404

CIUDAD RODRIGO REACHED.

Wellington followed up the French closely, forced Massena back behind the Coa, and defeating Reynier afresh at Sabugal on April 3, compelled the Army of Portugal to retire on

Ciudad Rodrigo, which was reached April 7. Here the one month's retreat ended. After a short rest, Massena fell back to Salamanca, and put his troops into cantonments. Ney had been right the mountain country Massena had chosen was untenable. Wellington reached Almeida before the French,

IN FRONT OF THE COA.

405

and invested it. In following up Massena's retreat, he had shown abundant energy, long as he had remained inactive in his Torres Vedras lines. Yet Massena had not been beaten by Wellington, but by circumstances. He had been promised reinforcements, which had not come, and the coöperation of Soult, which was delayed too long. His laurels, so ably won in the past, none the less faded.

In the Salamanca region Massena found reinforcements, reorganized his forces, and with thirty-five thousand men advanced, May 2, across the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo, to the succor of Almeida. Wellington, who had found his defensive battles so successful against the over-eager French, took up a position for the protection of his works, with thirty thousand men, on the table-land at Fuentes d'Onoro, in front of the Coa, between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. At the moment of Massena's approach he was absent, and the plan of the battle may not have been his. It was a good defensive position, covering the bridge over the Coa at Castella Bom; but it was not good in case of reverse, as the bridge might go lost, and the Coa runs through a ravine not easy to cross: he was fighting with a defile in his rear. The 5th division on the allied left was at the old fort of La Concepcion; the 6th division in the centre held the plateau of Almeida; the main force — 1st and 3d divisions—was on the plateau of Fuentes d'Onoro; the Light Division was out in the plain; a Spanish flying corps covered the right. In front of the position was the brook of Dos Casas, hard for the enemy to cross to its assault; but there was a chance for the French to turn the allied right, as indeed Massena at once perceived; and Wellington pushed out this wing as far as Nava d'Aver.

At Talavera, French discord and lack of one head had helped the English to the victory; the same thing was to occur here. On this position, on May 3, the French made a

406

MASSENA RENEWS THE ATTACK.

partial attack. Loison effected a lodgment on the plateau of Fuentes d'Onoro; but the English divisions and guns behind the village held him at bay, and finally drove him back across the brook. During the 4th Massena steadied his troops, reconnoitred, and making up his mind that the allied right was the only place he could attack, during the night of May 4-5 he moved over to the right Loison's corps, a division of Junot's, and Montbrun's cavalry, seventeen thousand men in all. This was the movement he should have undertaken on the 3d. On the 5th Massena renewed the attack, sending Loison and part of Junot around the allied right, while attacking the centre with Erlon's corps and containing the left at La Concepcion with Reynier. With his troops in good heart Loison took Poco Valho, and aided by Montbrun's cavalry, drove in the allied right. The French success was notable; Wellington seemed on the point of being turned out of his position, although the French onset was gallantly met by Craufurd advancing across the open ground. Had the French been able to hold the pace, they would have won; but by some conflict between Montbrun's and Bessières' cavalry, Wellington gained time to steady his right, bring up his reserves, and the attack could not be renewed. Despite the fine bearing of their new commander, the men of the 6th Corps missed Ney; and the allies again fought their defensive battle nobly. By clever handling Wellington withdrew his advanced right from the plain and took up a new position along a ridge west from Fuentes d'Onoro, which he stubbornly held, so as to cover the approaches to Almeida, and his main bridge at Castella Bom, for the Spanish corps had retired from the field. Loison's further progress was checked, and this gave the allies time to oppose him by fresh troops; and the attack by Erlon on Fuentes d'Onoro, which had begun two hours

ALMEIDA ABANDONED.

407

later, finally failed. The French army retired beaten, with a loss of three thousand men out of over forty thousand, to eighteen hundred of the allies out of ten thousand less.

The rival armies remained facing each other. On the 6th and 7th Wellington continued to strengthen his position, Massena feeling at all points of the line. His subordinates were not acting with him. Junot had leave of absence;

Reynier had asked for another command; Loison knew that Marmont was coming to take command; Bessières had failed his chief. Massena ordered a retreat, and abandoned Almeida. Both sides claimed the victory; but though Wellington said that "if Bony had been there, we should have been beaten," he had maintained his siege operations. The garrison of Almeida cut its way out by a bold sortie and rejoined the French army, by way of Barba del Puerco; and Salamanca was again regained by the Army of Portugal, in a pitiable condition. Massena, who had lost the confidence

408

TO RELIEVE BADAJOZ.

of the army, somewhat owing to his quarrel with Ney, was, on May 11, replaced by the much less able Marmont, who was to work under Soult's orders.

Measuring Massena's attack by the very moderate losses, one is tempted to ask what had become of the general who won the battle of Zurich, of the man who had defended Asparn. It was an ill ending to the career of a fine soldier, and yet in the advance and retreat he had done all any one could do. As the emperor did not perform his part, the task was an impossible one; Soult failed him utterly, and his lieutenants were at odds.

Wellington's skillful management, added to his ability to wait, in which useful quality he has rarely been equaled, had secured Portugal. From now on the English kept the country, and in the coming years made it their base; and it is probable that the French failure in this campaign encouraged the czar to defend his rights.

When Wellington heard of the capture of Badajoz, he sent Beresford towards Elvas; and on his approach, LatourMaubourg, who had succeded Mortier, retired from Campo Mayor March 23, and leaving small garrisons in Badajoz and Olivenza, retired on Llerena. Joined by Castaños and Ballesteros, Beresford crossed the Guadiana on rafts, and followed the French beyond Zafra, whence returning, he took Olivenza and invested Badajoz. Here Wellington personally joined him April 21, inspected the works, planned the siege operations and again left for the north, to meet Massena's renewed advance on Almeida. To relieve Badajoz, Soult drew troops from the north. He needed thirty thousand men, but could with safety spare only twenty-two thousand men and forty guns; and with these he marched on Badajoz, reaching a point within twenty miles of the city May 15, and writing Berthier that he would deliver battle,