In adopting the metaphysical method Dr. Willoughby has the support of great names. But that method, in the reviewer's judgment, belongs to a vanishing past. Political science, if it is to prove itself worthy to use the name science, must eliminate metaphysics and bring itself down to the realities of political life. The new school, led by Maitland and Laski in England, Krabbe in Holland, and Duguit in France, is sound in its criticism when it charges that the German and Austinian jurists base their philosophy of the State on concepts instead of facts.

The State is at all times fully organized in its government. When constitution-making is regarded as a part of the government, the State in its political aspect and the government are coterminous. The State can only act through individuals who are vested with its powers. Their acts are its acts, not its will. When we go back of these realities and regard the State as a juristic person and the exercise of its powers as a juristic concept, we pass from the realm of fact and step out into the blank void of metaphysics. CHARLES F. AMIDON.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. By E. H. Downey. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1924. pp. xxv, 223.

The late Dr. Downey, whom Professor John R. Commons has called "the highest American authority on the subject," prepared this book as an appeal to laymen in the hope that if they better understood the principles of the law regulating compensation for industrial accidents in the several states, they would support legislation giving broader scope to, and remedying defects in, compensation statutes. The legal profession would have been fortunate if Dr. Downey had lived to utilize his unsurpassed store of information for a similar volume addressed to the lawyers of America, because, generally speaking, the bar is not aware of the full purport and meaning that lie behind this great new experiment in the administration of justice. It has accordingly seemed advisable to devote these comments exclusively to those parts of the author's work which deal with the legal and procedural aspects of the compensation acts. Necessarily this involves the passing over of large sections of the book which supply valuable information as to rates of compensation, specific indemnity schedules, state insurance funds, the premium cost of insurance, and the like. In all these matters Dr. Downey was deeply interested, because he regarded industrial accident insurance as merely the first step in a general program of social insurance in which cost is the most critical consideration; for, as Professor Ely writes in a special introduction to this volume, while workmen's compensation is expensive, still more costly is that which provides for old age, and probably the most costly of all is that which aims to provide for unemployment," and therefore "unless cost is reduced to the lowest possible limits there is strong reason to fear that insurance may be extended beyond economic possibilities and that public treasuries may be bankrupted." 1 Most lawyers, I think, regard the compensation acts, which in less than fifteen years have been enacted in forty-three states, simply as statutes changing the substantive law as to personal injuries suffered by employees. Dr. Downey makes plain why the substitution of the principle of insurance for that of negligence was imperative when he says: "The human organism is imperfectly adapted to a mechanical environment. The injuries which arise are, broadly considered, nobody's 'fault.'" 2 The human body moves with a certain rhythm which does not always coincide with the deadly pre2 Pp. 7, 8.

1 P. xix.

cision of machine rhythm. If a thousand girls extend a thousand hands into a thousand die-stamping machines a thousand times a day, the number of mutilated fingers at the end of a year can be foretold by actuarial statistics.

Important as this substantive change undoubtedly was, Dr. Downey is perfectly aware that if the legislatures had done nothing more, the compensation acts could have accomplished but little. He estimates that under the old law" seven-eighths of all work injuries were left without legal relief." 3 But in a jurisdiction where administration of the compensation act was entrusted to the courts, as was originally the case in New Jersey, Carl Hookstadt of the United States Bureau of Labor estimated that 13,276 or over 60% of New Jersey's compensable accidents were not reported and presumably were not compensated." 4

66

For this reason it is no exaggeration to say that the real and undoubted success of the compensation acts is due to the new type of machinery which was created for their enforcement. This newly created administrative system which, in contrast to our traditional method of administering justice in the courts, operates with great speed and at practically no expense to the injured man, is possible because the law itself prescribes schedules of compensation based primarily on average weekly wages. The ascertainment of damages therefore does not involve an examination into all the facts, but merely a knowledge of arithmetic.

This point is often overlooked by those who, seeing the success of administrative justice in this field, urge that it be extended to cover personal injuries received in railway, street car, and even automobile accidents. The proponents of such measures should read Dr. Downey's statement as to how difficult it is to establish fair compensation schedules, and should then consider whether it is possible to fix by rule of law a schedule of damages that would justly compensate a violinist and a hodcarrier, each of whom might lose a forefinger in the same railway accident. Since average weekly wages can be determined as to employees from the payrolls, few disputes arise; but the extension of the plan to the general travelling public would involve for the ascertainment of average weekly income as much effort as is required for the enforcement of the income tax law.

