fragments rest entirely on assumption and on hypothesis, why may not equal credence be given to the opposite view? And as those who support that view have at all events something material to show, they may say, in pari causa melior est conditio possidentis. But then we come to the second query, viz.; "When were they reduced to writing?" M. Pastoret would assign a very early period to that fact, one prior to the Homeric era, and contemporaneous with the Trojan war. A few dates, however, rudely destroy that theory, for the Rhodian naval supremacy was not asserted till after the death of Alexander, having risen upon the ruins of the Athenian navy; nor was it till the naval glories of Phoenicia, of Crete, of Carthage, of Athens had passed away, that the Rhodian people reached that pitch of greatness to which Strabo testifies, when the empire of the sea, gained by the peaceful efforts of their merchants, had compelled them, as it were, to provide a system of legal rules, by which the vast interests of their merchants might be protected. If then, as we may fairly presume, these laws were reduced to writing, the period we should fix on for that effort at legislation, would be about 300 years before the birth of Christ.

The next question of interest in an inquiry into the authenticity and value of these laws, is this:-"At what period were these Rhodian laws adopted in the Roman empire?" If we are to accept the Greek preface as authentic, and believe what we there have handed down to us, it would appear that in Tiberius's reign, difficulties having arisen between the sailors, the masters of vessels, and merchants, in the province of which Nero was governor, he proposed to the Emperor to send commissaries to Rhodes, to collect their laws on the subject of maritime commerce; that the Emperor, with the consent of the senate, gave his sanction to the

proposal, and that the consul Antonius was charged with the execution of this new code. I will not go into the question of the authenticity of this preface, which has been impugned by Bynkershoek and Pastoret; but one fact which they rely upon in support of their views, that there was no consul of that name under Tiberius, is not a very strong one, for there was an Antonius acting in that capacity in Claudius's reign, who might have been consul suffectus in that of Tiberius. But, without appealing to this preface, we have a formal statement in one of the most ancient manuscripts of these laws, that they were sanctioned successively by Tiberius, Vespasian, Trajan, Adrian, Antonia, Pertinax, and Septimus Severus; and for a collateral proof of their early reception into the courts of law administered by Roman officers, we may appeal to the 9th law of the digest De Jactu, where the imperial confirmation of them is expressly mentioned by an emperor (whether Augustus or Marcus Antoninus), reigning prior to Justinian.

The title of the Rhodian laws, concerning which this controversy has arisen, is De Lege Rhodiade Jactu, and the rules expressed therein relate principally to the subject of contribution in the case of jettison, the general principle being, that all who had goods shipped on board the wrecked vessel, should contribute rateably to make up the actual loss sustained, provided the merchandise on board was destroyed in consequence of the imminent danger of wreck. If, however, the goods were not lost, though the ship was damaged in her hull or rigging, or if the goods were recovered again after being thrown overboard, there could be no claim for contribution. Where it happened that sundry merchants had freighted a vessel with goods, on board of which were several passengers also, in the event of a compulsory jettison owing to tempestuous weather, all who were in any ways interested in the event were bound to contribute, on the principle that qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus, and not only such persons, but the owner of the vessel also, for by the jettison his ship was saved. To recover this compensation, the owners of the goods so lost were allowed to proceed against the captain or

