FRENCH SURRENDER RATISBON.

193

The Austrian centre had been ruptured, and Charles with the right wing-Hohenzollern, Rosenberg, Lichtenstein - was completely cut off from the left wing, -Louis, Hiller, Kienmayer, which had been thrown back towards Landshut, whither they were rapidly moving during the night, while the French had won a central position on the Laber. This "rupture of the enemy's centre," to use the ancient strategic phrase which nine tenths of the soldiers of the world understand, is much of the same order as the manœuvre of 1815. There, the emperor strove to strike Blucher and drive him away from Wellington, thus "rupturing the enemy's centre;" here, he strove to strike Louis and Hiller and drive them away from Charles. The ancient phrase is as good as many of the short terms of the common law, and means more than most new ones that might be coined.

Charles took no hand in the manoeuvring to the south of him, but held the river near Leurndorf with half of his forces, while the other half advanced on Ratisbon, which the one French regiment surrendered at eventide. This regiment had for a full day and a half fended off Bellegarde on the farther bank, and had more than done its duty.

“One thousand men of the 65th, who had been left to guard the Ratisbon bridge, had not received an order to retire," narrates the 1st Bulletin. "Surrounded by the Austrian army, these brave men, having exhausted their cartridges, were obliged to surrender. This event grieved the emperor, who swore that in twenty-four hours Austrian blood should flow in Ratisbon to avenge this affront made to his arms."

At evening of April 20 Lichtenstein was at Wölkering, Rosenberg at Dinzling, Hohenzollern at Leurndorf and headquarters at Egglofsheim. Kollowrath was at Stadt am Hof. Bellegarde was ordered by Charles on Eichstädt, an eccentric movement for which no explanation is afforded us; it may have been an attempted threat to Ingolstadt to draw Napoleon's

VOL. III.

194

THE GRAND-TACTICAL SITUATION.

attention to his own line of retreat. As Davout had left Ratisbon, and Napoleon could get no further news from there, he sent a Bavarian officer to the Altmühl to learn what he could with reference to the enemy's troops on the Danube, and with regard to Kollowrath and Bellegarde. The Altmühl bridges were all cut or kept ready to be burned.

This battle of Abensberg well illustrates to what different effect masses may be used. Three of the Austrian corps had been contained by Davout with but half his one corps, while Napoleon with the rest of the French army fell on two other isolated corps and overwhelmed them.

The whole operation had been beautifully conceived and executed. The emperor had chosen a decisive point at which he was superior in force, on the centre, while projecting his right towards the enemy's line of retreat; and although his left was weak, the grand-tactical situation was such that if Charles drove back Davout, the latter would be approaching the main force in the French centre, which he would strengthen, while Charles would be getting farther away from his own right and left. And even if Charles pushed past Davout as far as Ingolstadt, or Bellegarde went up river too far, Napoleon still had a second line of retreat open through Freising and Augsburg on Ulm. This line he made ready to use by suitably strengthening it.

From Gera, April 20, Bernadotte wrote that he was on the march towards the Danube as ordered, but that he was "in absolute ignorance of what is being done by His Majesty's army and that of the enemy."

On April 21, at dawn, Napoleon from Rohr wrote Davout: "The day before yesterday and yesterday were another Jena." And to the King of Saxony: "The days of the 19th and 20th have been for the Austrians what the day of Jena was for the Prussian army. I shall shortly be in Vienna." He had

TO PREVENT A JUNCTION

195

advised the king to leave Dresden; he now told him he was quite safe there.

