The Ethics of Naturalism: A CriticismWilliam Blackwood, 1904 - 338 sider |
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action activity Adam Smith adaptation admit affections altruistic assertion attempt Bain benevolence Bentham Butler chap character complete consciousness course desire determine difficulty distinction doctrine duty egoism end of conduct enquiry environment ethical end evolutionism evolutionist fact feeling function George Grote give greatest happiness greatest pleasure harmony hedonistic human nature Hutcheson Ibid idea ideal implies impulses individual interests J. S. Mill kind logical look means ment mental merely method Mill Mill's mind modified moral sense motive Natural Law natural selection notion object organism philosophy pleasure and pain pleasure or pain point of view political present Principles of Ethics progress psychological Egoism psychological hedonism question rational realisation reason recognised reference regarded relation Science of Ethics seems selfish Shaftesbury social society Spencer standard sympathy teleological tend tendency theory of evolution things tion utilitarianism vidual virtue W. K. Clifford whole
Populære avsnitt
Side 64 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good, that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Side 328 - I have already urged, the practice of that which is ethically best — what we call goodness or virtue — involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless selfassertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival...
Side 26 - By the principle of self-preference, understand that propensity in human nature, by which, on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness...
Side 209 - I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.
Side 26 - I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact...
Side 18 - Here is a kind of attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms.
Side 95 - Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or, at least, not contrary to it.
Side 83 - Besides, the very idea of an interested pursuit, necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest, or happiness, consists in this, that an appetite, or affection, enjoys its object.
Side 146 - Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about ; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before.