cient evidence, as of unseaworthiness, or any other probable cause of loss.

SECTION XV.

COLLISION.

COLLISION is a peril of the sea which may deserve especial notice. In the chapter on Shipping, it has been stated, that, where a collision is caused by the fault of one of the ships, the ship in fault sustains the whole loss; that is, it must bear its own loss, and must indemnify the other ship for the injury that ship sustains. It has been held that the insurers of the ship in fault are liable for the whole of this loss, because it is all caused by collision, which is a peril of the sea. But the Supreme Court of the United States have recently decided that the insurers are not held for more than the loss directly sustained by the ship they insure, that is, not for the amount that ship pays to the other ship for injury done to it.

SECTION XVI.

FIRE.

THIS peril also must come under the common rule, that the insurers will not be held unless it be caused by something extraordinary, and not belonging to the inherent qualities of the thing which takes fire.

The insurers would be held for any direct and immediate consequences of the fire; and for loss caused by the endeavor to extinguish it. It is, indeed, a general rule, that the insurers are liable for the loss or injury which is the natural, direct, and proximate effect of any peril insured against, although the loss itself may be only the effect of a preceding loss; as, if a part of the cargo was burned up, and another part was injured by water used to arrest the fire, the insurers would be liable for both parts.

SECTION XVII.

PIRACY, ROBBERY, OR THEFT.

THERE can be no piracy or robbery, without violence; but this is not necessary to constitute the crime of theft. Piracy and robbery are most usually committed by strangers to the

ship; they may, however, be committed by the crew; and the insurers are answerable for such a loss, unless it arose from the fault of the owner. Our policies now usually have the phrase assailing thieves." This excludes theft without violence, and all theft by those lawfully on board the vessel, as a part of the ship's company. If, after shipwreck, the property is stolen, the insurers are liable, and might be so if there were no insurance against theft, if this was a direct effect of the wrecking.

SECTION XVIII.

BARRATRY.

THIS word means any wrongful act of the master, officers, or crew, as any fraud, cheat, or trick done by them, or either of them, against the owner. If he directed the act, or consented to it, or by his negligence or default caused it,-whether he were actual owner, or apparent or temporary owner by hiring the vessel, it is no barratry. But it is not necessary that it should be done with an intention hostile to him. For an act otherwise barratrous would be none the less so because the committer of it supposed it would be for the advantage of the

owner.

The master being appointed by the owner, and controlled by him, many policies provide that they do not insure against bar ratry, if the insured be the owner of the ship. The purpose of this is obvious; it is to prevent an insurance of the owner against the acts of one for whom the owner ought to hold himself responsible. The effect of the clause is to limit the insurance against barratry to goods shipped by one who is not owner of the vessel.

As a general rule, the insurers are liable for the misconduct of the crew, when all usual and reasonable precautions have been taken by the owner, and his servant, the master, to prevent such misconduct.

SECTION XIX.

CAPTURE, ARREST, AND DETENTION.

THE phrase which refers to these perils is usually in these words: "Against all captures at sea, or arrests, or detentions of all

kings, princes, and people." Almost every word of this sentence has been the subject of litigation or of discussion. The provision has been held to apply not only to captures, arrests, or detentions by public enemies, by foreign belligerent powers, but to those by the very government of which the insured is himself a subject, unless the same be for a breach of the law by the insured. Then the insurers are not liable, because they never are for the consequence of an illegal act of the insured. By th "people" are understood the sovereign power of a State, whatever be its form of government. "Capture" and seizure" are equivalent; they differ from "detention" in this respect: the two former words mean a taking with intent to keep; the latter, a taking with intent to restore the property. "Arrest" is any taking possession of the property for any hostile or judicial purpose.

SECTION XX.

THE GENERAL CLAUSE.

THIS clause has a very limited operation. We have already remarked, that it is usually restricted to perils of a like kind with those already enumerated; and although this phrase har been declared to be substantial and material, it might be difficult to hold an insurer liable under this clause, when he would not have been liable under some one of the enumerated perils.

