Stat. § 1014, is justified in treating the instrument as an indictment
found by a competent grand jury, and is not authorized to go into evi-
dence which may show or tend to show violations of the United States
statutes in the drawing of the jurors composing the grand jury which
found the indictment. Ib.

12. By a removal such as was made in this case the constitutional rights of
the defendants were in no way taken from them. I.

1. A privilege tax upon a railroad corporation is a tax upon property.
Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Co. v. Hewes, 62.

2. Edward P. Gallup, a resident in the State of New Hampshire, acted as
the executor of the will of William P. Gallup, deceased, of the county
of Marion in the State of Indiana. He was served with notice, under
sections 8560 and 8587 of the Revised Statutes of Indiana, of an inten-
tion of the county auditor in that county to add to the list of the tax-
able personal property in his possession as executor, and was required
to appear and show cause why that should not be done. The Supreme
Court of Indiana held, against his objection, that he was at the time
that the proceeding by the auditor began, an official resident of Marion
County, and was therefore within the express terms of the statute.
Held that this was a construction or application of the statute to the
case in hand which was binding on this court. Gallup v. Schmidt, 300.
3. The method followed by the auditor in assessing the additional taxes
was, perhaps, open to criticism, but was approved by the Circuit and
Supreme Courts of the State, and presents no question over which this
court has jurisdiction. Ib.

4. There was no invalidity in the fact of additional assessments.
Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 535.

U. S.

5. The filing of the intervening petition and the final adjudication thereon
were in time. Ib.

6. That the receiver had been discharged before final proceedings were
had, is immaterial.

Ib.

7. The Santa Fé Company cannot claim that it was misled, in any way, as
to its liability for these taxes. Ib.

8. No order was necessary for retaking possession. Ib.

9. The property was sufficiently described in the decree, and it must be
assumed that the testimony warranted the description. Ib.

10. Until there was an identification of the property subject to taxation,
and a determination of the amount of taxes due, it would be inequita-
ble to charge penalties for non-payment. Ib.

11. There was no error in refusing interest prior to the decree. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16.

TRADE-MARK.

This was a controversy relating to a trade-mark for protective paint for
ship's bottoms. The court held: (1) That no valid trade-mark was
proved on the part of the Rahtjen's Company in connection with paint
sent from Germany to their agents in the United States, prior to 1873,
when they procured a patent in England for their composition; (2) That
no right to a trade-mark which includes the word "patent," and which
describes the article as patented," can arise when there has been no
patent; (3) That a symbol or label claimed as a trade-mark, so consti-
tuted or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion which is
false, will not be recognized, and no right to its exclusive use can be
maintained; (4) That of necessity when the right to manufacture be-
came public, the right to use the only word descriptive of the article
manufactured became public also; (5) That no right to the exclusive
use in the United States of the words "Rahtjen's Compositions" has
been shown. Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen's American Com-
position Co., 1.

TREATIES.

The treaty of February 26, 1871, between the United States and Italy only
requires equality of treatment, and that the same rights and privileges
be accorded to a citizen of Italy that are given to a citizen of the United
States under like circumstances, and there is nothing in the petition
tending to show such lack of equality. Storti v. Massachusetts, 138.
See EXTRADITION TREATIES.

USURY.

1. In an action upon a note given to a national bank, the maker cannot set
off, or obtain credit for, usurious interest paid in cash upon the renew-
als of such note, and others of which it was a consolidation. Haseltine
v. Central Bank (No. 2), 132.

2. In cases arising under the second clause of Rev. Stat. sec. 5198, the per-
son by whom the usurious interest has been paid can only recover the
same back in an action in the nature of an action of debt. The remedy
given by the statute is exclusive.

Ib.

WAGES.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.