486

WINNING QUALITY LACKING.

that country, in the hope for eventual freedom, did everything it could for the French cause.

When Barclay's retreat called for fresh dispositions, Napoleon, as a second manœuvre, planned to contain the First Army by a front attack, with Murat and the cavalry, Ney and Oudinot, while, with Eugene, part of Davout and, if he came up, Jerome, he himself would move on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and strive there to reach the Russian communications both with St. Petersburg and Moscow. But he still dwelt at Vilna until the Bagration question could be cleared up, and would not begin the fresh operation.

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"My intention is not to have so great a matter engaged in without my presence and not yet to manœuvre on the Dvina," he wrote Berthier, July 6. And the same day Berthier was ordered to write to Murat: "Let him know that I do not intend to move on Dünaburg, but that, meaning to operate with my extreme right, we are far from being ready for it. We must regulate ourselves on the events happening to Bagration. If one can have an affair with him, beat him, throw him into the Pinsk marshes, or oblige him to retire on Mohilev, one may arrive before him at Vitebsk. . . . Make him understand that my intention is to manœuvre to turn the enemy by my right, because on his right the passage of the Dvina is no longer anything, the river being fordable; that in marching on Smolensk one menaces Moscow, and that in moving on Polotsk one forces the enemy to evacuate all the country to within four or five marches of St. Petersburg. This evacuation would have an advantageous effect" (for us) " on the morale of the Russians, . . . and instead of a little war of rearguard affairs and skirmishes" (chicanes), "it would give rise to great flank movements."

...

This is excellent strategic reasoning, but the work done thereunder savors little of the tremendous activity of Austerlitz and Jena. Both in Spain and Russia, the emperor's map strategy was perfect, but his logistics lacked the winning quality.

Matters progressed slowly, and on July 14 the Grand

488

POSITIONS, MID-JULY.

Army and the Russian forces stood thus: Murat had advanced via Midzi towards Drissa and had reached Somoshi, with Nansouty and Montbrun out at Druia and Cheres. Ney had joined Murat at Drisviati, and Oudinot was marching up river from Dünaburg. Macdonald had reached Smilzi, acting as a flanking corps to protect the Niemen, watch Riga, threaten a diversion below Drissa, collect breadstuffs in Courland, and finally to besiege and take Riga, to secure future winterquarters by holding the navigation of the Dvina. Eugene was at Smorgoni, the Young Guard at Kobilnik, St. Cyr and the Old Guard in Vilna. Jerome had got to Niesvish with Latour-Maubourg out at Romanovo; Schwartzenberg was at Pruzhani and Reynier at Stolovichi, thus opening the Grand Duchy to a raid by Tormasov. Davout had just left Minsk to march on Mohilev.

On the other side, Barclay had vacated his intrenched camp, and crossed to the right bank of the Dvina; Bagration had left Slutsk for Bobruisk. Tormasov's army had been completed and stood at Lutsk, ready to invade Poland and cut the French right wing communications. Not until July 10 had Napoleon's attention been seriously called to this Third Army, and next day he wrote Berthier to have Jerome detach Reynier to cover Poland:

"Answer Jerome that you have received with astonishment his letter of July 9. . . . That the order of the 30th is positive, that it was expressed in these terms: You are to direct yourself on Minsk. Reynier, without losing sight of covering Warsaw, will direct himself on Niesvish.' This means that the first object of Reynier is to cover Warsaw, that the second, if the enemy should withdraw all his troops from Volhynia and there was nothing more to fear for the Grand Duchy, would be to march on Niesvish."

This is unfair criticism.

By mid-July Napoleon's first excellent plan had completely

THE CAMP AT DRISSA.

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failed. Jerome's long stay at Grodno, owing to incompetence, conflicting orders and the enormous theatre, and Davout's at Minsk, expecting Jerome to coöperate and Bagration to march his way, had enabled the latter to escape the toils laid for him and make good his retreat via Bobruisk. Moreover, Tormasov now came into the problem as a distinct threat to the French right, to counteract which a speedy success of the French left was essential.

The Russian generals had been acting on no consistent scheme. When Barclay retired to Drissa and ordered Bagration thither, he did not foresee that his lieutenant would have to fray a passage through the French army. Long before the war, the Drissa camp had been erected as a defense to St. Petersburg; but if it were turned by the French reaching the Dvina above it, Barclay would be compelled to fight a superior force alone; and if he were defeated, Bagration would certainly be so, and the road to the heart of the empire be opened. Yet he could scarcely leave the St. Petersburg road open, small chance as there was of Napoleon's marching thither. Between the two plans, the Russians were preparing failure. All that Napoleon needed to profit by the situation was speed; and this, owing to the immense environments, to the question of victual, and, it must be acknowledged, his own lessened incisiveness, was conspicuously absent.

Alexander remained with his army. He had with him his old military instructor, Phull, who had originated the camp at Drissa, in which Barclay had but half-faith, pointing out to the czar that the French would not seek the Russians there, but that these would have to debouch from it and seek the French. There were jealousies in the Russian army, which even the czar could not allay. Although Clausewitz says Phull passed in Prussia as having much genius, and the czar always remained grateful to him, he was a foreigner, and was hated by the

490

SPEEDY REUNION ESSENTIAL.

real Russians. Even Barclay, though born in Russia, was of Scotch descent, and was not quite trusted. He soon noticed the French intention of turning the Russian left at Drissa and cutting the First from the Second Army. "It is for that reason that I have considered it necessary to make a march on the road to Polotsk," he said to the czar, while Alexander of Wurtemberg suggested taking up a strong position at Vitebsk. In any case, the speedy reunion of the two armies now became essential. As opinions differed, so antagonisms grew. While the czar was at hand, Barclay was not supreme, and although he saw the weakness of the position, he could not leave Drissa. But shortly Alexander left the army to organize the national defense; and no sooner was Barclay in command than he abandoned the camp and started through Polotsk on Vitebsk to a junction with Bagration. It has been questioned whether the formal consent of the czar had been given to this operation; but it may be assumed, and the documents rather support this view. His common sense must have shown him the necessity of joining his two main bodies, that is, for Barclay to move on Smolensk and draw in Bagration. As a rule, he exhibited the same crude but just and comprehensive idea of the requirements of war that was shown in our own Civil War by Abraham Lincoln. Each had to control difficult politics in order to wage efficient war. Alexander was constantly vexed by the ill-feeling between Bagration, who wanted to fight, irrespective of caution, — “I do not understand your wise manœuvres," said this officer: "mine consist in seeking the enemy and beating him,” and Barclay, who wished to draw him in to the main army. As late as November he wrote to Barclay: "Very grave faults committed by Bagration, in consequence of which the enemy forestalled him at Minsk, Borisov and Mohilev, forced you to leave the banks of the Drissa to move on Smolensk.