master of the ship, by what was called an actio ex locato; whilst he, on the other hand, could indemnify himself for any legal damage thus sustained by an actio ex conducto, against those owners or passengers whose goods were saved. But, in addition to these regulations de jactu, a right of action was given to the passengers against the master or captain, for rashness and negligence in navigating a river without a pilot, in the event of any accident from wind or weather. One curious case is given in the Digest:-A hires a vessel to transport his wife from one port to another; on the voyage she is confined; can any extra price be demanded for the child's passage? Ulpian says, certainly not; for, 1st, de minimis non curat lex; and, 2nd, the new-comer cannot want any of those things which are prepared for the passengers use. Such are the doctrines on the subject of maritime commerce, which have survived to our day as part of the codified system of the Roman law; small indeed and, to use Mr. J. Story's words, compressed within a very narrow compass. But the reason why I venture to consider it worth while thus to refer to their principles, and comment on their character, is, because I think they show that more ancient nations than one were impressed with the value of rules of law in relation to commercial transactions, and thus paid that just and voluntary homage to commercial enterprise which has been continued down through all time. Nor does that homage, thus paid by the Roman lawyers to commerce, stop with this brief fragment of the Rhodian code; other titles there are in the Pandects full of interest to the modern lawyer and merchant; such as those which treat of the responsibility of the owners and masters (exercitores) of ships, for the safe keeping and delivery of goods shipped on freight, for the contracts of the master in respect of the employment, repairs, and concerns of the ship, and for the acts and defaults of the agents and mariners of the ship, those that treat of bottomry and maritime, and those that treat of shipwreck. Must not, therefore, every commercial lawyer agree with the learned American author to whom I have above referred, when he pays a willing tribute to the practical value of the Roman law even in these days; containing, as it does,

the elements of our own law on the subject, expressed with excellent sense, and illustrated by apt examples? Brief, indeed, as the texts of the civil law are, all maritime nations have done homage to them, by adopting them as the nucleus around which to gather their own especial commercial regulations.

To conclude: from what I have said in this lecture, it may be deduced that the influence of Greek legal institutions, however circumscribed as compared with the world-wide fame and world-wide extent of the Roman laws, has still been felt in after times; and the innumerable colonies which spread along the basin of the Mediterranean, have left their traces in cities which may still, like Marseilles, boast of great descent, carrying with them that spirit of commercial enterprise and love for commercial law by which their parent state was so distinguished. But when the peaceful conquests of Greek merchants and Greek colonists were rudely interrupted by the violence of Roman armies, and the destiny of the then combined European world hung upon the victories of Rome, commerce for a while received a shock from which it did not easily recover. In time, however, a better prospect opened upon the world; and Rome (which, in the violence of thẻ strife for universal supremacy, had turned with disdain from the arts of peace), when the victory was won, and the empire of the world was achieved, was impelled into a course which resulted in some of the happiest triumphs of commerce. A new régime was inaugurated, commercial enterprise diverted the attention of its citizens from the din of arms, and commercial laws were added to its code, which have burst into matured vigour in later times.

ART. V.-LORD ST. LEONARDS' ACT TO FURTHER AMEND THE LAW OF PROPERTY.

1. The Act to further amend the Law of Property (23 § 24 Vict., c. 38), with Introductions and Practical Notes; and with further Notes on 22 & 23 Vict., c. 35. BY SYLVESTER JOSEPH HUNTER, of Trinity College, Cambridge, B.A., and of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworths, 1860. 2. Lord St. Leonards' Act to further amend, &c., with Notes, and also Supplemental Notes on 22 & 23 Vict., c. 35. BY JOHN SAVILL VAIZEY, of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-atLaw. London: Wildy & Sons, 1860.

3. The Act to further amend, &c., with Observations. Br CHARLES EDWARD JEMMETT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Stevens & Sons, 1860.

THE general tone of ordinary newspapers, at the close of the

late Session of Parliament, implied that the public were not satisfied with the results of the labours of their representatives; "worthless," "useless," and "fruitless," were the epithets commonly applied to the session. How far these reproaches were justly incurred, it is not our purpose nor our province to inquire at present; but we suspect that most of those who gave vent to these complaints, meant that the session had not brought to ripeness the particular fruit for which they longed, but that it was blasted on the branch by the rejection of the Paper Duty Repeal Bill. This rejection has given rise to much written and spoken disquisition on the place held by the House of Lords in the actual constitution of the country, on which topic also it is beside our present purpose even to indicate an opinion. What we wish to call attention to is the undoubted fact that, with few exceptions, all really effectual law reform originates in the Upper House of Parliament. The measures of this nature introduced by mem