Within the field of industrial accidents the administrative plan is feasible and has worked well. From ninety to ninety-five per cent of all claims are automatically adjusted by voluntary agreements between employee and insurer, all of which are checked by the industrial accident commissions. It is in the remaining five to ten per cent of contested claims that the nature of the administrative method most clearly appears. While courts are negative, relying on the self-interest of the litigants to bring about a proper presentation of the evidence, the commissions are affirmative. They investigate on their own initiative, they keep tabs on compensable accidents through newspapers, they endeavor to secure witnesses and needed medical testimony. For this purpose they have corps of investigators, impartial physicians, and even attorneys, as is the case with the Pennsylvania commission. Thus the commissions have auxiliary departments for direct investigation which the courts have never been allowed to have. Further, they make their own rules and control their own procedure, another essential power which in the main is denied to our American courts. Under these circumstances this administrative plan for securing justice has flourished and won wide public approval.

Having gone so far so well, the commissions are tempted to conclude that injured employees, even in contested cases, need no assistance from lawyers. 4 U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin, No. 275 (Sept. 1920) p. 116.

3 P. 144.

Dr. Downey writes: "Claimants ought not to be compelled to employ counsel... and the actual need for attorneys' services should be confined within the narrowest practicable limits." 5 This is almost the unanimous view of commissioners, but in it there is a danger. The framers of these laws saw the evils of the contingent fee system; they were familiar with the unholy triumvirate of shyster lawyer, "runner," and disreputable physician, generally with tame witnesses who "happened to see" the accident; and they intended, if they could, to be rid of lawyers once and for all. This tradition remains and is kept alive by that same class of practitioners who, through "lump sum settlements and otherwise, endeavor to secure for themselves revenues far beyond anything which the commission would award them under its statutory power to control fees.

The question which Dr. Downey overlooks, or at least does not deal with in the present volume, is the problem created by a commission's serving both as advocate and judge. Many cases present troublesome points of law, difficult questions of fact, and a sharp conflict of testimony. The employee needs counsel, and he needs zealous counsel who will act solely for the proper interests of his client. No commissioner can perform that duty and then become a dispassionate judge. Either the employee will in fact go unrepresented or gradually the community will lose faith in the impartiality of the tribunal.

To call these commissions quasi-judicial is misleading. One part of their work is purely administrative. But in contested cases their function is purely judicial. And precisely for this reason the writer heartily concurs in Dr. Downey's recommendation that the members of industrial accident boards and commissions "should be irremovable except by impeachment and be paid salaries commensurate with the emolument of judges of the higher courts." 6 REGINALD HEBER SMITH.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIFE OF THE STATES OF THE NEW WORLD. By Alejandro Alvarez. New York: Oxford University Press. 1924. pp. 573.

To the American public at large the Monroe Doctrine is not only a cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the United States; it is a tradition to which every loyal knee must bend, a sacred inheritance foreshadowed in the farewell address of Washington and proclaimed with renewed emphasis in the recent declarations of Secretary Hughes. It possesses, indeed, a validity little short of an amendment to the Constitution. Moreover, it is our own doctrine; and while others may share in its benefits, we alone propose to be responsible for its maintenance.

For the correction of this state of the public mind the collection of documents and opinions which Dr. Alvarez has gathered together should be exceedingly valuable, as should also be his own contribution in the form of an introductory survey of the meaning and present status of the Monroe Doctrine. Dr. Alvarez is recognized as one of the leading publicists of South America, and his earlier volumes, the Codification of International Law and American International Law, as well as his numerous other contributions to the science of international law, give to his writings an authority which must command attention. If the Monroe Doctrine is to be interpreted in terms of the interests of the Western Hemisphere as a whole, it is obviously desirable to have the task undertaken by a Latin American scholar, whose voice will have greater weight in that part of the world which 6 P. 72.

5 P. 70.

has been the indirect beneficiary of the Doctrine without having been consulted in its making or application.

Part I of the volume is devoted to "History, Practice, Ideas, Facts," and it embraces a comparative study of the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted and applied by the United States and Latin America respectively, followed by a brief study of the "principles " of the Doctrine and a description of the relations of Europe to the Doctrine. This last section consists almost entirely of extracts from Moore's Digest of International Law, reducing the personal contribution of Dr. Alvarez to an essay of some thirty pages. Of these the most interesting are those in which the author attempts to link the Monroe Doctrine with the several declarations, such as the "Bolivar Doctrine," made by the Latin American states at the time of their separation from Spain. In this respect it cannot be said that the author makes out a very satisfactory case. Although the Monroe Doctrine, as Dr. Alvarez rightly appreciates, was based upon the principle of self-protection, it was in its essence a claim on the part of the United States of interest in the welfare of territory not belonging to it; whereas the Latin American declarations were concerned for the most part with the independence of their own dominions against the interference of the mother country or her allies. More to the point were the various efforts made to create a confederation of the Latin American states to maintain their separate independence. Dr. Alvarez, looking only at the principles of independence and non-intervention contained in the Monroe Doctrine and finding them embodied in the several Latin American declarations, would elevate the Monroe Doctrine into a principle of American public law. To this end he would also "do away with the term Monroe Doctrine, while preserving its ideas."