SECTION XXI.

PROHIBITED trade.

THIS is not the same with contraband trade (which belonge to war), although the words are sometimes used as if they were synonymous. It is perfectly lawful for a ship to break through a blockade if it can, or to carry arms or munitions of war to a belligerent. This would be contraband trade. And it is per fectly lawful for the State whose enemy is thus aided, to catch seize, and condemn the vessel that does this, if it can. vessel takes upon itself this risk; and it is not covered by a common policy, unless the purpose is disclosed and permitted. Prohibited trade belongs to a time of peace. It is either trade prohibited by the State to which the ship belongs,-and then it is

The

wholly illegal, and the insurers are not only not answerable under a general policy for a loss occasioned by this breach of law, but an express bargain to that effect would itself be illegal and void; or it may be trade prohibited only by a foreign State. And then it is not an illegal act in the vessel by whose sovereign it is not prohibited. The intention to incur this extra risk should be communicated; because the insurers should be enabled to take it into consideration. But in practice, our policies generally, if not universally, except expressly the risks arising from prohibited trade.

The parties may always agree to add such risks, or except such, as they choose.

SECTION XXII.

DEVIATION.

As the insurers are entitled to know, either from information given them, or from the known course of the trade, what risks they assume, it is obvious that the insured have no right to change those risks, and that, if they do, the insurers are not held to the new risk. Such a change of risk is called a deviation; it certainly discharges the insurers; and although the word originally meant in law what it means commonly, a departure from the proper course of the voyage, it now means, in the law of insurance, any departure from or change of the risks insured against. And it discharges the insurers, although it does not increase the risk, as they have a right to stand by the exact bargain they have made. There may be a deviation while the ship is in port; or where the insurance is on time, and no voyage is indicated. And a very slight deviation may suffice to discharge the underwriters.

But no deviation discharges the insurers, or, in the language of the law, no change or risk is a deviation, unless it be volun tary, that is, not if there was or seemed to be a sufficient necessity for it.

The proper course-a departure from which is a deviationis always the usual course, provided there be a usage; for a master is not bound to follow their track wherever one or two have gone before, but must be allowed his own reasonable discretion.

If there be no course so well established that every one would be expected to follow it, the master must go to his destined port in the most natural, direct, safe, and advantageous way.

An extraordinary and unnecessary protraction of a voyage would be a deviation. But the mere length of the voyage, without other evidence, would not prove this.

Liberty policies, so called, are often made. That is, the insured is expressly permitted to do certain things, which, without such permission, would constitute a deviation. And a large proportion of the cases on the subject of deviation have arisen under these policies. Most of the phrases commonly used have been construed by the courts; and generally quite strictly. A liberty to "enter" a port, or “touch” at a place, permits a ship to go in and come out, but it permits little delay, because for delay the word "stay" or "remain " is necessary.

It is certain that no permission is necessary for any change of course or risk that is made for the saving of life, or even for the purpose of helping the distressed. Always provided, however, that the change of course, or the delay, was no greater and no longer continued than this cause for it, actually and rationally considered, required. It is, however, equally well settled, that a change of course or of risk for the purpose of saving property is a deviation not justified by its cause. A delay for the purpose of towing a vessel is certainly a deviation, unless there are persons on board the vessel which is towed, and they can be saved in no other way.

Sometimes it is intended that a ship shall visit many ports, and even go backwards and forwards, at places between the port from which she sails and that at which the voyage is finally to terminate. Such purposes as this are sometimes provided for by a policy on time; and sometimes by express permission to go to and trade at certain ports.

If permission be given to enter and stop at a dozen differ ent ports, the vessel may omit any of them, or the whole, but must visit in the proper order all to which she does go. She cannot go back and forth.

The substitution of a new voyage for that agreed upon is of course a deviation, and one that can seldom or never be justi