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WAR TO NOURISH WAR.

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As a condition precedent to any operations, Napoleon had to choose between his usual habit of living on the country and a system of magazines and supply-trains. The first would enable him to move rapidly, to hunt down small bodies, and to do the business of suppressing the insurrection promptly; but its daily depredations would make bitter enemies of the whole population, now fully roused, and would lead to the usual excesses of the troops. The latter plan would place the cost of the war on France, where it was already none too popular, and would entail slow marches, lumbering convoys and heavy detachments along the line of communications. Moreover, the country was not well organized for a system of magazines, inasmuch as even the town governments fled on the approach of the French; it did not appeal to Napoleon as apt to lead to the prompt conclusion of the campaign; he did not know how poor the land was; and he elected again to make war nourish war, as he had so successfully done in other lands.

"The emperor," says Balagny, "was decided in Spain, as everywhere else, to make his army live on the country, and to apply in all their rigor the laws of war, to obtain in effect a terror on the Spanish nation, and to bring about its submission; resolved to employ pitilessly this system, that he judged the only efficacious one." Unfamiliar with Spain, the error was natural; but owing to the topography and the furibund population, his decision resulted in more than one strategic situation succumbing to starvation.

The war in Spain and Portugal was yet more complicated for the French by the numerous bands of guerrillas. The regular armies could be beaten, were in fact beaten; the guerrillas could be driven off, but neither beaten nor destroyed. Though guerrillas pure and simple, they were given a legal standing by the Juntas, and as the war was upheld by

VOL. III.

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BANDS OF GUERRILLAS.

the priesthood, who inculcated the killing of a Frenchman as a meritorious act, murder by the Spaniards and retaliation by the French added to it a peculiar sting.

The guerrillas were not always local inhabitants, but often bands under a set chief, perhaps an officer out of service, or an ambitious university student, or an old soldier too restless to serve in the regular ranks, and yet more frequently a monk. These bands not only did constant mischief to the French troops, but they prevented the country authorities from helping them collect victual, and the French armies were never able to gather more than a fraction of the provisions of any country through which they passed. If the English, with the magazine system and Portugal and Spain as allies, could scarcely feed their armies, how could the French, living on a naked and hostile country, expect to do so?

As the Spaniards had been encouraged by their successes, and as the emperor ill understood the land and the people, it was natural for him to believe that they might, like his former adversaries, decide to concentrate and receive a general battle. "In the situation of things, the presumption of the enemy leads one to think that he will remain in the position he is in. The longer he remains near us, the better it will be. The war could be ended at one single stroke by a cleverly combined manœuvre, and for this it is necessary for me to be there," he had written Joseph from Erfurt, October 13. In fact, prior to Napoleon's arrival, the Spanish left had offered an exceptional chance for a fatal blow, hemmed in as it was at Bilbao by sea and mountains. Had Lefebvre lured Blake farther east and awaited the oncoming corps, his Spaniards could have been cut off by a turning manœuvre, and captured or thrown into the sea. Napoleon, who saw what might have been done, blamed Lefebvre for his hasty action. And yet, how could this marshal comprehend his master's larger

VICTOR AND LEFEBVRE.

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strategic problems? Who except the emperor himself did so? Even when executed with brilliant results, who understood them?

The long, semi-circular position of the Spaniards still offered many a weak spot for a successful thrust; at one moment the emperor thought Saragossa could be captured out of hand; but the logical direction seemed to be on the centre towards Burgos, at which point Blake and Castaños could be cut asunder and each one taken in reverse, as well as the direct road to the capital be opened. It was therefore determined to move the 2d Corps on Burgos, while Lefebvre and Victor, Ney and Moncey, should contain the forces in their front. Napoleon by no means gave up hope of being able to get into Blake's rear, although this was but a minor part of his plan. Victor was hesitating in his work. Between him and Lefebvre, Blake might have been surrounded, but they did not work together; Victor objected to Villatte's detail to Lefebvre; and after reaching Amurio and Orduna, although Lefebvre was still advancing, he retired, leaving Villatte at Valmaseda. Blake moved forward and attacked Villatte, and by good luck alone did this excellent division escape disaster. Napoleon, who had ordered Lefebvre forward, believing Victor to be on his left, was incensed at the latter's withdrawal, and, adding Lapisse to the column, at once sent Victor orders to return and sustain Lefebvre and Villatte.

Berthier wrote him : "His Majesty is very discontented that instead of sustaining Villatte you left him in engagement with the enemy, a fault all the more grave because you knew that Lefebvre had committed that of leaving a division of your corps exposed, while with his other two he moved back on Bilbao. . . . How, then, instead of moving in person to the head of your troops to sustain one of your divisions, did you leave this important operation to a general of brigade who had not your confidence, and who had with him but a third of your forces?" To Lefebvre Berthier wrote: "The emperor is much annoyed at the false movement of retreat

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on Bilbao.

...

DETAILED REPORTS REQUIRED.

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had put your headquarters at Valmaseda, and camped with your three divisions so as to act according to circumstances, you would already have made eight to ten thousand prisoners."

The army now in the emperor's hand stood thus: Sébastiani and Villatte at Bilbao and Valmaseda, under Lefebvre ; Victor with Ruffin and Lapisse between Valmaseda and Orduna; Bessières with Bonnet, Merle and Mouton, out towards Burgos; Desolles and Ney with Bisson at Logroño; Marchand at Tolosa; Moncey at Tafalla and Lodosa; the Guard at Vittoria; the cavalry at various places along the line. There were over one hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and to sustain his attack on the centre Napoleon still intended to call in Victor as soon as the French right was clear. Meanwhile he never ceased to issue instructions for the protection of the communications. He gave orders to fortify Miranda, Pancorbo, Burgos when taken, and other places, and to intrench strong positions along the roads of communications. He could never get enough information, and on November 15 Berthier issued a general circular on the subject, requiring the chiefs of staff of the corps and of detached bodies, and all commandants of strong places and others in authority, to render full and detailed reports every day, and especially with regard to the breadstuffs in their respective localities.

Bessières had been thrown forward on Burgos, and on November 8 found Belvider in force in the wood of Gamonal, whereupon instead of vigorously attacking, he assumed the defensive, thus arresting the advance when he might have given the Spaniards a lesson. "It seems to the emperor, Berthier wrote, "that you missed a fine occasion of having a success and getting us news."

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By this time Napoleon had got a fair grasp of the situation. Matters on the right could be corrected. The few movements

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