MOORE ESCAPES. 115 cavalry, while Soult, now assembled, headed for Mansilla. At this moment Moore was closing up at Benavente, the crossroads of the routes of Lisbon to Leon, Madrid to Galicia ; and his column was just starting for Astorga. His cavalry, in parties along the Esla, protected the retreat, while he personally remained at Benavente during the 28th to close up the column, and to destroy such stores as he could not carry off. On this day Napoleon with the van reached Valderas. Early next day Moore vacated Benavente and followed towards Astorga, while his well-handled cavalry stopped the French horse from forcing the Esla, and then followed on to Baneza. He had escaped Napoleon by a bare two days. It was now a race for Corunna. Soult threw back La Romana with the Spanish auxiliaries at the Mansilla crossing of the Esla on December 30, and next day was at Leon, still hoping to turn Moore's left; while Napoleon reached Baneza, and on January 1, 1809, Astorga. Moore kept on towards Corunna; La Romana followed on awhile, and then filed off towards Orense. If it was intended as such, Moore had made a notable strategic advance on the French communications, and on being skillfully met, had effected a prompt and able retreat. On the other hand, the French had made a good bid to cut off the Anglo-Portuguese. Over snow and ice they had marched in twelve days from Madrid to Astorga, little less than two hundred miles as the crow flies, or two hundred and thirty miles along the road they had taken, with a mountain range to cross. This was almost twenty miles a day. But owing to Moore's alertness, they had lost their chance of forcing battle on a compromised enemy. The above is not the view of the French general staff usually most even-handed-in reviewing all the documents. "The operations of Sir John Moore," says Balagny, "during the period of December 11 to 23, were undertaken without 116 A MISTAKEN BELIEF. method and without art, in conditions particularly adventurous, and without assuring his liberty of manœuvre and the security of his troops. Therefore he came close to paying for his lack of foresight dearly, and owed his safety only to circumstances independent of his will." It is, perhaps, questionable whether by his operation Moore could do the Spanish cause any good, and he was risking his own army. He English Officer and Riflemen. seems to have acted from gallantry, unwilling to leave Spain without a fight, rather than to have conducted a campaign on any well-established principle which might result in any permanent gain. It cannot be said that Napoleon moved up to the Douro merely to protect his communications: he did so with the hope of cutting off Moore and possibly the Spaniards. Yet, as Moore mistakenly believed that Napoleon had left no suitable forces to protect Burgos, and that all told he had but eighty thousand men in Spain, he may have been THE AUSTRIAN SITUATION. 117 warranted in the assumption that a thrust on the French communications would be a protection to Lisbon. He scarcely understood the emperor and his methods; and his operation towards Burgos stands out in contrast to his uncertainty with regard to earlier manœuvres. Would he not have been stronger as a threat to Napoleon, if he had concentrated and remained at Benavente with his army intact? And yet the fact remains that his manœuvre transferred to Leon and Galicia a large body of French that might have accomplished more by moving down the Tagus on Lisbon. Turning over to Soult, with Ney in support, the task of following up Moore, Napoleon started the Guard towards Valladolid, and himself reached the city January 6. He here received news of the Austrian situation which demanded his speedy return to Paris. As matters stood in Germany, Spain and Portugal were but a side-show. That he ever doubted his own ability to subdue the Peninsula is improbable: his mind was not given to such doubts. Neither had he any misgivings as to its eventual conquest by his lieutenants, and with Moore eliminated, a prompt operation in force on Lisbon must, it would seem, have succeeded. On January 15, 1809, he wrote Joseph from Valladolid, "The circumstances of Europe oblige me to go and pass twenty days in Paris. If nothing opposes it, I shall be back towards the end of February. The major-general will remain ten or twelve days more, to be well assured that you have a knowledge of all affairs. . . If you think it wise, you can keep my absence secret for a fortnight, saying that I have gone to Saragossa." "The Court at Vienna is behaving very ill, but might repent. Have no disquiet, I have enough forces, even without touching my army of Spain, to go to Vienna in a month." ... The English fleet was at Vigo, and, had contrary winds prevailed, Moore might have been in bad case; but the lay of the land enabled him to retard pursuit. From Astorga to Lugo is a species of defile some eighty miles long, where a feeble rearguard could hold the one practicable road, with only here and there a chance to turn its position by climbing the rugged mountains on either hand. Soult was unable to do much to disturb Moore's retreat, and Ney, in Soult's rear, was quite neutralized. Yet Moore, though able to retire at his leisure, made unusual efforts to get to Corunna, refusing to accept battle at Astorga, but coming close to so doing at Lugo. Having no supplies provided for his retreat, and the country being poor, his troops suffered severe hardships, while many men were left behind and much of the train abandoned. The French column suffered no less. Why Moore was unwilling to defend Corunna, which had marked value for the English, is not easy to understand. It was not a strong place, but neither had the French any but field guns; the sea was open to the British to victual the town; and even at the last minute, with due precautions, the army could embark. Though not proposing to hold himself there, when, on January 11, Moore reached Corunna, he found himself compelled to turn and fight for the chance of embarking, for the fleet did not come up until the 15th. On reaching the vicinity, January 14, Soult found Moore drawn up in battle order in front of the town; he heartily attacked January 16, with some twenty thousand French against a somewhat lesser number; the English maintained the defense with their national tenacity; the battle, largely fought among the walls and hedges with which the country is filled, was drawn. Moore was killed, and Baird and Paget wounded. The English stuck to their main position, showing an obstinacy to which the French were unused, and during the night and next day completed their embarkment. In the battle, the English records show the small loss of seven hundred men; the French casualties probably added up twice that SURRENDER OF CORUNNA. 119 number; but even this is a small percentage. In the entire operation Moore lost some six thousand men and much material. The Spaniards in Galicia made scarcely a pretense of defending themselves. Corunna surrendered January 20, with two hundred guns; and a few days later Ferrol, with three hundred guns, ten war ships and several merchant vessels, was captured. La Romana finally left the Orense country and retired to Monterey, in the mountains, to reorganize. The other Spanish forces had not been idle. Encouraged by Napoleon's absence from Madrid, the Army of Andalusia advanced on the Tagus from Cuença, in the hope that the capital might be disgarnished of troops, and at the same time the Army of the South moved against Lefebvre. But, crossing at Almaraz, Lefebvre drove the latter back to Merida and beyond the Guadiana; and during this manoeuvre, Victor de |