LV.

THE BERESINA. NOVEMBER 15, 1812, TO JANUARY 31, 1813.

KUTUSOV played a Fabian game, when by an attack he could have destroyed the wreck of the Grand Army. On November 17, at Krasnoi, Napoleon stood with the Guard to let his rear close up. Kutusov weakly attacked, and all came up except Ney, who, left to his fate, by a circuit fought his way through to the army, reaching it with less than a thousand men. At Orsha a slight reorganization was made, and much material was burned. Napoleon intended to move through Minsk, but when this place went lost, Studianka was chosen for crossing the Beresina. Meanwhile Wittgenstein had pushed back Victor, who had gone to St. Cyr's aid, and Chichagov had come up to the Beresina. At frightful loss the Beresina was crossed November 27-28, and the army kept on towards Vilna. On December 5 the emperor left Murat to command the army, and made his way to Paris by December 18. At Vilna and at Kovno the army - now only a mob - expected to pause, but could not. Pursuit stopped at the Niemen. The Prussians and Austrians made a Convention with the Russians. The French losses the Russian a hun

in the campaign were probably four hundred thousand men, dred and fifty thousand. Murat turned over the command to Eugene, who conducted the army back to the Oder, and later to the Elbe. Napoleon at once began creating a new army, with which he proposed to march back to the Niemen.

THE emperor's judgment of Kutusov's enterprise proved accurate; and although every day added to the danger as well as the difficulties of the French, yet the Russian general clung to his policy of letting distress do the work of battle. On almost any day he might to advantage have attacked in force, but he refrained. On his side, the emperor might have foreseen that the Russians could anticipate him at Krasnoi, and have evaded them by marching on Orsha north of the Dnieper; but poor maps and uncertain news induced him to keep to the route he knew, bad as it was.

On November 15, at 8.30 A. M., Napoleon and the Guard

662

KUTUSOV HYPER-CONSERVATIVE.

started from Korytnia for Krasnoi, while the Russian van under Miloradovich, advancing towards the main road, reached it at Rshavka just as the Guard appeared. Instead of attacking smartly and pushing on to Krasnoi, Miloradovich, held back by Kutusov, only opened artillery fire, and Napoleon filed by with small loss. Junot and Poniatowski were already beyond Krasnoi, Eugene had left Smolensk and reached Lub

nia, Davout and Ney were still in Smolensk. Kutusov's main force was at Jurova. Sending Roguet's division of Guards to drive off the Cossacks, Napoleon remained at Krasnoi during the 16th to allow the corps in the rear to close up. During the day Kutusov came along to Novoselki and his van to Nikulina, both close to Krasnoi; but he seemed still to avoid attack, though this was the auspicious moment. There was good reason for the loud complaints among Kutusov's lieutenants; to end the matter would be to save thousands of Russian as well as French lives; for although they were not perishing in droves, the Russian force was also dwindling in the extreme cold. All his officers urged action, but Kutusov stuck to his own course. He was hyper-conservative.

KUTUSOV'S SCHEME.

663

When Eugene reached the Russian van astride the road east of Nikulina, his smart attack was repulsed, and Miloradovich sent in a demand for surrender. But, made of rugged stuff, Eugene started on a circuit around Miloradovich by way of Fomina, and reached Krasnoi at night of the 16th with thirty-five hundred men left of the six thousand with which he had left Smolensk. Davout was at Korytnia, and Ney still at Smolensk. Junot and the Poles had kept on to Liadi. During this threat against Eugene, Napoleon might to advantage have attacked Miloradovich's rear, but he had only the Guard to put in, which, although still consisting of thirteen thousand foot, two thousand horse and a few guns, he must keep intact, as a nucleus for the army, and, as he never forgot, for his own personal safety.

A worse situation could scarcely exist. Strung out over a distance of forty miles, Kutusov by one strong push could cut the French army in two, and successively demolish the several corps; or, should Napoleon await their arrival at Krasnoi, Kutusov, by extending his left, could seize the road to Orsha and cut the army off from its one line of retreat. This was, in an uncertain way, the Russian leader's idea. He thought to throw Tormasov to the left, hold Galitzin in front of Krasnoi, and let Miloradovich, from a position south of the road, handle Davout and Ney; but the whole scheme was lamely carried out. Napoleon, however, had to choose between abandoning Davout and Ney, and running this risk; and at the point of fatal danger the old Napoleon flamed up. Relying on the dread inspired by his own personality and the Guard, he stood his ground, and enabled both Eugene and Davout to join the army. At first blush, this act appears foolhardy, but it was the only thing to do; the least risk lay in the boldest course; he could not remain passive and encourage the enemy to offensive measures; it was safer, even with his

664

THE REARGUARD ABANDONED.

handful, to attack, himself; and as after Eugene's escape Miloradovich still held the road at Nikulina by which Davout and Ney must reach him, he advanced on the enemy, hoping Kutusov might call in Miloradovich to strengthen his own line. Both from an individual and a military point of view, his act commands our admiration.

Early in the morning of the 17th Napoleon sent out Mortier, who took Uvarova after a slight combat; and so soon as

the emperor with the Guard demonstrated along the Smolensk road at Nikulina, Miloradovich was called in from the right to the main army, drawn up in order for battle. Recogniz ing his danger, Davout pushed through and reached Krasnoi before noon. But as Tormasov had extended far beyond the French right, this fragile offensive could not last. Napoleon must withdraw before Ney could come up, and leave the rearguard to its fate. This was done. It was a sad necessity, but unless we go back to Hannibal at Crotona in 203 B. C.,

NEY CUT OFF.

665 perhaps no finer figure can be found in the annals of war than Napoleon standing here with fifteen thousand famished men facing an army of eighty thousand effective, for many hours, to enable ten thousand comrades to escape annihilation. There was no particular fighting. Kutusov's purpose to throw his left around the French, to cut the road to Orsha, weakened when he ascertained that Napoleon and the Guard were in his front, and he let them pass on towards Dubrovna, intending to harass their rear and then turn on Davout. Thus when the emperor retired through Krasnoi, he met only the light horse which had been sent beyond the town; this fell back, and the handful reached Liadi. In covering the retreat Davout suffered considerably; especially Friedrich's division at the rear was harassed. The army generally lost heavily in prisoners, mostly, however, non-combatants, without whom it was better off. Eugene was at Liadi, and Junot and Poniatowski beyond the town. Kutusov assembled his army at Dobraia.

Ney was thus cut off. With six thousand men, and an equal number of unarmed stragglers, he had left Smolensk before daylight, November 17, and had marched to Korytnia, unaware that the Russian army stood across the road. There had been another quarrel with Davout, because Ney, reaching Smolensk last, found no food; and he afterwards accused Davout of deserting him on the march to Krasnoi; but Davout was drawn in to Krasnoi by the emperor's order, although Ney claimed that he received no intimation of this fact. It was not like Davout to fail to communicate important instructions, and it is not fair to assume that he did so fail: the numberless Cossacks on the road would have made the loss of a dispatch probable. Ney was, however, not fully informed; and Fézensac, who was with him, says that he had no news for three days before he left Smolensk. Of the two