The same fruitful errour was the cause why nothing was done to impress the people of France (so far as we can at all consider the inhabitants of France as a people) with an idea that the government was ever to be really French, or indeed any thing else than the nominal government of a monarch, a monarch absolute as over them, but whose sole support was to arise from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on his throne by German forces; in short, that the king of France was to be a viceroy to the emperour and the king of Prussia.

It was the first time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties, have thought proper to thrust wholly out of their councils, to postpone, to discountenance, to reject, and, in a manner, to disgrace, the party whom these powers came to support. The single person of a king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is himself his party! The royal party with the king or his representatives at its head is the royal cause. Foreign powers have hitherto chosen to give to such wars as this the appearance of a civil contest, and not that of a hostile invasion. When the Spaniards in the sixteenth century, sent aids to the chiefs of the league, they appeared as allies to that league, and to the imprisoned king (the cardinal de Bourbon) which that league had set up. When the Germans came to the aid of the protestant princes, in the same series of civil wars, they came as allies. When the English came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared as allies to that prince. So did the French always when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany. They came to aid a party there. When the English and Dutch intermeddled in the succession of Spain, they appeared as allies to the emperour Charles the Sixth. In short, the policy has been as uniform as its principles were obvious to an ordinary eye.

According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the French princes of the blood, nobles, and parliaments, and then recognised by the combined powers. Fundamental law and ancient usage, as well as the clear reason of the thing, have always ordained it during an imprisonment of the king of France; as in the case of John, and of Francis the First. A monarchy ought not to be left a moment without a representative, having an interest in the succession. The orders of the state ought also to have been recognised in those amongst whom alone they existed in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.

Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the kingdom of France, according to nature and to its fundamental laws, and not according to the novel and inconsiderate principles of the usurpation which the united powers were come to extirpate, the king of Prussia and the emperour, as allies of the ancient kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, first, to free the monarch, if possible; if not, to secure the monarchy as princi

pal in the design; and in order to avoid all riss to that great object, (the object of other ages the the present, and of other countries than that t France,) they would of course avoid proceeding with more haste, or in a different manner than wh the nature of such an object required.

Adopting this, the only rational system, the ntional mode of proceeding upon it, was to commence with an effective siege of Lisle, which us French generals must have seen taken before ther faces, or be forced to fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence to draw supplies, we have been behind them; a plentiful country enemies, from whence to force supplies, wo have been before them. Good towns were alwa within reach to deposit their hospitals and mag zines. The march from Lisle to Paris is thro a less defensible country, and the distance is harcy so great as from Longwy to Paris.

If the old politick and military ideas had verned, the advanced guard would have be formed of those who best knew the counts and had some interest in it, supported by soc of the best light troops and light artillery, whe the grand solid body of an army disciplined: perfection, proceeded leisurely, and in close nexion with all its stores, provisions, and hea cannon, to support the expedite body in of misadventure, or to improve and complete

success.

The direct contrary of all this was put in pr tice. In consequence of the original sin of L project, the army of the French princes was where thrown into the rear, and no part of brought forward to the last moment, the time the commencement of the secret negociation. I naturally made an ill impression on the peopl. furnished an occasion for the rebels at Pars give out that the faithful subjects of the king distrusted, despised, and abhorred by his ar The march was directed through a skirt of L raine, and thence into a part of Champagne, a Duke of Brunswick leaving all the strongest p behind him; leaving also behind him the strea of his artillery; and by this means giving a se riority to the French, in the only way in w: the present France is able to oppose a Gez force.

In consequence of the adoption of those politicks, which turned every thing on the sole and single person, the whole plan of the s was reduced to nothing but a coup de main, in to set that prince at liberty. If that failed eve thing was to be given up.

The scheme of a coup de main might ( favourable circumstances) be very fit for a pa at the head of a light corps, by whose fr nothing material would be deranged. But a royal army of eighty thousand men, headed a king in person, who was to march an brad and fifty miles through an enemy's country— this was a plan unheard of.

