BUSACO SELECTED.

389

towards mid-September Massena drew in Reynier, and, with sixty thousand men and eighty-four guns, began his advance. He expected to make Coimbra a secondary base. He should have marched down the Mondego, but some traitorous Portuguese led him by the nearest route, which was thoroughly bad, and he did not reach Viseu until September 23. Despite several good defensive lines behind affluents of the Mondego, Wellington slowly withdrew.

Napoleon had been wearied by the delays of the marshals, who under his eye had done such rapid work. He wrote, on September 19, to Berthier:

"My Cousin, send to-morrow an officer, bearer of a letter for Massena, in which you will make him understand that my intention is that he should attack and overturn the English. That Lord Wellington has not more than eighteen thousand men, of whom, I think, fifteen thousand are infantry and the rest cavalry and artillery; that Hill has not more than six thousand men, infantry and cavalry; that it would be ridiculous if twenty-five thousand English should hold in the balance sixty thousand French. That in not fumbling, but in attacking them frankly, after having reconnoitred, they can be smartly checked. . . . I am too distant, and the position of the enemy changes too often, for me to give counsel on the manner of delivering the attack, but it is certain that the enemy is out of condition to resist." He was in error.

As the morale of his allies, if not of the British troops, had already suffered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and they needed success to cheer them up; as this would not permit Wellington to retire farther, and as he had not yet completed the devastation of the country in front of Lisbon, and was not ready to reënter the Torres Vedras lines, he determined to defend the Mondego at Coimbra; and Hill and Leith were drawn in to the plateau of Busaco, which, lying three hundred feet above the valley, he had selected as a battlefield. Cavalry parties held the roads on right and left. The position admirably suited the tactics

which had served so well at Talavera, and the junction of his divisions was effected September 26, just as Massena put in his appearance. At this time Wellington's army consisted of the divisions under Spencer, Hill, Picton, Cole and Leith, and Craufurd's Light Division. The cavalry was under Cotton.

From Viseu, the Army of Portugal advanced on the enemy. Ney, on his arrival with the van, was for immediate attack, as it was thought that Hill and Leith were not yet all up, and as the English seemed, from their movements to and fro on the hills, to be still engaged in taking position; but the army waited for Massena, who should have been in the lead, and who on arrival deferred the attack until the morrow. By that time the English were concentrated in a position of difficult approach; Busaco crest gave room for the British first line, five miles long, and hid the second line and reserves. Forty thousand men were on the ridge, and, as usual, the troops were concealed behind rocks and by a natural scoop of the ground. Woods covered the field in places. There were but two roads up the plateau, one leading to the Convent and one by way of San Antonio; nowhere could forces be massed for an assault, and columns would necessarily be broken by the rugged ground. The position was one which should have been turned, not attacked. But luckily for Wellington's defensive plans, Talavera had been forgotten, and the French were eager for battle. Ney and Reynier were selected to assault the position, with Junot in reserve. They were to operate together, but Ney was delayed. Early in the morning of September 27, Reynier advanced in two columns up the San Antonio road. His assault was delivered in excellent heart, though as the ground permitted an attack only by successive brigades, it was in far from effective order. The impact was sharp, but so soon as the French reached the summit, in

D

POR

NO GRAND-TACTICS.

391

broken order and out of breath, they were met by a concentric hail of grape and canister, and immediately after by platoon fire and the vigorous countercharge of the fresh English battalions. They clung to their work like men; for a brief moment there was hope of rupturing Picton's line,

COIMBRA

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MARCE

ZEZERE R

MONDEGO

MILES

20

Battle of Busaco.

but Leith restored the battle, and Hill, in reserve, came from the right to secure it. There was no grand-tactics. It was merely the assault of a fortified position, where fresh troops

CELORICO

392

A NOBLE STRUGGLE.

of exceptional bravery and coolness, by their heavy volleys succeeded by a stout onset, checked and drove back the assailants. In three columns, Ney attacked, more than two hours later, along the Convent road. As only foot could move through the woods or scale the rocks, his guns were left behind. The attack was all that could he expected on the broken ground, and was delivered with Ney's usual élan. Wellington ably used his lines of red-coats, and smartly threw regiments on the flanks of the French battalions, or poured a withering fire into them from his point of vantage. No one could have employed defensive tactics better. At Vimiero and Talavera he had tested his scheme for utilizing Saxon phlegm against Gallic ardor; it had succeeded, and well served the purpose he had in view; and he clung to its use with consummate discretion. Here again the fresh defenders were too strong for the brave assailants. After a noble struggle Ney's columns were hurled back down the slope, which there were only slight partial efforts to recover. The French loss was six thousand men, including several general officers, the allied loss less than fifteen hundred men, but half of the force having been put in.

This defeat wasted the entire moral effect of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and of the advance into the heart of Portugal; and it stands out in singular contrast to many a battle of Frederick's, where heights as bad had to be captured by his grenadiers.

Massena was ill-placed. Denuded of victual, the country was bad for an advance, and a retreat at this moment might be turned into a rout. Neither could he regain the left bank of the Mondego, as Wellington held the direct road. Luckily - it is said before the battle he discovered another road leading across the hills by the Boyalva Pass to the west, and tapping the main road from Oporto to Coimbra, which by

TORRES VEDRAS LINES.

393 some misadventure the allies had neglected to hold. To conceal the turning march, Massena indulged in some skirmishing in front of Busaco next day; but the British commander made small reply. To march on Coimbra between the English army and the sea was a bold operation, and Wellington could well have fallen on the flank and rear of Massena's army but he preferred his defensive scheme, and quietly retiring, he marched south, and reached Torres Vedras October 10, fully aware that the French were advancing into a country where they could not subsist. At Coimbra as at Viseu, not an inhabitant was to be found; every one had left under pain of death, and from Celorico to Lisbon there was not a mouthful, except what the fleeing Portuguese had been unable to carry away and had buried or hidden. Much of this was unearthed and gave a few weeks' subsistence, but the promise of a successful campaign seemed poor.

Wellington's withdrawal after Busaco illustrates the small gain of a defensive victory without pursuit. Though defeated, Massena turned his opponent out of his position, and forced him into retreat.

The French army followed the allies through Leyria and Villafranca towards Lisbon. Wellington's secret had been kept as usual. Until he reached Leyria, Massena heard nothing of the Torres Vedras lines, on which Wellington had been laboring for nearly a year. Even in England their construction was not generally known.

Lisbon is situated on a peninsula between the Tagus and the sea. Back of the city, across this peninsula, rise two low ranges some twenty-five miles long. It was on these that the lines were constructed, with a third one in the rear to protect an embarkment, should the other two be forced. These extraordinary works the revival of an antiquated system, but well adapted to the conditions - consisted of eighty-seven