THE RIVAL BODIES.

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Lannes, who had just arrived from Spain and been invested with command; and Nansouty's and St. Sulpice's cavalry near by in support. Out on the left, on yesterday's battlefield, was Davout personally, with Friant and St. Hilaire, and Montbrun's dragoons; and Massena was in the vicinity of Pfaffenhofen, with a party out at Au, and Oudinot on the Freising road. Thus the centre and left were now together, and the right within working distance of the centre. Opposite Davout stood Charles' right wing, Hohenzollern on the heights behind Hausen, Rosenberg near Dinzling; the 1st Corps reserve on the heights of Grub, Lichtenstein with the cuirassiers, Lindenau and Veczay, on the main road from Eggmühl to Ratisbon, with van at Egglofsheim. Charles' centre was thus pushed forward from the Laber in the direction of Hausen and Thann, while the left wing under Louis stood facing the Abens, with Bianchi on the heights in front of Biburg, Reuss on those in front of Siegenburg, Thierry near Offenstetten, and Kienmayer in reserve; Hiller's flying left wing had advanced to the river at Mainburg. Bellegarde was marching from Amberg on Neustadt, and Kollowrath was at Stadt am Hof.

As in almost all similar cases, the authorities differ much as to the exact positions and strength of the rival divisions and corps: the different bodies are mentioned in the many French and German reports and authorities as occupying certain posts at hours not always specified; and all that one can be certain about is the presence of the larger parts of each army at such places as shall explain the grand tactical manœuvres. On small charts, the purpose of which is only to indicate at a glance the general position, so as to catch the eye of and assist the reader, nothing like exactness can be arrived at. The most reliable contemporary records and the best historians vary frequently. But the strategy and grand tactics are plain.

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THE TABLES TURNED.

Charles had been outmanœuvred. Whereas at Landshut he had been concentrated opposite the weak French centre, his line was now long and in awkward groups; and his right wing, reaching out towards the Bohemian corps, was too strong for the petty force that opposed it. Should the Austrians

strive to concentrate for battle, Massena could sooner strike Hiller's flying left wing at Mainburg than the archduke fall in on his own centre and left. Napoleon proposed to follow up the success of April 19 by vigorous work on the 20th, but he was ignorant of what the enemy might be doing. At 3 A. M. Berthier wrote Lefebvre: "The emperor desires that you should let him know at once if the enemy has beaten in retreat." He did, however, believe that Charles would retire on Landshut, which was his natural line of retreat, and where large supplies were accumulated: it was a second thought which suggested to him to break through the Austrian centre. Although each leader was but half informed of the other's whereabouts, yet Napoleon's admirable manoeuvring of the 19th, on his assumptions from what he did know, had completely turned the tables. There was a gap between the Austrian right and left wings, held by a slender cordon of troops, which the French could brush away and cut the army in two, and then turning to the right and the left beat each of the severed parts in detail: Napoleon had now the precise opportunity Charles had neglected. And yet the archduke

Bavarian Light Infantry

man.

TO NULLIFY THE RETREAT.

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was a soldier of high rank, perhaps with Wellington the strongest of his contemporaries, except when the gigantic personality of Napoleon overshadowed him and robbed him of the push and purpose he really possessed. That he was but one of many in like case cannot discredit him.

The only manœuvre by which Charles could assemble his dispersed divisions before Napoleon could strike his blow was by a rapid concentric march to the rear on Landshut; and that he must not be allowed time to do this was manifest. Like Gustavus and Frederick, Napoleon was always scheming what to do under conditions which might arise: without running riot, his imagination constantly conjured up possible combinations. It has been often alleged that Napoleon thought and ordered once for all. This is not so. His plans developed rapidly, but by the usual process; and at the expense of prolixity, this process has occasionally been dwelt upon, together with the changes his ideas and plans underwent, as their study or the shifting conditions gave them a new complexion. So here was gradually developed the plan for nullifying this retreat to Landshut by advancing Massena around the enemy's left to seize his direct line of communications, as well as his rich magazines. To best accomplish this, he proposed to leave Davout with St. Hilaire and Friant to "hold the enemy in respect" near Thann and Hausen, and St. Sulpice to hold the Saal defile. This would contain the Austrian right wing, while Lannes should head Morand and Gudin with Nansouty's cuirassiers on Rohr, break through the enemy's line, seize the road to Landshut, and cut Charles and Louis apart; and Napoleon with the Bavarians and Wurtembergers should advance on Pfeffenhausen against the Austrian left.

The situation was clear to the emperor's mind. He was as yet mistaken as to the existing facts, for at 6 A. M., April 20, he wrote Massena:

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SUPERIOR FORCES.

"All the reports of this morning are that the enemy is beating in retreat with all speed. The battlefield is covered with his dead. The divisions Friant and St. Hilaire, and a Bavarian division, were the only ones engaged. I am mounting to go myself to reconnoitre the situation of things at the outposts, attack the enemy if he still occupies certain positions, and pursue him with my sword in his ribs if he retreats. I beg you on your side not to lose an instant, and to surprise him at the passage of the Isar."

That the enemy was retiring in all speed was not the case; Lefebvre at 6 A. M. notified Berthier that the enemy was still on the heights of Biburg, and that Charles was in command (which was also a mistake), and that he did not yet know what Davout was doing. "There have arrived on my route only the divisions Gudin and St. Sulpice which I have seen, and Morand's which Savary has seen," he said; and in an hour he sent word that he had heard news from Davout, but knew little about him. But although the emperor's information was scant, he was right in his deduction, from this error and the other facts, as to what it was wise to do. It is just this ability to throw aside unimportant items and to act on the essential ones which equips the able captain; and in deciding on action it made small odds whether the enemy was retiring or not. From several reconnoissances and the late clash of arms he knew that Charles was out towards Ratisbon with a large part of the Austrian army; he knew that there was another considerable Austrian force in the vicinity of Mainburg; he knew the total of the Austrian army south of the Danube, and he was justified in believing that he had a force superior to that opposite him in the Austrian centre, as well as one better concentrated. He cast aside the minor fact of the enemy's advance or retreat, and used the essential one of superior forces at the critical point. All Napoleon needed was numbers, to which he could impart momentum by his

A DELICATE SITUATION.

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extraordinary speed, and give a proper direction by his strategic insight, and he could afford to forget what the enemy was doing when the main facts ran in his favor. His confidence in his ability to do a thing was apt to get it done. We shall hereafter see this wonderful sense of perspective, this singular power of arraying and gauging facts and then promptly acting on them, weaken and bring disaster. Here it was in full force.

The 1st Bulletin states that Napoleon's main object was to destroy the corps of Louis and Hiller. "He ordered Davout to hold Hohenzollern, Rosenberg and Lichtenstein in respect, while with Morand and Gudin, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, he attacked in front the army of Louis and Hiller, and had the communications of the enemy cut by Massena through Freising."

During the night of April 19-20 the best course of action to this end became gradually clearer. It was a delicate situation, for to push his right wing too rapidly forward might simply drive Hiller on Louis, and both up to join Charles, and destroy the chances of rupturing the Austrian centre. At midnight Massena was again notified to hold his two directions, Neustadt and Landshut; at 3 A. M. Massena himself was to move via Moosburg on Landshut, while Oudinot should get into touch with the French centre; by 6.30 A. M. the matter was settled, and Massena was to move up the Isar, -"if you could go to Landshut, it would be preferable, but strive to go to Moosburg," the emperor wrote, — while he