her to set about vigorous preparations for getting her fleet into fighting order. Still there was no prospect of its being ready for many months to come. Napoleon was anxious to separate Great Britain from Austria, and sought to open distinct negotiations by addressing, under his new imperial title, a personal letter to King George. Pitt's reply ignored the Pitt declines new title, and was a refusal to negotiate apart to negotiate. from the other powers. The tone of a note from Austria was so pacific that Napoleon was balked of his intention of immediately using his Boulogne army to threaten Austria, and thus excuse himself for dropping the project of invading England-which, as he had just informed his council, he had never really intended to do. This, it has been conjectured, was the reason why, not long afterwards, he resolved to turn his West Indian expedition into a means for enabling his various fleets, including that of Spain, to unite, and after all to carry out the old plan of invasion. and Toulon In January 1805 Villeneuve and Missiessy had their orders. The latter, by combined luck and skill, escaped to sea under conditions of weather which prevented the blockading 1805. The squadron from getting any clue to his destination. Rochefort Villeneuve too slipped out of Toulon. Nelson, fleets, knowing that Sicily and the Eastern Mediterranean January. were the sphere in which the French were likely to be dangerous, directed his pursuit thither; but Villeneuve, finding that he had been sighted by a couple of Nelson's scouts, took discretion to be the better part of valour, and retired to Toulon again. It was only after this that we have the first intimation of a presumably new intention on Napoleon's part to carry out the grand combination of fleets in the West Indies, and to use it for forcing the Channel. On 30th March, Villeneuve with his fresh instructions, again slipped out of Toulon. Nelson, still judging that the area of first importance was the Eastern Mediterranean, The escape of had prepared a trap into which his adversary Villeneuve, would have sailed if the East had been his destination. But by good fortune Villeneuve picked up information which enabled him to evade Nelson's scouts and make his course March. to the westward: though he was in such haste to escape from Nelson's reach, that he barely gave himself time to pick up some Spanish battleships at Cadiz before hurrying off to the West Indies. Nor could Nelson at first discover what had become of him, and for a time the English admiral held himself bound to maintain his watch over the regions where he was entitled to expect Villeneuve; until at last he got the definite information which showed that his adversary had departed through the Straits-and at the same time other news, in the circumstances of an alarming character, of which he would have had early and timely information but for the loss of two dispatch boats. The Malta At the moment when Villeneuve was moving from Toulon, and the Russian ambassador, though not the Tsar himself, was agreeing to Pitt's terms, an expedition was sailing expedition. from Portsmouth, carrying six thousand troops to Malta, with a view to an Italian campaign, and taking with it a convoy of merchantmen. In the ordinary course, that expedition would have passed along the linked line of blockading squadrons from Brest to Cadiz, till it passed under the care of Nelson. But Villeneuve was out through the Straits. Orde, driven off from Cadiz by the unexpected approach of Villeneuve, had fallen back to join Calder, who was watching Ferrol; but though he had done his best he had failed to keep touch of Villeneuve, and no one knew where the great French fleet had gone; it was quite possible that the Malta expedition would fall into his hands. As a matter of fact, Villeneuve had made for the West Indies, but the pressing necessity was the protection of the Malta expedition from a probable very serious danger. Nelson Nelson himself was thoroughly alive to the vital importance of securing the Sicilies, and it was only when the safety of the expedition was insured, a sufficient portion of his fleet detached to command the Mediterranean, and the last doubt banished from his own mind that the West Indies were Villeneuve's objective, that he was able, with a smaller fleet than Villeneuve's, to start in pursuit. of the combination. Napoleon's plan of combination had already failed. The Brest fleet, as well as those from Rochefort and Toulon, was to have come out if it could get to sea without fight- Collapse ing a pitched battle; but it had failed to do so. Missiessy had failed to accomplish anything on his own account in the West Indies; and since Villeneuve failed to arrive in accordance with the original plan which had been foiled in January, Missiessy, not having received the fresh instructions which were on their way, acted on his first instructions, and sailed for home. By the end of May the British line of blockade, disturbed by the events of April, was again complete still in perfect readiness for a concentration upon the Channel should that be called for; and the returned Missiessy was again shut up in Rochefort. The chase Villeneuve had a month's start of Nelson; but according to his instructions he was to wait for Ganteaume from Brest before driving the British out of the West Indies. By the beginning of June it was not Ganteaume, but after Nelson who reached the West Indies. Nelson's Villeneuve, May-July fleet, combined with