Although this plan was not well chosen, a proceeded upon principles altogether ill p

and impolitick, the superiority of the military force might in a great degree have supplied the defects, and furnished a corrective to the mistakes. The greater probability was that the duke of Brunswick would make his way to Paris over the bellies of the rabble of drunkards, robbers, assassins, rioters, mutineers, and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed command of a theatrical, vapouring, reduced captain of cavalry, who opposed that great commander and great army. But-Diis aliter visum-He began to treat, the winds blew, the rains beat, the house fell-because it was built upon sand-and great was the fall thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the two marches made by the duke of Parma into France.

There is some secret. Sickness and weather may defeat an army pursuing a wrong plan; not that I believe the sickness to have been so great as it has been reported; but there is a great deal of superfluous humiliation in this business, a perfect prodigality of disgrace. Some advantage, real or imaginary, must compensate to a great sovereign, and to a great general, for so immense a loss of reputation. Longwy, situated as it is, might (one should think) be evacuated without a capitulation with a republick just proclaimed by the king of Prussia as an usurping and rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken away the obnoxious French in his flight. It does not appear to have been necessary that those magistrates who declared for their own king, on the faith, and under the immediate protection, of the king of Prussia, should be delivered over to the gallows. It was not necessary that the emigrant nobility and gentry who served with the sing of Prussia's army, under his immediate comnand, should be excluded from the cartel, and given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was so ross and so cruel a breach of the publick faith, not with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumouier has dropped very singular hints. Custine has poken out more broadly. These accounts have ever been contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rupture between the powers. The French have given out, that the duke of Brunswick endeavoured to negociate some name and place or the captive king, amongst the murderers and proscribers of those who have lost their all for his cause. Even this has not been denied.

It is singular, and, indeed, a thing, under all ts circumstances, inconceivable, that every thing should by the emperour be abandoned to the king of Prussia. That monarch was considered as principal. In the nature of things, as well as in his position with regard to the war, he was only in ally; and a new ally, with crossing interests in many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At best, and supposing him to act with the greatest fidelity, the emperour and the empire, to him, must be but secondary objects. Countries out of Germany must affect him in a still more remote manner. France, other than from the fear of its doctrinal principles, can to him be no object at all.

Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiss, are left to their fate. The king of Prussia has no direct and immediate concern with France; consequentially, to be sure, a great deal: but the emperour touches France directly in many parts: he is a near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milanese territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, possessed by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Prussia's territories on the Lower Rhine. The emperour is the natural guardian of Italy and Germany; the natural balance against the ambition of France, whether republican or monarchical. His ministers and his generals, therefore, ought to have had their full share in every material consultation, which I suspect they had not. If he has no minister capable of plans of policy, which comprehend the superintendency of a war, or no general with the least of a political head, things have been as they must be. However, in all the parts of this strange proceeding, there must be a secret.

It is probably known to ministers. I do not mean to penetrate into it. My speculations on this head must be only conjectural. If the king of Prussia under the pretext, or on the reality, of some information relative to ill practice on the part of the court of Vienna, takes advantage of his being admitted into the heart of the emperour's dominions in the character of an ally, afterwards, to join the common enemy, and to enable France to seize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, any thing more alarming for this country, separately, and as a part of the general system. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of politicks, for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumstances-But I never knew accidents to decide the whole of any great business; and I never knew temper to act, but that some system of politicks, agreeable to its peculiar spirit, was blended with it, strengthened it, and got strength from it. Therefore the politicks can hardly be put out of the question.

Great mistakes have been committed: at least I hope so. If there have been none, the case in future is desperate. I have endeavoured to point out some of those which have occurred to me, and most of them very early.

Whatever may be the cause of the present state of things, on a full and mature view and comparison of the historical matter, of the transactions that have passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect, I think I am authorized to form an opinion without the least hesitation.

That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor ever can be, the least rational hope of making an impression on France by any continental powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the soul, of the whole confederacy against it.

This, so far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the whole tenour of former history In speculation it is to be accounted for on two plain principles.

First, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other powers, as having less of crossing interest, or perplexed discussion with any of them.

Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with any of these continental sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime power, greatly superiour to them all put together; a force which is only to be kept in check by England.