Despite loss of the battle, the archduke hoped that by maintaining himself between the Laber and the Danube, the Austrian left would be able to come down the Isar and join him. by way of Sträubing; and he now ordered in Kollowrath to his support. He might himself, by forced marches, have retired via Sträubing, and have called in the Landshut column as well as the two Bohemian corps; but Napoleon, with the advantage of shorter lines and greater speed, had no idea of permitting such a junction. He assumed that Charles must be retiring towards his left wing, and he planned that, with Oudinot in reserve, Davout was to move back on Ratisbon, cross the Danube, and drive Kollowrath and Bellegarde back into Bohemia, while he himself with Lannes, Vandamme and Wrede, and Nansouty's horse, was to pursue the Austrian left wing, which he mistakenly deemed the stronger part of the Austrian army, and Massena was to cut off its retreat. Lefebvre's part was to fall on the Austrian centre, supposed to be in full retreat. Napoleon had no idea that Charles proposed to retire through Ratisbon, or that Davout and Lefebvre were to face the bulk of the unbeaten Austrians.

To carry out this operation, from Rohr, at 5 A. M., April 21, the emperor wrote Davout: "Massena should have arrived at Landshut at three o'clock yesterday afternoon. You have nothing in front of you but a curtain of three infantry regiments. . . . I have ordered Lefebvre with Demont and Deroy, and St. Germain, to move on Langquaid. . . . In case of need, you are to sustain him. . . . This is what you have to do. Lefebvre will pursue the parks, equipments, and even Prince Charles if he takes the direction of the Isar, whether he goes to Landshut by way of Eggmühl, or to Sträubing: sustain him if necessary. When your rear is cleaned up, you will move on Ratisbon. You will attack Bellegarde and Klenau" (Kollowrath). "You will pursue them and drive them into the mountains of Bohemia. You will so act that the left bank of the

...

196

HILLER AND LOUIS.

Danube shall be purged, and that only débris can get back. I am on the way to Landshut, and as soon as I shall have done all possible harm to the enemy, I will get ahead of him at the Inn."

And although at 4.30 A. M. Lefebvre had been ordered to march with the crown prince, Deroy and Demont on Rottenburg, half an hour later he was ordered to move with Demont on Langquaid, and Deroy would sustain him. Lefebvre, with the Bavarian cavalry and St. Germain's cuirassiers, was to follow the enemy "retiring via Eggmühl or Sträubing" and attack on sight. "Pursue the enemy with your sword in his back, and before to-night announce to the emperor that you have taken from the enemy his park, his baggage, his wounded." "Assure His Majesty of the route which the main part of Prince Charles' army will have taken. Has he marched on Sträubing, on Landshut, or on Ratisbon? That is what is essential to know." Lefebvre was to communicate with Davout, who would lend a hand. But as, being satisfied that he was cut off from Landshut, Charles determined on a new line, through Ratisbon and along the left bank of the Danube, Napoleon's plan became inoperative, and Lefebvre and Davout, instead of pursuing him, had to oppose Charles all day of the 21st.

After retiring across the Laber, Hiller and Louis had kept on during the night of the 20th-21st to Landshut, in great disorder and with loss of much material abandoned on the road; the marshy plain of the Isar, full of canals and crossed by roads on causeways, as well as the little town, were glutted with the wagon trains, and passage almost stopped; and while, about 9 A. M., the Austrians were struggling across the lowland and through the town, protected by cavalry which Hiller had posted on the main roads to delay pursuit, Napoleon, riding with the French van, reached the heights of Altdorf, overlooking the river. The crown prince as a reserve

197

BATTLE OF LANDSHUT.

had remained at Rottenburg and Langquaid, but Lannes with Morand and Gudin had started at daylight on the Rottenburg road towards Landshut, and Bessières, who had arrived April 20, leading Nansouty's cuirassiers in the van, and Wrede and the Wurtembergers under Vandamme in second line, on the Pfeffenhausen road. Bessières debouched

The

from Ergolding, and Wrede's horse from Altdorf. emperor drew up batteries on the hills, and by firing along the causeways and into the town made the confusion tenfold. With Nansouty and the Bavarian horse, he ordered Bessières to clear the way for pursuit, and the Austrian cavalry line was shortly thrown back on the Isar; but until noon the Austrian foot, by dint of hearty fighting, managed to hold