These views of the author will serve to indicate the value of the documentary material to be found in the annexes to Part I, covering some ninety pages, much of which, while interesting in itself, seems to have only a very remote connection with the Monroe Doctrine as understood by the United States.

As to the much debated question concerning the compatibility of certain of the more recent manifestations of the Monroe Doctrine with the Doctrine as originally proclaimed, Dr. Alvarez dwells at some length upon what he calls the policy of "imperialism or hegemony" pursued by the United States. It is this policy of intervention in the countries of Central America and of the Caribbean which, the author asserts, has given rise to great anxiety in Latin America and has led to the formation of alliances to oppose it. At this point, however, Dr. Alvarez fails to note that in the long extract from his American International Law, which appears in the last part of the volume, he makes a distinction between the policy of "hegemony" and that of " imperialism," the former consisting in a justifiable effort on the part of the United States to prevent certain of the weaker Latin American states from committing acts which might bring about the intervention of European states, the latter being concerned with the extension of territory and with the control of the political and economic life of other states.

Part II of the volume, consisting of the declarations of statesmen and the opinions of publicists of Latin America and the United States in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, and forming a little more than half of the volume, will prove of great interest to the student, for he will there find a more illuminating picture of the point of view of Latin America than in any of the resolutions of Pan-American conferences, where a frank expression of opinion is hardly possible.

It is to be regretted that Dr. Alvarez found it impossible to discuss the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, upon which there is apparently a difference

of opinion in the United States and in South America. The long efforts of Dr. Alvarez to have the principles of the Monroe Doctrine ratified by the states of Latin America as a body would have made his comments upon the logical and practical compatibility of the Doctrine with the Covenant of the League all the more valuable. Incidentally, the extracts from the opinions of President Wilson, given at the close of the volume, omit the President's most significant utterances upon this very subject.

C. G. FENWICK.

FEDERAL INCOME TAX. By George E. Holmes. Sixth Edition. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1905. pp. xcvi, 2007.

During the recent war, soon after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1917, several practising lawyers, including this reviewer, were summoned to Washington to help in the reorganization of the office of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue. They were well enough equipped with legal education, but most of them were untrained in the intricacies of taxes. They soon learned, when they had exhausted the resources and records of the Internal Revenue Bureau, to rely on three outside aids: one of these reproduced in readily accessible form the informal, as well as the formal, rulings of the Commissioner; the second expounded accounting principles; and the third gave a shrewd and sane interpretation of many of the knotty problems in the law.

The third was Holmes. It was then not so tall nor so wide nor so thick as the current volume, but it had plenty of meat. The work has since grown tremendously with the development of the law, so that it has now some of the vices as well as the virtues of size.

In 1918, to be sure, there had been the excise tax of 1909 and the income tax acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917, together with the excess profits tax of 1917. But these were comparatively simple acts, viewed from present familiarity with the later statutes of 1918, 1921, and 1924. Hundreds of difficult questions inherent in income tax law and practice had not been thought of. Occasionally the Commissioner promulgated a set of regulations and rather infrequently issued Treasury decisions. Income tax cases in the courts were rare. In the last few years, however, a constantly increasing stream of decisions has poured forth from the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the courts, and the new Board of Tax Appeals is swelling the flood. Consequently, the 1925 Holmes, although doing its best to remain a single volume, confines itself with difficulty within that compass.

The subject-matter, it is conceived, needs a fresh analysis and rearrangement. After a chapter on the rates of tax, several chapters on special classes of taxpayers, such as fiduciaries and farmers, are interposed before a discussion of income subject to tax is reached. Then other chapters intervene before credits for the purpose of the normal tax and for foreign taxes are explained. It is suggested that a more logical and convenient arrangement might be made by a division of the subject into four parts, each subdivided into chapters, one part dealing with the method of tax computation, including rates normal, surtax, and special- and credits; another part dealing with the determination of net income, including different classes of income and deductions; another dealing with administrative provisions, including returns, payment, claims, and legal proceedings; and a fourth part dealing with the provisions peculiar to special classes of taxpayers, including partnerships, personal service corporations, insurance companies and the like. Within the chapters, too, the abundance of material is often not well digested or arranged. In section twenty-two, for example, dealing with