England, except during the eccentrick aberration of Charles the Second, has always considered it as her duty and interest to take her place in such a confederacy. Her chief disputes must ever be with France, and if England shews herself indifferent and unconcerned when these powers are combined against the enterprises of France, she is to look with certainty for the same indifference on the part of these powers, when she may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to disconnect this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which, if she ought not rashly to meddle, she ought never wholly to withdraw herself from it.

If then England is put in motion, whether by a consideration of the general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new system on the Netherlands, it must embrace in its project the whole as much as possible, and the part it takes ought to be as much as possible, a leading and presiding part.

I therefore beg leave to suggest,

First, that a minister should forthwith be sent to Spain, to encourage that court to persevere in the measures they have adopted against France; to make a close alliance and guarantee of possessions, as against France, with that power, and, whilst the formality of the treaty is pending, to assure them of our protection, postponing any lesser disputes to another occasion.

Secondly, To assure the court of Vienna, of our desire to enter into our ancient connexions with her, and to support her effectually in the war which France has declared against her.

Thirdly, to animate the Swiss, and the king of Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on the principles of the grand alliance.

Fourthly, To put an end to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to forget the past. I believe if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she will return to her old sentiments, with regard to this court, and will take a more forward part in this business than any other power.

Seventhly, to acknowledge the king of France's next brother, (assisted by such a council and such representatives of the kingdom of France, as shail be thought proper,) regent of France, and to send that prince a small supply of money, arms, cloathing, and artillery.

Eighthly, To give force to these negociations, an instant naval armament ought to be adopted; one squadron for the Mediterranean; another for the Channel. The season is convenient, most of ou trade being, as I take it, at home.

After speaking of a plan formed upon the ancient policy and practice of Great Britain, and s Europe; to which this is exactly conformable = every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is, I conceive, much more strongly called f by the present circumstances than by any forme, I must take notice of another which I fear, ba cannot persuade myself to believe, is in agitation This plan is grounded upon the very same view of things which is here stated, namely, the danger v all sovereigns, and old republicks, from the preva lence of French power and influence.

It is to form a congress of all the Europea powers, for the purpose of a general defense alliance, the objects of which should be,

First, The recognition of this new republi (which they well know is formed on the principles. and for the declared purpose of the destruction x all kings,) and, whenever the heads of this republick shall consent to release the royal ca tives, to make peace with them.

Secondly, To defend themselves with their jo forces against the open aggressions or the secto practices, intrigues, and writings, which are use. to propagate the French principles.

It is easy to discover from whose shop this comodity comes. It is so perfectly absurd, tha: that, or any thing like it, meets with a serious tertainment in any cabinet, I should think it effect of what is called a judicial blindness, i certain forerunner of the destruction of all crows and kingdoms.

Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our court, and of our then allied powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as she can by sea, and to make some addition by land.

mitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, iss contrary to human nature, and the course of huma affairs, that I am persuaded no person in his senses. except those whose country, religion, and sovere are deposited in the French funds, could dra of it. There is not the slightest petty boundary suit, no difference between a family arrangeme no sort of misunderstanding, or cross purp between the pride and etiquette of courts, would not entirely disjoint this sort of alia

and render it as futile in its effects, as it is feeble in its principle. But when we consider that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine, and evil example, in the success of unprovoked rebellion, regicide, and systematick assassination and massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the rest follows of course. How far the interiour circumstances of this country support what is said with regard to its foreign politicks, must be left to better judgments. I am sure the French faction here is infinitely strengthened by the success of the assassins on the other side of the water. This evil in the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that center, or 10 part of the circumference can be free from the nischief which radiates from it, and which will spread circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little lefensive precautions which can be employed gainst them.

I do not put my name to these hints submitted o the consideration of reflecting men. It is of

too little importance to suppose the name of the writer could add any weight to the state of things contained in this paper. That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the English constitution ought no more to stand against it than the ancient constitution of the kingdom in which the new system prevails. I thought it the duty of a man, not unconcerned for the publick, and who is a faithful subject of the king, respectfully to submit this state of facts as this new step in the progress of the French arms and politicks, to His Majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those persons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character, and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me to have a large stake in the stability of the ancient order of things.

Bath, November 5, 1792.