Cochrane's West India squadron, though smaller than that of the combined French and Spaniards, was more than Villeneuve cared to meet in a pitched battle, and the Franco-Spanish fleet started to sail home again on 10th June. Cochrane had remained undisturbed by the French at Jamaica. There Nelson left him, having formed his own conviction that the French were making for Europe, and once more started in pursuit five days behind his quarry. He judged that Villeneuve would make for the Mediterranean, whereas Villeneuve was actually making for the Bay of Biscay. Hence the pursuer did not overtake the pursued. The end of But the dispatch boat sent direct to England the chase. sighted the French, and on 8th July, Barham had warning of the course Villeneuve was taking. He had fully expected that the arrival of Nelson in the West Indies would send Villeneuve home again. His object then was to intercept the approaching fleet; and the blockade of Rochefort was raised in order to strengthen Calder off Ferrol. Calder succeeded in finding Innes's Eng. Hist.-Vol. IV. B Villeneuve, whose fleet considerably outnumbered his own. The fight was in itself successful; but Calder, not knowing what the Rochefort fleet might do, did not follow up his victory, and the French and Spaniards went to Vigo. They had not been broken up, but Napoleon's scheme of combination had gone completely to pieces. A fortnight later, while Calder was watching for the Rochefort fleet, which had seized its opportunity, slipped out, and disappeared into space, Villeneuve got into Ferrol. The combined fleet there was so large that Calder's blockade could no longer be maintained. Meanwhile Nelson reached the Mediterranean, and since it was clear that this had not been Villeneuve's objective, he made fresh arrangements for possible contingencies, left Collingwood still in command, and carried his own squadron round to join Admiral Cornwallis before Brest; the presumption being that the objective of the French fleets would be the Channel. The Channel concentration was completed in the middle of August, but was not maintained. Villeneuve from Ferrol Barham and might attempt to strike either northward or southCornwallis. ward. Cornwallis had no hesitation in reducing his own force to the lowest point which he considered necessary for defensive operations, and again dispatched Calder, with a force sufficient to paralyse an active offensive on Villeneuve's part, to watch Ferrol. The same view of the situation was taken by Barham independently, and Cornwallis received instructions to do precisely what he was doing-although severe criticism has been passed upon him by modern critics for breaking up the concentration. Subject to the security of the Channel, for which, in the view of the best judges at the time, adequate provision was made, it was imperative that the enemy should not snatch superiority in the Mediterranean; the more so because of the critical relations between Austria, Russia and Britain. As a matter of fact, Villeneuve with his thirty sail of the line was actually at the moment sailing for Cadiz. There Collingwood, who with his small squadron had fallen back on his approach, quietly renewed the blockade on 21st August, reckoning with justifiable confidence, The Mediterranean, September. that the enemy were in too demoralised a condition to be immediately dangerous. Within the next few days the political sky had so far cleared that the coalition had taken definite shape, Napoleon had abandoned the whole scheme of invasion, and the Mediterranean had once more become the vital area. Nelson was again dispatched to take the Mediterranean command with an increased fleet and a free hand. 18th October. Nelson had no doubt about his power of preventing Villeneuve from taking an effective offensive; but his extreme anxiety was to bring the enemy to battle and annihilate Villeneuve him—a very different thing from merely paralysing leaves Cadiz, him. Villeneuve had no mind to tempt fate; and Nelson had inspired him with the same sort of fear as Drake had inspired in Queen Elizabeth's days. Left to himself he would have remained in Cadiz. But the emperor had chosen to attribute the failure of his scheme of invasion to his admirals, and especially to Villeneuve, who was driven to desperation by the expectation of immediate supercession. On the night of 18th October he put to sea, for Nelson was holding off with his main fleet, with the express object of enticing him out. The intended movements of the two fleets were complicated by changing winds, and it was not till the 21st that Nelson found his adversary in the Bay of Trafalgar.1 The British were numerically inferior, but had a large supply of the three-deckers which appear to have been reckoned as equivalent to two two-deckers apiece, and there was no comparison Trafalgar, between the personnel of the two fleets. The enemy's fleet was stretched in a line heading northwards. with a north-west wind came down approximately at right angles in two lines upon the French centre, pierced it at two points, enveloped the centre and rear, and annihilated it. The victory, though won at the cost of the life of the greatest of all seamen, was absolutely and completely crushing. After Trafalgar, there was no more question of balancing British fleets against naval combinations; the united fleets of Europe could not have wrested the naval supremacy from the British. 1 See Note TRAFALGAR and diagram at end of volume. Battle of 21st October. Nelson |